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Abstract 
I present a quantitative model which accounts for changes in occupational wages, occupational 
employment shares, and the overall wage distribution. The model reproduces numerous aspects of US 
cross sectional data observed from 1979 to 2010, notably job and wage polarization. Decompositions 
reveal changes in production complementarities to be crucial but insufficient to replicate the observed 
occupational and wage changes. The distribution of worker skills, sorting, and the distribution of skill 
demands all play pivotal roles. The model indicates skill demands polarized over these three decades, 
shifting demand away from middle-skilled towards high and ‒ to a lesser extent ‒ low-skilled 
occupations. I find that industry trends, technological progress, and trade account for up to 57% of 
changes in skill demands. Information and communications technology spurred demand for jobs 
requiring interpersonal and social skills in the 1990s. This development appears far more pivotal than 
the automation of routine jobs concentrated in the manufacturing and construction sectors. 
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1 Introduction
The US labor market has undergone major changes over the past few decades, affecting what jobs workers do
and what their jobs pay. These changes include greater differences in pay (rising wage inequality) and more
jobs in high and low-pay occupations versus middle-pay occupations (job polarization). Evidence suggests
labor demand-shifting factors ranging from technological change to globalization explain both phenomena.
However, changes in occupations and wages sometimes appear counter to these demand-side explanations.
For instance, low-paid workers’ wages fell relative to the median wage in the 1980s but rose relative to the
median in the 1990s. If relative demand shifts drive these wage changes, then we might also expect to see a
relative drop in low-paid occupational employment in the 1980s and rise in the 1990s. However, occupational
employment changes looked similar in both decades even though wages changes did not.1 This paper aims to
reconcile changes in the occupational structure (average wages and employment) and the wage distribution.
In doing so, I estimate a job search model to match these changes from 1979 to 2010. I use the model to
infer the underlying shifts in demand which took place and distill which economic forces account for these
shifts.
Importantly, we cannot directly observe the skill demands underlying the occupational and wage dis-
tributions. We most readily observe equilibrium job allocations and wages. A model of job selection can
isolate changes in skill demand and reconcile wage and occupational patterns. For example, Autor and Dorn
(2013) show clerical employment correlates negatively with the risk of a machine replacing the worker, how-
ever clerical wages correlate positively with this risk. This pattern seemingly contradicts the narrative that
labor-saving technology lowered labor demand in automatable occupations, causing their wages and employ-
ment to decline. Based on this narrative, we expect clerical employment and wages to correlate negatively
with automation risk. However, selection effects can make sense of a positive correlation for wages. If the
most productive workers stay in this occupation as demand falls, then average wages may rise. This example
shows how a model of job selection might reconcile counterintuitive changes in occupational employment
and wages.
The static, competitive Roy (1951) model provides a strong foundation to model job selection but misses
out on a rich set of forces which shape wages and the allocation of jobs. In particular, dynamic incentives and
labor market search frictions alter the composition and quality of jobs accepted as well as the distribution of
earnings across workers even in the same occupation. For example, labor-saving technology increases the risk
of job loss for some workers. Employers may increase the wages of workers who anticipate being replaced by
a machine to incentivize them to remain at the job despite increasing unemployment risk.2 The static Roy
model misconstrues such wage increases arising from dynamic incentives. Ignoring such forces may lead to
different conclusions regarding how skill demand changed and what drove said change. We cannot directly
observe such dynamic tradeoffs, but a model can parse their influence. This paper contributes by presenting
a quantitative model rich enough to capture these forces, reconciles wage and occupational changes, and yet
remains simple enough to estimate with commonly available data.
Several key challenges emerge when considering a model of job selection and wage setting in this context.
First, we must specify what mechanisms allocate workers to jobs and determine their pay in equilibrium.
Conclusions about how skill demands changed may differ depending on what mechanisms set wages and
allocate workers to jobs. Second, occupations pose a severe computational burden, because there are so
many of them. The Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT) holds over 12,000 occupational titles. Third,
1See Lefter and Sand (2011); Mishel, Schmitt, and Shierholz (2013)
2E.g. Kredler (2014).
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changes to skill demands, skill supply, and productivity remain unobserved. We must make inference about
these objects. The model I employ enriches the Roy framework in just enough ways to overcome each of
these challenges.
I build on a state-of-the-art model developed by Lise and Postel-Vinay (2016). Workers and employers
search and match in the labor market. Those who meet decide whether to form an employer-employee
relationship and bargain to determine wages. Workers make decisions today knowing their decision will
affect their position in the labor market tomorrow. They possess heterogeneous, multidimensional skills and
use their skills to perform tasks of varying complexity in manual and cognitive dimensions. These tasks
define occupations. Tasks reduce the dimensional space of occupations, facilitating the inclusion of variety of
occupations in structural estimation. Task complexity characterizes the skill level needed to perform a task.
Naturally, differences between the worker’s skill level and a job’s task complexity characterize skill mismatch
(i.e. over/under-qualification). This concept provides a natural framework to analyze job selection. Some
workers lack the skill level needed in some dimension for a job but others have it. Wages guide workers away
from jobs they perform poorly. The model shares the above features with Lise and Postel-Vinay (2016) but
in contrast features changes in productivity and the distribution of skill requirements (i.e. skill demands)
over time. We cannot fully observe productivity or the distribution of skills demanded or supplied in the
data. However, the model imposes enough structure on the data to allow us to draw inference on these latent
objects. I discipline the model’s parameters using cross-sectional and longitudinal-based moments from US
micro data.
The estimated model reproduces numerous aspects of US cross sectional data observed from 1979 to 2010.
These aspects include decadal changes in employment shares and average wages across occupational groups
and the rise in wage dispersion. The model also replicates the varying patterns of inequality expansion (1980s,
2000s) and contraction (1990s) at the bottom half of the wage distribution. Given a good model fit, I perform
a series of decompositions to dissect how the model reconciles occupational and wage changes. The model
sheds light on what circumstances led to wage polarization in the 1990s despite consistent job polarization.
Job polarization refers to a rise in the employment shares of low and high-skilled occupations at the expensive
of medium-skilled occupations. Wage polarization refers to wage compression in the wage distribution below
the median and expansion above it. The model infers that production technology shifted away from general
skills to specific skills (e.g. cognitive, manual) in the 1980s and then away from manual skills towards
cognitive skills in the 1990s, causing wage polarization during this period. Throughout, the distribution of
skill demands shifts from manually complex to cognitively complex tasks, causing job polarization. Changes
in the distribution of skill endowments and skill demands are just as important as changes in productivity to
match occupational and wage changes. Selection effects play a major role in replicating the data. Estimates
of changes in skill demands noticeably differ depending on the agents’ horizon of foresight over future changes
in productivity and skill demands.
The model permits comparisons of prominent explanations for skill demand shifts and leads to insight
about what forces drove changes in skill demand over the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s. The literature on wage
inequality and job polarization propose an array of explanations behind shifts in labor demand ranging from
the adoption of labor-saving technology (automation) to increased access to cheap labor abroad (offshoring).3
Classical, closed economy determinants of labor demand include technology (neutral vs. labor-augmenting
vs. capital-augmenting) and the price of physical capital. Open economy considerations include the relative
price of import goods, i.e. import competition. I take these prominent factors and examine how well they
3This literature is too large to survey here. Autor (2015) extensively surveys technological change.
3
account for changes in the distribution of skill demands.
Two major issues arise in attempting to evaluate these explanations. First, we often observe either limited
or low frequency data regarding technological change. For example, we observe different types of capital
adoption (e.g. machinery versus transport equipment) annually in cases where we observe them over a long
horizon (10+ years). Low range or low frequency time series data make distinguishing between genuine and
spurious correlations challenging. I exploit cross-sectional variation in task complexity between occupations
and variation in industry concentration across occupations to overcome this challenge. Second, it remains
unclear in many studies how much the factors explored contribute to changes in the occupational and wage
distributions at the national level. These studies typically exploit cross sectional variation at the country,
industry, firm and local area levels.4 Studies exploiting variation at the cross-country level do not speak
to particular national experiences. Aggregating effects across industries, firms, or local areas is non-trivial,
because demand-shifting factors can induce broad, national-level general equilibrium responses like labor
reallocation across sectors or spending multiplier effects.5 These effects may amplify or dampen the overall
demand impact of any given factor, which summing up local effects may fail to capture.6 I take an agnostic
stance on how skill demands shifted and use the model to estimate them. The model presents a picture of
what happened to skill demands nationally as it represents the whole of the US labor market from 1979 to
2010, circumventing this second challenge.
I perform variance decompositions to measure the contribution of the prominent explanations put for-
ward to explain changes in the distribution of skill demands. First, I consider measures of task content to
examine what job characteristics not modeled account for skill demand shifts. Task content differs from task
complexity. For example, sales and craftsmen jobs require a medium level of cognitive skills even though the
content of each job differs greatly. I map cognitive and manual task complexity in the model to occupational
task content in the data. I find that demand increased mainly in task areas that require interpersonal skills
like negotiation and persuasion. Meanwhile, demand decreased mainly in areas populated with automatable
(i.e. “routine”) tasks. However, this risk of automation has little explanatory power after controlling for
manufacturing and construction industry trends. In contrast, demand growth in interpersonal task areas
remains a large explanatory factor for demand shifts even after controlling for industry trends. Jobs more
vulnerable to being shipped overseas (i.e. offshored) actually increased in demand on average in the 1990s,
all else equal. These jobs include ones which require high cognitive skills but little face-to-face contact
like economists and accountants. Next, I measure the contribution of industry trends, capital adoption (to
capture technological change), and import competition from China. Decompositions show information and
communications technology (ICT) drove changes in skill demands in the 1990s to a large extent. This evi-
dence supports the narrative that ICT developments spurred much demand for jobs requiring interpersonal
and social skills. Machinery and transport equipment adoption provide some explanatory power for changes
in the 1980s, while drivers of demand in the 2000s remain more mixed. Overall, industry trends and tech-
nological progress explain much of the shifts in skill demands, yet a sizable portion (43%) of these changes
remain unexplained.
4Firpo, Fortin, and Lemieux (2011) provide a notable exception, however they only look at the impact of some factors on
the overall wage distribution − not the occupational employment or occupational wages.
5Reallocation refers to labor moving to other area in response to a negative shock. Multiplier effects refer to Keynesian-type
spending multipliers.
6Acemoglu, Autor, Dorn, Hanson, and Price (2016) argue reallocation and multiplier effects on labor demand caused by
increased Chinese import competition take place mostly within local areas and thus aggregating local area effects reflects the
national impact.
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1.1 Connected Literature
This paper relates to several dense and interconnected literatures. The challenges mentioned provide an
organizing principal to parse this dense literature and place this paper into context.
Determining the endogenous allocation of workers to jobs dates back to Roy (1951) whose model remains
widely used to frame the endogenous allocation of workers to jobs (Boehm, 2017; Autor and Dorn, 2013;
Autor and Handel, 2013; Yamaguchi, 2012). In a standard Roy model, workers possess specific heterogeneous
skills, and competitive skill prices allocate workers across jobs. While a good foundation, this setup ignores
dynamic decision making and labor market imperfections. Consequently, the Roy model mischaracterizes a
set of rich and potentially important outcomes surrounding occupational choice which the dynamic, structural
model here captures. Work dating back to Willis and Rosen (1979) supports the notion that workers make
dynamic career decisions, forecasting their future earnings to make schooling and occupational choices.7
Dynamic decisions change selection and wage setting incentives in the presence specific human capital. For
example, Chari and Hopenhayn (1991) show wages in declining “vintages” (e.g. manufacturing jobs) face
countervailing pressures in the presence of specific human capital. On one hand, new hires need an incentive
to acquire and maintain specific skills in a job which has increasingly less productive value elsewhere and
high risk of layoff. This pressures employers to pay higher starting wages to fill vacancies. On the other
hand, older workers become stuck in this occupation over time, so the employer need not compensate them
as much to stay.8 Average wages in the occupation may rise if the former force dominates. The Roy model
can only reconcile wage increases with higher demand or selection of better workers into the job. Neither
need occur in this example. The interaction between labor market imperfections and dynamic considerations
(i.e. the inability to easily move to a new job) drive wage dynamics here. Thus, the competitive lens of the
Roy model misinterprets this scenario.
Task-specific, heterogeneous human capital provides a way to incorporate occupations without a heavy
computational burden and model unobserved skill evolution. Task-specific means this human capital only
helps perform a specific task. Workers differ in their stock of human capital, making it heterogeneous. Task-
specific human capital emerged in the job/wage polarization literature to explain non-monotone changes
across the wage distribution (Acemoglu and Autor, 2011). Papers apply this framework to understand
phenomena like occupational mobility (Sanders, 2016) and why skills reward differently across occupations
(Yamaguchi, 2012).9 Even more papers use it in the Roy occupational choice framework to explain the drivers
of job and wage polarization. Datasets like The Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT) and O*NET provide
information on tasks to estimate this class of models, while datasets like the National Longitudinal Survey
of Youth (NLSY) provides information to estimate pre-labor market entry skills which evolve according to
the model. The model here adopts this framework.
Structural and reduced form literatures provide differing ways to deal with unobserved skill demand
and supply. In the structural literature, Lindenlaub (2017) estimates the static, competitive equilibrium
of a multidimensional assignment model. Task, skill, and wage data identify skill supply and demand as
well as productivity in the model. She then uses the model to explain wage changes over the 1990s and
2000s. Changes in production technology parameters come as an unanticipated shock and wages fully
adjust. The model provides valuable insights into the mechanics of wage polarization where workers may
7E.g. Keane and Wolpin (1997); Heckman, Lochner, and Taber (1998). Dynamic decisions refers to the feature that workers
take the future into account for their decision today. It seems unlikely workers suddenly become myopic entering the labor
market.
8Their skills are specific and increasingly less valued elsewhere.
9Sanders and Taber (2012) provide an extensive overview of this literature.
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switch ranks. While useful to examine wage changes, the assignment equilibrium of Lindenlaub (2017)
remains unsuitable to address job polarization or other changes in the occupational structure.10 Changes in
production complementarities drive wage polarization in this frictionless, static assignment model. However,
this frictional, dynamic model says changes in the distribution of skill supply and skill demand appear just
as important as changes in productivity when matching both occupational and wage changes.
I build directly on Lise and Postel-Vinay (2016). Their multidimensional skill, search model specifies how
skills evolve to gain insight on the role of skill accumulation and mismatch over a worker’s life cycle. There,
changes in the occupation structure only arise from job selection − not changes in the distribution of skill
requirements or productivity. The distribution of skill requirements and productivity parameters remain
fixed.11 They estimate their model to match moments in the NLSY1979 male cohort and examine the lose
due to skill mismatch. In contrast, I examine a transition path where the distribution of skill requirements
(i.e. demands) and productivity evolve and match moments on both the NLSY1979 cohort (to discipline
model parameters) and the cross-sectional distributions of wages and occupations over time.
The reduced form literature uses econometric techniques to identify demand shifts consistent with wage
and occupational changes. It takes equilibrium employment and wage outcomes as given and aims to sep-
arate out selection effects without estimating the underlying structural model.12 This literature proposes a
variety of demand shifting factors like import penetration and metrics for technology adoption to pin down
demand shifts. Papers exploit time-series, cross-sectional variation in these factors across firms (Bresnahan,
Brynjolfsson, and Hitt, 2002; Bartel, Ichniowski, and Shaw, 2007), industries (Autor, Katz, and Krueger,
1998), countries (Michaels, Natraj, and Van Reenen, 2014; Goos, Manning, and Salomons, 2014), and local
areas (Autor, Dorn, and Hanson, 2013; Autor and Dorn, 2013; Acemoglu and Restrepo, 2017). I view my
structural approach as complementary to this literature. It provides a comprehensive framework in which to
compare and contrast some of the demand-shifting economic forces that these papers present. The model’s
job selection mechanism makes the effect of changes in skill demands on wages ambiguous at both the indi-
vidual and occupational levels. This ambiguity allows the model to match seemingly contradictory changes
in employment and wages. Such ambiguity also exists in competitive models on the aggregate level like
Boehm (2017) and Kredler (2014). Boehm (2017) employs a static, perfectly competitive Roy model where
selection effects (also referred to as sorting) generate ambiguity at the aggregate level. Increased demand
for a task reallocates workers across jobs. Occupational wages may rise or fall depending on the skill dis-
tribution of the workers who move. In this paper, workers reallocate, but search and matching frictions
affect reallocation. Kredler (2014) employs a dynamic model of human capital and technological change.
Wage dynamics generate ambiguity at the occupational level.13 Wages rise as an occupation contracts to
compensate entering workers for a shorter career. Similarly, wages may rise as prospects of a job-to-job move
worsen in my environment. Experienced workers face wage loses as their skills become obsolete.14 All else
equal, average wages within an occupation may rise or fall with occupational contraction, depending on the
10See Footnote 57 in Lindenlaub (2017).
11An obvious way around this drawback is to estimate the equilibrium of the Lise and Postel-Vinay (2016) over sub-periods
where skill requirements and technology remain fixed. I show this estimation approach matches wages changes well but fails
to match wage and employment changes at the occupational level. It also precludes any analysis on the role of changing
expectations in job polarization and wage determination
12In contrast, the structural approach puts structure on selection effects and equilibrium outcomes, aiming to use the model
to make inference about the data.
13Kredler (2014) constructs a dynamic model based on the two-period model of Chari and Hopenhayn (1991).
14Their skills become obsolete, because human capital is specific to their occupation or vintage. Entering workers do not
possess as much occupation-specific human capital, so obsolescence does not drive down starting wages. In Kredler (2014),
human capital solely depends on the level of experience in an occupation or vintage whereas here it can also depend on work
history.
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distribution of entrants and experienced workers.
2 Model
2.1 The Environment
Time is discrete. The economy consists of workers and jobs. Workers enter and exit the labor market
exogenously. Workers may be employed, unemployed, or out of the labor force. They live finite lives and
possess human capital also referred to as skills. All workers possess a non-separable bundle of general,
cognitive and manual skills denoted by x ∈ X . Workers use their skills to do tasks. Cognitive and manual
skills are task-specific, meaning manual skills do not contribute to doing cognitive tasks and vice versa.
General skills affect the overall efficiency level doing any task. Skills reflect task complexity.15
Employers or firms offer a job as in the standard Mortensen-Pissarides framework (Mortensen and Pis-
sarides, 1999). A job consists of a non-separable bundle of cognitive and manual skill requirements (or
demands) denoted by y ∈ Y. Skill requirements differ according to the firm’s production technology. Work-
ers search for jobs and supply their skills to a firm with whom they match. Skill requirements reflect the task
complexity required for a job. Employers post job vacancies and draw skill requirements from the distribu-
tion F(y). Matched employers use their technology and the worker’s skills to produce output. Employers
pay workers wages thereby splitting the total value (or surplus) created from the worker-employer match.
f(x,y) is the flow value of output from a match between a worker with skills x and a firm requiring skills y
where f : X × Y → R+. c(x,y) is the flow disutility of labor for worker x at firm y where c : X × Y → R+.
b(x) is the flow utility of an unemployed worker x where b : X → R+. In what follows, the subscript of t
denotes that the function is time dependent.
Workers and firms have a common discount factor β˜. As mentioned, worker transitions in and out of the
labor force are exogenous. Workers entering the labor market at time t draw their skills from an exogenous
distribution Vt(x). Workers enter the labor market at time t, aged a and draw initial skills denoted by
x(0). They exit the labor market permanently with age-dependent probability ξa and exit with certainty
at age 65.16 The distribution of worker skills in the economy is denoted by Wt(x). The skill requirements
distribution, Ft(y), evolves exogenously whereas the worker skills distribution, Wt(x), evolves endogenously
when there is human capital evolution as I will describe shortly.
Workers and firms engage in random search in a single labor market. Employed and unemployed workers
encounter an employer in each period with probabilities Me,t and Mu,t, respectively. Given an encounter,
a job offer is drawn from the commonly known distribution F(y). Jobs may be destroyed with exogenous
probability δ. Enduring matches face a permanent productivity shock with probability ω where the firm
15Task-specific skills are coarser and more transferrable than occupation-specific skills. This task-specific framework based
on task complexity has two important advantages. First, the framework accomodates many occupations with a much smaller
number of parameters. With occupation-specific skills, the number of model parameters (e.g. productivity levels) increases
with each additional occupation. In contrast, this number does not grow with the number of occupations with task-specific
skills, allowing us to accomodate many occupations. Second, this framework provides a natural explanation for why different
occupations have similar pay. Similar pay is due to the similar complexity of the tasks these occupations require (Yamaguchi,
2012).
16In Cortes, Jaimovich, and Siu (2016), workers decide whether to enter the labor market before deciding where to work
and do not know their skill level ex-ante. They decide based the realization of a stochastic process and the expected returns
to working. Implicitly here, the worker entry-exit decision depends on age, a stochastic process, and mandatory retirement at
65. I use the corresponding reduced-form probabilities in this model. Explicitly, worker entry-exit may depend on factors like
the value of home production or leisure. Exogenous entry-exit probabilities will capture these decisions so long as the ex-ante
expected labor market return depends only on age. This will be the case if workers learn their specific skills only after entry.
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draws new skill requirements from F(y).17 Workers and firms take the distribution of skill requirements as
given at time t and forecast it over future dates.18 A worker’s task-specific skills at a job requiring skills y
evolve according the law of motion h : X × Y → X where
x(t+ 1) = h(x(t),y), (1)
thus (1) defines human capital (or skill) evolution at job y. I assume h satisfies the following:
lim
t→∞h(x(t),y) = y, (2)
lim
t→∞h(x(t),0) = x. (3)
(3) says the skills for unemployed workers (for whom y = 0) depreciate towards a lower bound (x) in the
support X as the duration of their unemployment spell grows. (2) defines learning-by-doing. A worker’s skills
converge to the skill requirements of the job as they spend time on-the-job. Workers with skills exceeding
those required lose their excess skill level over time, while workers learn skills on-the-job for which they
remain deficient. I call an employed worker over-qualified in a skill dimension when that worker’s skill level
exceeds the required skill level and under-qualified in a skill dimension when that skill level falls short of
the required skill for the job. With learning-by-doing, job selection determines human capital evolution,
because the job selected determines gains and loses of skill.19 Thus, the distribution of worker skills becomes
endogenous if h(x(t),y) 6= x ∀(x,y, t).
2.1.1 Timing
At the start of each period, the worker is employed, unemployed, or out of the labor force and their skills
have evolved accordingly. For an employed worker, the match breaks up exogenously with probability δ and
the worker leaves the work force with probability ξa. If still employed, then worker produces f(x,y) with
their current firm. Next, the worker meets a new employer with probability Me,t and then receives a job
offer (y). If a meeting occurs, the worker and potential employer decide whether to form the match and
then proceed to negotiate the split of the surplus. If they both accept the match, then the employed worker
starts the next period with the new employer, leaving the current employer. If the worker does not meet
an employer, then the current match may experience a permanent shock to skill requirements (w.p. ω). If
faced with the permanent shock, the employer and worker decide whether to remain matched or separate.20
The worker starts the next period unemployed in the case of a separation following the shock.
An unemployed worker (x) receives an exogenous utility flow b(x) at the start of the period. Next, the
worker meets an employer with probability Mu,t and then receives a job offer (y). If a meeting occurs, the
employer and worker decide whether to form the match and proceed to negotiate the split of the surplus.
If they both accept the match, then the newly employed worker starts the next period with the employer,
barring a separation or labor market exit at the start of the next period. If the match does not form or no
meeting takes place, then the worker stays unemployed the next period, barring a labor market exit at the
start of the next period. Workers out of the labor force exogenously enter as unemployed at the start of the
17The distribution of firm skill demands evolves exogenously. Although unmodelled, these skill requirements evolve with
technological change. I introduce technological innovation on-the-job through this permanent shock to skill requirements.
18I consider the cases where all agents have no foresight and perfect foresight over this distribution.
19Job selection is equivalent to task or occupational selection in this model, because the combination of tasks a worker selects
defines their occupation.
20Matches terminate mutually if the surplus falls below zero, so workers quitting is equivalent to employers firing them in
this model. The worker may quit to go into unemployment in order to search again with the meeting rate Mu,t.
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period.
At the start of each period, an unmatched employer posts a vacancy at cost τ and meets a worker with
probabilityMv,t. Upon meeting a worker, the employer draws skill requirements (y) and then decides whether
to form a match with the worker (x). If the match forms, then they negotiate the split of the surplus and
begin producing together the next period. Matched employers produce f(x,y) with the worker at the start
of each period and then engage in negotiations if the worker meets another employer who makes a poaching
offer. Matched employers whose workers do not meet another employer may experience a permanent shock
to skill requirements (w.p. ω). If faced with the permanent shock, the employer and worker decide whether
to remain matched or separate. Newly unmatched employers may post a vacancy tomorrow in the way
described or freely exit the labor market. Employers outside the labor market may freely enter at the start
of the period as an unmatched employer.
2.1.2 Bargaining Protocol
Workers and employers bargain over the total value (or surplus) generated by the match. The outcome of
this bargaining process determines the split of the surplus. The bargaining protocol follows the sequential
auction model of Cahuc, Postel-Vinay, and Robin (2006). Unemployed workers with bargaining power
λ ∈ [0, 1] bargain with employers à la Nash. Hence, unemployed workers take a share of the surplus equal
to λ. Employers attempting to poach employed workers compete with the worker’s current employer. If
an employed worker meets an employer offering skill requirements (y′), then the two employers engage in
Bertrand competition over the share of the surplus to give the worker. As result, the worker receives a value
equal to at least the surplus of the employer with whom the worker generates lower surplus. This value is
the worker’s outside option in the bargaining process. The worker and employer with higher surplus then
engage in Nash bargaining over the surplus amount exceeding the worker’s outside option. Thus, a job-to-job
transition only occurs when the surplus for the poaching employer exceeds that of the current employer.
To illustrate the process, let S(x,y) denote the surplus of a match of employer with skill requirements
y and worker with skills x. Let W (x,y, σ) denote the value the worker receives in the match and σ denote
the share of the surplus received. Suppose a meeting on-the-job occurs and S(x,y′) ≥ S(x,y) > W (x,y, σ)
so that the poaching employer with y′ generates higher surplus with the worker than the current employer.
The offer of y′ triggers a bidding war between the two employers, because the worker expects to gain
from renegotiating the wage contract, W (x,y, σ). The worker stands to gain in the case where S(x,y) >
W (x,y, σ). Bertrand competition causes employers y and y′ to bid until W = S(x,y) at which point
employer y loses the bidding war. Then, employer y′ and the worker Nash bargain over S(x,y′) − S(x,y)
where the worker has bargaining power λ. Hence, the share of the surplus for the worker at the new employer
(σ′) is
σ′ = σ(x,y′,y) =
λ[S(x,y′)− S(x,y)] + S(x,y)
S(x,y′)
= λ+ (1− λ) S(x,y)
S(x,y′)
∈ (0, 1]. (4)
The employed worker takes a value W (x,y′, σ′) equal to the lower surplus of the two employers plus a share
of the surplus gain from the job-to-job move.21 The corresponding worker’s surplus share consists of the
unemployed worker’s share (λ) and an additional amount generated by competition between the employers
for the worker.22
21I assume the share of the surplus stays constant until an on-the-job meeting triggers renegotiation. Assuming the share
stays constant until renegotiation does not affect mobility decisions but does affect the time profile of wage payments as Lise
and Postel-Vinay (2016) note. Total value (or surplus) determines mobility. I also assume unemployed workers accept job offers
when indifferent.
22I elaborate on the reasons for using this protocol in Appendix A.2.
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2.2 Worker’s Problem
Let zt denote the aggregate state variables Ft, ft, Me,t, and Mu,t. Let any function T (·; zt) be denoted
by Tt(·) and Et denote the expectation over zt+1.23 As mentioned, y denotes the skill requirements of the
current employer of a worker. y consists of cognitive (yc) and manual (ym) skill requirements. x denotes the
skills of the worker which evolve to x′ next period. x consists of cognitive skills (xc), manual skills (xm),
general skills (xg), and age (a). For workers, I define an age effective discount factor βa = β˜(1− ξa). Denote
the value functions for an unemployed and employed workers at time t as Ut(x) andWt(x,y, σ), respectively.
σ denotes the employed workers endogenous share of the total surplus. I denote the total surplus at time
t by St(x,y). I assume σ remains constant prior to renegotiation.24 Since the worker receives a constant
share σ of the surplus St(x,y), Wt(x,y, σ) = σSt(x,y) + Ut(x). I assume linear utility in wage income.25
An unemployed worker receives a flow income b(x). Thus, the unemployed worker’s value function Ut(x)
imposing the bargaining protocol solves
Ut(x) = b(x) + βaEtUt+1(x′) + βa(1− δ)λMu,tEt
∫
Y
max{0, St+1(x′,y)} dFt(y). (5)
where x′ = h(x,0) for xm and xc. The value of being unemployed consists of the flow income b(x), the
age-discounted present value of being unemployed tomorrow, and the present value of the expected share of
the surplus if the worker finds employment.
Let wt(x,y, σ) be the wage implementing the employed worker’s wage contract at time t. The employed
worker’s value function Wt(x,y, σ) given σ and imposing the bargaining protocol solves
Wt(x,y, σ) = wt(x,y, σ)− c(x,y) + βaEtUt+1(x′) + βa(1− δ)(1−Me,t)σEtS˜t+1(x′,y) +
βa(1− δ)Me,t ×
Et
∫
Y
max{σŜt+1(x′,y), Ŝt+1(x′,y) + λ[St+1(x′,y′)− Ŝt+1(x′,y)]}dFt(y′), (6)
where
Ŝt+1(x,y) = max{St+1(x,y), 0}
S˜t+1(x
′,y) =(1− ω)Ŝt+1(x′,y) + ω
∫
Y
max{St+1(x′,y′), 0}dFt(y′)
subject to (1). As in Hagedorn, Law, and Manovskii (2017), I assume a small offer writing cost  prevents
employers with lower surplus than the current employer from engaging in Bertrand competition if an on-
the-job meeting occurs so that σ′ = σ in equilibrium if S(x,y) ≥ S(x,y′) > W (x,y, σ).26 The value of
employment with firm y consists of the wage less disutility of labor, the present value of unemployment, and
the share of the surplus if the worker does or does not meet a firm while searching on-the-job or experiences
a permanent change to skill requirements after no meeting on-the-job.
23Thus, any function subscripted with t also has the argument zt.
24This assumption pins down wages in the model, because wages adjust to deliver this constant surplus split.
25I thereby assume risk neutrality for workers and firms. The assumption significantly increases the tractability of the model
at the cost of precluding any kind of meaningful welfare analysis.
26This restriction prevents bidding up of wages on-the-job in order to restrict attention to human capital in terms of producing
wage growth over job tenure in the model. An obvious extension would be to allow both human capital accumulation and bidding
up of the share of surplus on-the-job (so-called job shopping). In Appendix A.3, I show the wage and surplus function without
this restriction.
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2.3 Employer’s Problem
As described, an unmatched employer decides whether to post a vacancy at time t and then draws skill
requirements from Ft(y) if it meets a worker. Employers draw a new y at each worker meeting. Hence,
the value of a vacancy is the same for all unmatched employers ex-ante. Let τt be the cost of posting the
vacancy at time t and let Vt be the value of this vacancy posting. Let Pt(x,y, σ) be the value of producing
with a worker of type x and delivering surplus share σ. Let Ce,t be the probability of meeting an employed
worker and Cu,t be the probability of meeting an unemployed worker − all conditional on meeting a worker.
Then the value of a vacancy Vt solves
Vt = −τt + (1− δ)Mv,tCu,t(1− λ)Et
∫
Y
∫
X|u
βa max{0, St+1(x,y)}dFt(y)dWt(x|u) +
(1− δ)Mv,tCe,t(1− λ)×
Et
∫
Y
∫
Y×X|e
βa max{0, St+1(x,y)− Ŝt+1(x,y′)}dFt(y)dWt(x,y′|e) (7)
whereWt(x|u) andWt(x,y′|e) are the distributions of unemployed workers and employer-employee matches
at time t, respectively. I assume free entry of employers which drives the value of vacancy to zero so that
τt = (1− δ)Mv,tCu,t(1− λ)Et
∫
Y
∫
X|u
βa max{0, St+1(x,y)}dFt(y)dWt(x|u) +
(1− δ)Mv,tCe,t(1− λ)×
Et
∫
Y
∫
Y×X|e
βa max{0, St+1(x,y)− Ŝt+1(x,y′)}dFt(y)dWt(x,y′|e). (8)
Alternative assumptions on free entry and the timing when employers learn their types are possible27, however
I choose this timing and the free entry assumption for tractability as in Lise and Postel-Vinay (2016).
The value of producing solves
Pt(x,y, σ) = ft(x,y)− wt(x,y, σ) + βa(1− δ)(1−Me,t)(1− σ)EtS˜t+1(x′,y) +
β(1− δ)Me,tEt
[
max{0, (1− σ)St+1(x′,y)} · ρ(x,y)
]
(9)
where
ρ(x,y) =
∫
Y
1{St+1(x′, y˜) < St+1(x′,y)}dFt(y˜)
subject to (1). ρ(x,y) is the probability the worker at y does not draw an employer with higher surplus.28
The matched employer receives output less wages and the share of the surplus from producing next period
which depends on whether or not another employer poaches the worker. If the worker does not meet another
employer, then the current employer draws new skill requirements (w.p. ω).29 Pt(x,y, σ) = (1−σ)St(x,y)+
Vt since the employer takes a constant share of the surplus,. It follows that the total surplus of a match
(x,y) is
St(x,y) = Wt(x,y, σ)− Ut(x)︸ ︷︷ ︸
σSt(x,y)
+Pt(x,y, σ)− Vt︸ ︷︷ ︸
(1−σ)St(x,y)
. (10)
27See Hagedorn, Law, and Manovskii (2017). However, their model is one dimensional, and the distribution of y is normalized
to uniform for identification. This model does not impose these restrictions.
28
1{·} denotes the indicator function.
29The match only draws new skill requirements if the worker does not meet another employer. I impose this structure to
make the model more tractable in terms of solving for the surplus.
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2.4 Surplus, Wages, and Equilibrium Concept
Now we can derive the surplus function using (5), (6), (9), and the free entry assumption which implies that
Vt equals zero. Given meet probabilities, we can also solve St(x,y) backwards, because βa = 0 (ξa = 1)
for workers aged 65 and older. These workers leave the labor force due to mandatory retirement as stated
earlier. The surplus for a match where the worker retires next period is
St(x,y) = ft(x,y)− c(x,y)− b(x) (11)
which is just the static flow of the surplus. For non-retiring workers, the surplus is
St(x,y) = ft(x,y)− c(x,y)− b(x) + βa(1− δ)Et
[
− λMu,t
∫
Y
max{0, St+1(x′, y˜)} dFt(y˜) +(
1−Me,t
)
S˜t+1(x
′,y) +Me,t · ρ(x,y) ·max{0, St+1(x′,y)}+
Me,t · (1− ρ(x,y)) ·
[
Ŝt+1(x
′,y) + λ
(
S¯t+1(x
′,y)− Ŝt+1(x′,y)
)]]
, (12)
S¯t+1(x
′,y) =
∫
Y
1{Ŝt+1(x′,y) < St+1(x′, y˜)} · St+1(x′, y˜) dFt(y˜)∫
Y
1{Ŝt+1(x′,y) < St+1(x′, y˜)}dFt(y˜)
.
Assuming the match survives to next period (w.p. 1 − δ), the surplus consists of the static flow and the
continuation value. The continuation value consists of four terms. The first term reflects that the worker can
quit and search again as an unemployed worker and expects to obtain the value shown. It enters negatively
into the surplus, because the incentive to form the match falls if the worker’s incentive to quit the next
period rises. The second and third terms consist of two parts. The first part is the probability that the
worker does not leave the match. The worker only stays if 1) a meeting does not place (w.p. 1 −Me,t)
or 2) a meeting takes place but the poaching employer draws skill requirements that do not deliver higher
surplus (w.p. Me,tρ) given the worker’s x. The second part is the surplus next period, barring a mutual
separation due to a negative match surplus. Thus, the second and third terms are the value coming from the
expectation to remain in the match. Naturally, the fourth term is the value coming from the expectation to
leave the match for another job. Me,t(1− ρ(x,y)) is the probability of meeting an employer who draws skill
requirements that deliver a higher surplus for the worker’s x. The second part of this last term consists of
the expected value the worker obtains from transitioning to a new employer.
(12) shows how the distribution of skill requirements and other parameters governing the surplus affect
the total value of a match and consequently match formation and continuation. The worker and the employer
care about who the worker can meet next, because some of the total gain from a job-to-job move goes to the
worker. The employer extracts some of that gain today. This potential gain affects the current surplus and
in turn affects match formation and match continuation.30 Thus, expected changes in Ft(y) due to drivers
of job polarization also influence current job selection through the value of a potential or current match.
The effect of changes in Ft(y) on the value of a match are generally ambiguous. Let us refer to the
probability of drawing a better match in terms of surplus (1 − ρ) as the worker’s job prospects.31 Suppose
30I use match formation and job selection interchangeably. The employer and worker do not care about who the employer
can meet next except vis-à-vis the option value of the employer searching again (i.e. the value of a vacancy). Employers do not
search for replacement employees on-the-job as workers search for new employers. Employers searching on-the-job to replace
the worker adds an additional and potentially interesting layer of complexity that I do not take on here.
31Better also refers to cases where surplus is at least as good.
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ω is zero and Ft changes once permanently such that ρ(x∗,y∗) rises for the worker x∗ at employer y∗.
In other words, the worker x∗’s job prospects worsen at the current employer y∗. This change lowers the
option value of searching again as an unemployed worker and increases the value of continuing the match
tomorrow. Both of which increase the surplus. Intuitively, the current match becomes more valuable to
the worker as job prospects worsen. However, worsening prospects ambiguously affect the expected value
from leaving to a better job. It lowers the probability of the worker finding a better match (1 − ρ), but it
may increase or decrease the expected value of a new match, S¯t+1. This effect depends on how F changes.
Suppose the probability mass on matches with the highest surplus for x∗ move to matches with the lowest
surplus, then S¯t+1 falls. In this case, the expected value from leaving the current match falls, lowering the
value of the current match. This effect offsets the increase from the first three continuation terms. Thus,
worsening job prospects have an ambiguous effect on the value of a match. Hence, we cannot determine a
priori the selection effects of a change in Ft(y). Intuitively, this effect should be ambiguous. Worsening job
opportunities make a job both more valuable and less valuable. A job becomes more valuable when finding
a better one becomes more difficult, but a lack of future opportunities makes the job less valuable. These
opposing considerations complicate predicting the allocative impact of job-polarizing skill requirements.
An employer delivers the worker’s share of the surplus through wages. Combining (12), Wt(x,y, σ) =
σSt(x,y) + Ut(x), and substituting in (6) produces the following wage equation
wt(x,y, σ) = σft(x,y) + (1− σ)c(x,y) + (1− σ)b(x) + (1− σ)βa(1− δ)×
Et
[
λMu,t
∫
Y
max{0, St+1(x′,y)} dFt(y)−
Me,t · (1− ρ(x,y))
(
λS¯t+1(x
′,y) + (1− λ)Ŝt+1(x′,y)
)]
. (13)
The first three terms consist of the worker’s share of the static surplus (11) plus the labor disutility, c(x,y),
and outside option, b(x), flows. The potential gains from a transition to unemployment and a transition
to another employer make up the continuation value’s wage contribution. The wage increases with the
attractiveness of unemployment in order to deliver the share of the surplus promised and sustain the match.
The attractiveness of unemployment increases in the probability of meeting a new employer (Mu,t) and
the expected surplus associated with this meeting. The wage falls as the potential gains from a job-to-job
transition increase. In this manner, the employer extracts some of the surplus gain from potential job-to-job
moves. An increase in potential job-to-job transition gains arises due to either a higher meeting rate on-the-
job (Me,t), better job prospects in terms of potential matches (1 − ρ), higher future surplus at the current
job (Ŝ), or higher expected future surplus elsewhere (S¯). Deteriorating job prospects for the worker due to
a fall in 1− ρ, S¯, or Ŝ increase the wage.
(13) does not yield unambiguous predictions for wage changes at the individual or aggregate level if F
changes. Consider an economy with only two occupations with skill requirements yˆ and y˜, respectively, and
a set of workers whose skills are such that surplus is highest with their current employer. Then, a fall in
the probability mass on yˆ decreases 1 − ρ and S¯ and thus increases the wage for a worker at employer yˆ.
However, the gains from an employment to unemployment transition fall, thus decreasing the wage for this
worker and offsetting the increase just described. In this manner, the contraction of an occupation puts
upward pressure on wages, but wages in the occupation may rise or fall. The wage effect for an individual
depends on which change in the continuation value dominates. Naturally, the effect on average wages within
an occupation depend on the distribution of the individuals within the occupation and how their individual
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changes aggregate.
2.4.1 Equilibrium Concept
We can now consider an equilibrium for this model. I focus on an equilibrium concept where the economy
transitions from one steady state in 1979 to another in 2010. This equilibrium path is the outcome of decen-
tralized, optimal individual behavior over time given beliefs about objects that change over time and taking
others behavior as given. A transition path equilibrium allows changes in skill requirements and productivity
over time, which generate changes in the equilibrium wage distribution and occupational structure. Skill
requirements or demands, Ft(y), evolve over time to produce job polarization in this model.32 Productivity
evolves (ft) over time and contributes to changes in wage outcomes and changes in the occupational structure
through sorting (also referred to as selection effects).
In this model, workers and employers must form beliefs over how these skill demands will evolve in
order to make decisions about what matches to form and determine wages. The two most straightforward
albeit extreme cases are perfect foresight and no anticipation. Under perfect foresight, all agents know the
entire path {Ft(y)}Tt=0 and {ft(x,y)}Tt=0 (i.e. zt) following an unanticipated change at time 0. Under no
anticipation, changes in zt surprise all agents each period and zt remains their best guess of zt+1. Comparing
these cases provides insight on the importance of expectations over the future demand for an occupation in
job selection and wage determination.
In Appendix A.5, I define the general rational expectations equilibrium and explain the difficulties in
solving for it outside of a steady state.33 I then make the case for this more restrictive but more easily solved
partial equilibrium, which I use to take the model to the data. Here, I provide the definition. A partial
equilibrium must consist of the solutions to (5), (6), and (9) which characterize equilibrium wages (13) given
that free entry assumption drives equilibrium Vt (7) to zero.
Definition 2.1 (Partial Equilibrium Path).
Given {zt}Tt=0, the tuple {Ut(x),Wt(x,y, σ), Pt(x,y, σ), Vt, wt(x,y, σ)} form a partial equilibrium path from
time 0 to time T if the following hold.
1. (5), (6), and (9) solve Ut(x), Wt(x,y, σ), and Pt(x,y, σ), respectively
2. wt(x,y, σ) satisfies (13) for all employed workers
3. Vt = 0 at every period t by (8) [Free Entry]
4. Agents hold beliefs over the path of {zt}Tt=0, i.e. {Ft(y)}Tt=0 and {ft(x,y)}Tt=0
Solving this equilibrium amounts to backwards solving (12) from (11) at time T back to time 0 when the
unanticipated changes to zt hit. If the agents’ beliefs coincide with the actual paths of Ft and ft, then it
can be a considered a rational partial equilibrium path.
3 Data
Use of the task framework became popular with Autor, Levy, and Murnane well over a decade ago. Naturally,
the datasets used to analyze the task content of occupations in the US are well-known, well-documented, and
32But not just job polarization. Ft(y) also affects the wage distribution.
33Exogenous meeting rates make the equilibrium partial. Appendix A.5 endogenizes the meeting rates to show the general
equilibrium.
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widely used now. These datasets include the Current Population Survey (CPS) and National Longitudinal
Survey of Youth (NLSY) for workforce data over time and the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT)
and the Occupational Information Network (O*NET) for task content and complexity information. Esti-
mating the model requires time-varying information on hourly wages, employment shares and wages across
occupations, the equilibrium distribution of y, and the distribution of initial worker skill endowments. The
aforementioned datasets provide a means to obtain this information.
3.1 Wages and Employment Shares
Changes in the wage distribution and employment shares provide variation to estimate productivity parame-
ters and the distribution of skill requirements. I use the CPS to measure changes across the wage distribution
and employment shares from 1979 to 2010. I draw on the Outgoing Rotation Group (ORG) of the CPS to do
so. The CPS ORG consists of roughly a quarter of the monthly CPS administered by the US Census Bureau.
The Bureau interviews households for 4 months, rotates them out of the survey for 8 months, and rotates
them back into the survey for a final 4 months. The ORG consists of individuals interviewed in the last
month of each rotation and provides point-in-time measurements of wages for most workers. The March CPS
Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC) provides household income and demographic data used
extensively to study income inequality.34 However, the March supplement does not provide point-in-time
measures of hourly wages in contrast to the CPS ORG questions. This point-in-time measurement makes the
quality of wage data in the ORG considerably higher than the ASEC (Lemieux, 2006). From the CPS ORG,
I pool monthly observations to construct an annual dataset of hourly wages, occupations, and demographic
information. I provide detailed information on dataset construction, occupational harmonization, sample
restrictions, and summary statistics in Appendix B.1.
I estimate the model at the level of hourly wages for several reasons. First, the model does not have an
intensive margin with respect to labor supply (i.e. hours worked). Hourly wages better reflects changes in
productivity and skill requirements solely due to changes on the extensive margin. Second, most workers
(approximately 60%) in the economy receive hourly pay rates. The number of workers receiving hourly
pay rates has also remained stable around 60% since 1979.35 Examining wages and not total compensation
raises the concern that perhaps changes in non-wage benefits rather than productivity or skill requirements
explain changes across the wage distribution. The share of non-wage compensation has arguably increased as
shown in Sherk (2013), however the vast majority (approximately 80%) of total compensation still consists of
wages according to macro-level data. Available evidence suggests wages well reflect changes in the economic
returns to a job even in the presence of non-wage benefits (Katz and Autor, 1999). The lack of extensive
individual-level data on compensation composition over time makes it difficult to say whether increased
non-wage benefits account for wage polarization and expansion. Katz and Autor (1999) argue from available
evidence at the time that non-wage benefits actually tend to reinforce rather than offset changes in the wage
distribution we observe over the 80s and 90s.36 Thus, I judge hourly wages to be a fair metric on which to
34See Heathcote, Perri, and Violante (2010) for example.
35See Table 10 of Bureau of Labor Statistics (2016).
36Thus, implementing this model with wage data is not necessarily misleading despite missing out on developments that
affect non-wage compensation like healthcare costs. Wages still contain information on productivity and skill requirement
developments, which I make inference on using indirect inference as opposed to an exact identification strategy. One could
argue that employers and workers only care about total compensation and not wages. Therefore, wages only carry partial
information regarding pay and job selection. This argument rests on the assumption that the employer can fully adjust the
composition of total compensation. If benefits come in standardized packages for example, then the employers will not be
neutral to the wage-benefit composition at the individual level. Recent evidence from Eriksson and Kristensen (2014) suggests
employers as well as employees face a nontrivial trade off in determining wages and non-wage benefits. The presence of such a
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Figure 1: Wage Percentile Changes (1979 to 2010)
examine job selection and pay decisions.37
Figure 1 shows changes at wage percentiles across the three decades I consider. The left panel shows all
workers and the right panel shows only men. The patterns for men and women appear to differ slightly with
more wage growth for women, however an overall picture emerges. Wages expanded across the top wage
distribution over all three decades. Wages compressed at the bottom of the wage distribution in the 1990s,
which we commonly refer to as wage polarization. In the 2000s, some wage compression appears the very
bottom of the distribution, but overall wages did not expand or compress in the bottom half. This figure
confirms much of previous findings with respect to wage changes over these decades (Mishel, Schmitt, and
Shierholz, 2013).
I present occupational employment share and average wage changes using Acemoglu and Autor’s (2011)
broad grouping of occupations in Figure 2.38 They group occupations into low-paid, medium-paid, and
high-paid categories.39 The low-paid category consists only of low-paid service occupations. The medium-
paid category consists of sales, clerical, administrative support, production, craft, repair, and operative
occupations. The high-paid category consists of managerial, professional and technical occupations. The top
panel of Figure 2 confirms the existing evidence regarding job polarization. We observe a relative decline
in middle-paid occupations throughout the 1980s and 1990s (Mishel, Schmitt, and Shierholz, 2013; Lefter
and Sand, 2011). We also see disproportionate growth in low-skilled service occupations in the latest decade
(Autor and Dorn, 2013). The right panel of Figure 2 shows only men. They exhibits similar employment
share patterns.
Average wages within occupations diverge from employment share patterns. The gap in average wages
expands between occupations in the 1980s as wages overall spread out in the 1980s (Figure 1). Average
wages polarize like wages overall in the 1990s as they rise less in the middle-paid occupational group than
the low and high-paid groups. However, women appear to drive this pattern as men show less wage growth
in the low-skilled occupational group. Average wage differences appear to expand in the 2000s, although not
nearly as strongly as in the 1980s. Looking only at men, we observe overall wage polarization even though
tradeoff increases the importance of wages with respect to what information they carry.
37The availability of individual wage data compared to total compensation facilitates its widespread use and use here. However,
the debate as to whether wages are a sufficient metric to track the evolution of returns to employment remains a contested and
important area of research.
38Several papers in the job polarization literature present these figures in terms of occupational skill ranks using average wages
in a reference year to rank occupations (Acemoglu and Autor, 2011; Autor and Dorn, 2013; Mishel, Schmitt, and Shierholz,
2013). I replicate and discuss these figures in Appendix B.6.
39In general, pay reflects skill level, so the literature often uses low-paid and low-skilled interchangeably.
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average occupational wages for men do not on strongly polarize between groups. This observation suggests
men in the middle-paid group moved down the wage distribution by the start of the 1990s, and their partial
wage recovery may account for some of the wage polarization we observed.
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Figure 2: Employment Share and Average Wage Changes (1979 to 2010)
These occupational categories consider in Figure 2 do not yet map into the model primitive regarding skill
demands (y). I make use of task content/complexity data to map the occupational data to skill requirements.
3.2 Skill Requirements
The DOT (1977) provides measures of task complexity along cognitive and manual dimensions of skills
at the occupation level. Importantly, the DOT features information gathered from direct observation of
the tasks performed in an occupation and thus measures task complexity independent of worker skills.40
The US Department of Labor infrequently updated the DOT before replacing it with the Occupational
Information Network (O*NET) in the late 2000s. Even so, the DOT remains relevant to most of the period
under consideration. I manually update DOT task information using O*NET due to the emergence of new
occupations in 2003 where the DOT does not provide information. More recent work like Lise and Postel-
Vinay (2016) use O*NET instead of the DOT. I compare the DOT and O*NET and argue the case for using
the DOT here in Appendix B.4. Both the DOT and O*NET come with the severe drawback that they only
capture task changes between but not within occupations.41 More recent attempts at analyzing task content
within occupations include the Occupational Requirements Survey (ORS) and Autor and Handel (2013).
40It would not be credible to use measures conditional on the distribution of worker skills to construct the equilibrium
distribution of y, because this (unobserved) distribution of worker skills changes over time as well.
41I provide more detailed information about the DOT and O*NET datasets and their drawbacks in Appendix B.2 and B.4.
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The ORS only began releasing data in late 2016 (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2017). Autor and Handel
collect representative survey data that allows them to capture differences in task content within occupations
at a point in time. Given limitations to data availability, the DOT provides an acceptable and widely used
means to obtain task measures.
I use the Dictionary of Occupational Titles combined with the CPS ORG to estimate equilibrium skill
requirements. Many papers like Autor, Levy, and Murnane (2003) and Yamaguchi (2012) use this merging
method and data. They also provide detailed descriptions and discussions of the DOT. I relegate those
descriptions and discussions to Appendix B.2 and B.4 and focus on the main procedures here. I merge
DOT measures into the CPS ORG using Dorn’s harmonized occupational coding system (Dorn, 2009). This
combined CPS-DOT dataset contains DOT task measures on the occupational level and individual weights
to construct skill scores. From here, I construct cognitive and manual skill scores using principle components
analysis à la Yamaguchi (2012). I use general learning ability, verbal ability, and numerical ability to estimate
cognitive skill requirements. I use an array of other aptitudes to measure manual skill requirements, including
physical strength, motor coordination, finger dexterity, and manual dexterity. Appendix Table 13 contains
details on all these additional measures. I take the first principle component in each case and linearly rescale
it to the interval [0, 1].42 Some papers convert these task measures to percentiles, however this transformation
makes all occupations equidistant. I preserve the distance in skill requirements between occupations, because
this distance governs differences in output and consequently differences in wages between occupations.
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Figure 3: DOT Equilibrium Skill Requirement Moments (1979 to 2010)
Figure 3 shows the resulting moments.43 We observe a rise (fall) in the mean level of cognitive (manual)
task complexity and increased dispersion in both dimensions of task complexity. In addition, the (negative)
42I could also use two exclusion restrictions and the first two principle components to identify cognitive and manual skills.
I implement this alternative approach, rotating the first two principle component scores based on the restriction that general
learning ability and motor coordination reflect only cognitive and manual skill, respectively. This alternative approach yields
cognitive skills with a correlation each year of at least 0.99 for cognitive skills and 0.96 for manual skills. Thus, the approach
makes little difference with respect to the final skill scores. I use the apporach of running two separate factor analyses for ease
of interpretation.
43I smooth the time series of the moments to reduce sampling noise using Lowess with the optimal bandwidth.
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correlation between cognitive and manual task complexity falls until the last decade. I also show mean
skill requirements for the major occupational and industry groups in Tables 1 and 2 from 1979 to 2010.
The scores appear intuitive, and the following hold on average. High-skilled (management, professional,
technical) occupations require the most complex cognitive tasks and thereby the most cognitive skills. Low-
skilled service occupations require the least cognitively complex task and thus the least cognitive skills.
The middle-skilled occupations (clerical to products and crafts) require varying amounts of cognitive task
complexity but relatively higher manual task complexity compared to low and high-skilled occupations. This
feature suggests that technological change inducing middle-skilled occupations to contract works through
eliminating manually complex tasks. Industries requiring the highest cognitive task complexity include
financial services, professional and business services, and educational and health services. Industries requiring
the highest manual task complexity include manufacturing, construction, and mining. The service industry
requires the lowest levels of cognitive task complexity.
Table 1: Mean Skill Requirements by Major Occupational Group
yC yM
Management, Professional, Technical 0.613 0.384
Clerical and Retail Sales 0.427 0.417
Construction, Mechanics, Mining, Transport 0.264 0.525
Machine Operators, Assembling, Inspection 0.370 0.543
Products and Crafts 0.161 0.480
Service 0.193 0.385
Table 2: Mean Skill Requirements by Major Industry Group
yC yM
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing, and Hunting 0.312 0.446
Mining 0.382 0.462
Construction 0.363 0.517
Manufacturing 0.344 0.467
Wholesale and Retail Trade 0.374 0.398
Transportation and Utilities 0.337 0.440
Information 0.479 0.418
Financial Services 0.548 0.350
Professional and Business Services 0.510 0.402
Educational and Health Services 0.471 0.428
Leisure and Hospitality 0.342 0.389
Other services 0.290 0.465
The mean skill requirements for these major occupational groups also suggests a simple mapping from
skill requirements y to low, middle, and high-skilled occupational groups. Figure 4 plots average y for all
occupational titles 1979 to 2010 with red lines at 0.4 on the x-axis and 0.60 and 0.45 on the y-axis. This
figure and Table 1 suggest cutoffs in the level of cognitive and manual skill provide a fair mapping from skill
requirements to occupational categories. I consider the breakdown where jobs with yM < 0.4 and yC < 0.45
make up low-skilled occupations, jobs with yM ≥ 0.4 and yC < 0.6 make up middle-skilled and the rest are
high-skilled. This breakdown, weighting occupations by their employment share, captures approximately 70%
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Figure 4: Average Skill Requirements by Occupation
of the employment for each category (low, middle, high) using the Acemoglu and Autor (2011) occupational
groups. Coincidently, this particular breakdown nearly reaches the cutoffs that best match the Acemoglu and
Autor categories. Occupational titles and task content define the Acemoglu and Autor categories whereas
only task complexity defines these occupational categories. Yet, the two groupings overlap significantly, which
suggests task complexity captures a lot of information about occupations. Many occupational mappings
based on skill requirements are possible, however none match the simplicity and intuitive appeal of this
one. With this mapping, the relative contraction of manually complex tasks corresponds to the relative
contraction of middle-skilled occupations. The relative expansion of cognitively complex tasks corresponds
to the relative expansion of high-skilled occupations.
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Figure 5: Occupational Changes based on Skill Requirement Definition
I replicate Figure 2 using the occupation mapping described. Unsurprisingly, Figure 5 and Figure 2 exhibit
similar overall patterns. These groupings overlap substantially, so they should look similar. However, they
differ in levels. The categorization based on skill requirements results in more low-skilled occupations44, thus
4421.8% vs. 11.8% in 1979, 23.3% vs. 16.3% in 2010. Examples of occupations recategorized into the low-skilled category
by skill requirements include hotel clerks and parking lot attendants. Most occupations recategorized from middle-skilled to
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lowering the increase in the share of low-skilled occupations in the 2000s. It also results in less high-skilled
occupations45, thus raising the increase level for high-skilled occupations. In addition, male occupational
wages polarize more under the skill requirement categorization unlike in Figure 5.
3.3 Worker Skills
The National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (1979) provides nationally representative information to con-
struct the distribution of entering worker skill endowments, Vt(x). It also provides observations on the joint
distribution of worker skill endowments and skill requirements, labor market transitions, and wages. I use
the NLSY to construct V0(x) as well as estimate some micro-level moments requiring panel data. Much of
my treatment and construction of the NLSY parallels Lise and Postel-Vinay (2016) and Boehm (2017). I
elaborate on this construction and its issues in more detail in the Appendix B.5.1 and describe the main
process here.
I construct x(0) analogously to skill requirements. I use the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery
(ASVAB) test in the NLSY79, which provides pre-labor market entry scores for mathematics knowledge,
arithmetic reasoning, word knowledge, paragraph comprehension, numerical operations, general science,
coding speed, auto and shop information, mechanical comprehension, and electronics information (Bureau
of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor, 2014a). I extract the first two principle components of all the
ASVAB scores, and impose two exclusion restrictions to identify cognitive and manual skill scores. I restrict
mathematical knowledge to contain information only on cognitive skills, and auto and shop information
to contain information only on manual skills. I linearly rescale these scores into the interval [0, 1] to form
estimates (x̂C(0), x̂M (0)). For worker skills, I rotate the first two principle component scores instead of
separating the measures into categories, because the ASVAB measures do not categorize as easily as the DOT
measures. Tests about mechanical comprehension and electronics likely convey information about cognitive
and manual skills as both tests require some knowledge of general science and reading comprehension.
Figure 6 shows the constructed V̂0(x) for the NLSY1979 cognitive and manual skills.46 It also shows
V̂0(x) conditional on gender and educational attainment groups. The distribution of initial cognitive skills
across education groups appear intuitive. Higher education groups exhibit more cognitive skills. They also
tend to exhibit more manual skills although to a much lesser difference than cognitive skills. Initial cognitive
skills across gender do not notably differ, while initial higher manual skills exhibit a strong skewness towards
males. I reweigh V̂0(x) using the observed educational attainment and female share of the labor force to
obtain V̂t(x) over time. This approach remains sensible only if the distribution of cognitive and manual skills
remains similar within education-gender cells of cohorts. In Appendix B.5.1, I use the NLSY97 to validate
this restriction, which shows little difference between V̂1979(x) and V̂1997(x) within education-gender group
for cognitive skill but more difference for manual skills. Finally, I allow a transformation of x̂(0) into x(0)
in the estimation to align it with y, because x̂(0) need not necessarily align with the DOT y.
low-skilled occupations are lower level clerical or manufacturing occupations.
4529.0% vs. 25.3% in 1979, 42.0% vs. 36.2% in 2010. Nearly all recategorized occupations are from high-skilled to middle-
skilled occupations. They mainly consists of health and human service related occupations like nursing, occupational therapists,
physical therapists, and clinical technicians.
46Workers initial ages vary based on educational attainment level.
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Figure 6: Marginal Distributions of Initial Worker Skills
4 Estimation
I estimate it via indirect inference after parameterizing it.47 The model requires parameterization for the
following objects: Ft(y), ft(x,y), c(x,y), b(x), and h(x,y). It also requires estimating or calibrating βa, δ,
ω, λ, Me, and Mu. Indirect inference requires three steps. First, I set parameter values. Second, I solve the
model. Given parameter values, we know ft(x,y)− c(x,y)− b(x). This function corresponds to the surplus
function in the final period before mandatory retirement. I solve the model backwards from this terminal
period in the worker’s life. Third, I simulate the model to produce the targeted moments. Estimation iterates
over this process until the model suitably reproduces the targeted moments.48
4.1 Parameterization
The parameterization I employ relies heavily on the one developed in Lise and Postel-Vinay (2016), because
it yields a good fit to many aspects of the data. The production function consists of linear terms in skill
requirements and quadratic terms to capture complementarities and under-qualification in a skill dimension.
Skill requirements reflect the employers production technology and thereby directly affect output. In turn,
output loss in production drives positive sorting across task dimensions as it prevents matches with severely
under-qualified workers in some task dimension. The degree of output loss increases convexly with the
distance between skill and skill requirements. The wage function (13) reflects the curvature in the production
function. Matching changes in the shape of the wage distribution may require a change in the convexity in
the production function. To this end, I introduce within-task complementarity terms xCyC and xMyM to
form the production function in (14).49 This production function exhibits absolute advantage in productivity
47Lise and Postel-Vinay (2016) provide a formal identification argument for their model based on specific functional forms
that yield a closed form solution for the surplus function (see their Appendix A.6). The exact argument remains too stylized to
apply directly here, however the spirit of their identification argument holds relevance for which features of the data to target.
Non-parametric identification of static search models is an emerging area of research, but it has yet to be extensively addressed
for dynamic models.
48I estimate based on the equally weighted minimum distance loss function.
49Lindenlaub (2017) permits such within-task complementarities and shuts down between-task complementarities.
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as excess skills do not hurt output. General skills amplify output, which magnifies differences within cohorts
over time.50
f(x,y) = xG ·
[
α0,t + αC,tyC + αM,tyM + αCC,txCyC + αMM,txMyM
− κC min{xC − yC , 0}2 − κM min{xM − yM , 0}2
] (14)
Empirically, over-qualified workers experience wage loses compared to workers with similar skill levels
positioned in jobs where their skills are required. They also receive higher wages compared to workers
with just-qualified skills (i.e. x = y), doing the same job (Slonimczyk, 2013). The disutility of labor
serves to permit these empirical observations. Workers only experience labor disutility in dimensions of
over-qualification as shown in (15).51 General skills amplify the effect of labor disutility. I specify the flow
utility of an unemployed worker with the same general structure as the production function shown in (16).
However, it does not depend on specific skills.52
c(x,y) = xG ·
[
νC ·max{xC − yC , 0}2 + νM ·max{xM − yM , 0}2
]
(15)
b(x) = xG · b0 (16)
The worker’s specific skills accumulate or depreciate linearly in task dimensions shown in (17). This learning-
by-doing specification varies the skill acquisition or loss according to the distance between the worker’s current
skill and skill requirements. In this manner, learning-by-doing is heterogeneous across workers.
h(x,y) = x︸︷︷︸
skill today
+ ΓH ·max{y − x,0}︸ ︷︷ ︸
skill gain
+ ΓD ·max{x− y,0}︸ ︷︷ ︸
skill depreciation
(17)
ΓH =
(
γhCC γ
h
CM
γhMC γ
h
MM
)
, ΓD =
(
γdCC γ
d
CM
γdMC γ
d
MM
)
I specify general skills (18) as a function of age and an individual component (ε) weighted by initial cognitive
skills. This component exists to capture wage dispersion in talent among workers in the most cognitive-
intensive jobs. The quadratic age term serves to capture the wage-age/experience trend.
xG(t) = γ0 + γ1age(t) + γ2age
2(t) + xC(0) · ε (18)
Finally, I parameterize Ft(y) using five time-varying parameters (rt, aC,t, bC,t, aM,t, bM,t) to characterize
the sampling distribution of skill requirements. The time-varying nature of the parameters makes parsimony
crucial to estimate the model. To this end, I use a Clayton copula to characterize the joint distribution
of yC and yM . It consists of one parameter (r) controlling the correlation between yC and yM .53 I use
Kumaraswamy marginals for yC and yM . This marginal provides a closed form cumulative distribution
function over the support [0, 1], making it more tractable.54 Each marginal consists of two parameters
50Empirically, wages exhibit increasing dispersion at higher ages.
51Over-qualification does not cause output loses, but it does lower the total surplus of a match thus indirectly lowering wages.
Thus, over-qualified hold an absolute advantage but still may be undesirable. Over-qualification also increases wages in some
jobs as the wage equation (13) shows. The disutility of labor due to over-qualification enters wages positively as the employer
compensates the worker for said disutility. In this manner, over-qualified workers can receive higher wages compared to workers
with just-qualified skills in the same job but lower wages relative to others in their skill level in more skilled jobs.
52I impose this restriction to reduce the number of parameters to estimate.
53This copula falls into the class of Archimedean copulas, and its closed form conditional distribution function simplifies the
sampling process.
54Kumaraswamy approximates a Beta distribution and can be shown to map into a generalized Beta distribution (Jones,
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governing the shape of the marginal. The first shape parameter pushes mean and variance in opposite
directions, while the second pushes them in the same direction. This feature makes the model able to match
similar trends with respect to the mean and dispersion of cognitive task complexity but opposing trends for
marginal task complexity.
The five parameters for Ft(y) and four parameters in ft(x,y) vary over time, and I specify a process for
how they evolve. One obvious approach estimates these parameters at each point in time. I estimate the
model at the monthly level over 32 years, rendering this approach intractable. Instead, I allow them to evolve
over time using linear time trends with structural breaks to capture different trends across decades. Time
trends with structural breaks provide a compromise of flexibility and parsimony. I set structural breaks to
occur near the start and end points of each decade.55
4.2 Solution and Simulation Protocol
Given parameters, I solve for the match surplus function and simulate a model labor market to produce the
targeted simulated moments. I simulate the labor market monthly for approximately 50,000 workers from
January 1979 to December 2010. The simulation consists of a burn-in period, a transition period, and a
terminal period. I index the transition period January 1979 as time period 1 (t = 1) and December 2010
as time period 384 (t = 384). I index the burn-in period as t = 0 and the period after December 2010 as
T = 385. F(y) and f(x,y) do not vary over time during the burn-in period or after the transition.56
To solve the model, I first solve the model before (burn-in) and after the transition. S(x,y) equals the
static portion of the match surplus, f(x,y)− c(x,y)− b(x), for workers whose age next period is 65. Given
S(x,y) at this terminal age, I exploit the recursive structure of the surplus function and solve backwards over
age to obtain S0(x,y) and ST (x,y). Next, I use the recursive structure of the surplus again to solve St(x,y)
backwards over time from t = 384 to t = 1. The perfect foresight solution uses the time-varying parameters at
their respective times. In contrast, the no foresight solution does not incorporate information from the future.
In the case of no foresight, the agents assume no parameters vary over time, i.e. St+1(x,y) = St(x,y). Thus,
obtaining St(x,y) requires solving the model backwards over age at every point in time t = 0, 1, ..., 384, 385.
Given the surplus function, the simulation protocol produces a cross section of worker skills (xit), skill
requirements (yit), surplus shares (σit), and labor market transitions. From here, I construct wages based
on (13), employment shares based on the mapping in Figure 4, and labor market transition rates. I add a
zero-mean, log-normal measurement error with standard deviation υ to simulated wages, because the data
exhibits measurement error. The simulation protocol starts with a burn-in period, holding all parameters
fixed. To initialize the burn-in period, all workers start out employed at a random yi0 and draw skills xi0
from V0(x).57 Matches immediately terminate where the surplus is negative. The simulation then runs
through the burn-in period to the terminal period (t = 385).
One period (t) of the simulation goes as follows. A worker starts the period with skills xit aged ait. The
worker exits the labor force and the match terminates with probability ξa. An employed worker’s match
with yit terminates with probability δ. An employed worker in a surviving match meets another employer
with probability Me. An employed worker who meets a new employer then draws y′ from Ft(y) and moves
2009).
55I also explored including the dates of the breaks in the optimization routine. However, they did not change much from
around the start and ends of decades naturally, because the timing of targeted moments is decadal.
56Obviously, this approach misses out on any forward looking effects from the 2010s, which may affect decisions and wages in
the 2000s. However, it provides a clean way to estimate the transition path. In the case of no foresight, this issue is irrelevant.
57I burn-in this labor market for 1000 periods, which provides enough time for the initial cohort of workers randomly assigned
to jobs to exit the labor market. I draw workers initial ages from the 1979 cross-sectional age distribution in the CPS ORG.
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to the new employer if St+1(x′,y′) > St+1(x′,yit) where x′ = h(xit,yit). A worker who accepts starts at
the new employer next period and the surplus share (σit) updates according to (4). An employed worker
who fails to meeting a new employer draws y′ from Ft(y) with probability ω. Matches with new skill
requirements tomorrow terminate if St+1(x′,y′) < 0. In the case of separation, a worker starts the next
period unemployed. An unemployed worker meets an employer with probabilityMu. An unemployed worker
who meets an employer then draws y′ from Ft(y) and moves to the employer if St+1(x′,y′) ≥ 0 where
x′ = h(xit,0). A unemployed worker who accepts starts at the new employer next period and the surplus
share (σit) equals λ. Otherwise, that worker starts next period unemployed. A worker out of the labor force
enters at the start of the period.58 This worker draws new skills from Vt(x) and searches as an unemployed
worker.59
4.3 Target Moments
The model consists of two sets of parameters − time varying and time invariant. Time invariant parameters
include κC , κM , νC , νM , b0, (γ0, γ1, γ2), Γh, Γd, β˜, δ, ω, λ, ξa, (θ0, θ1), (ζC , ζM ), arrival rates Me and Mu,
and measurement error variance υ2.60 The ζ parameters map the initial skills estimates (x̂C(0), x̂M (0)) into
(xC(0), xM (0)) via x(0) = x̂(0)ζ to better align x and y. The θ parameters are the scale and shape parameters
for Pareto-distributed individual heterogeneity ε. Time varying parameters include the five parameters of
Ft(y), α0,t, αC,t, αM,t, αCC,t, and αMM,t. I calibrate some parameters externally and estimate the others
using variation in the data.61
4.3.1 External Calibration
I fix a small number of parameters and show these externally calibrated parameters in Table 3. I set the
monthly discount factor β˜ as commonly done in the literature. Its value roughly corresponds to a 10%
steady state discount rate per annum. I add (zero-mean, log-normal) measurement error to wages as occurs
in the CPS ORG wage data. Lemieux (2006) measures the variance of measurement error in wages in the
CPS ORG. I set υ2 to around the level estimated there. I set the involuntary separation probability δ to
its counterpart in the data. IPUMS-CPS identifies voluntary and involuntary unemployment, and I apply
Shimer (2012) to construct monthly worker flows. I set δ to match the monthly involuntary flow from
employment to unemployment. Similarly, I estimate ω to match the involuntary flow into unemployment
from employment. Finally, I calibrate entry (µa) and exit (ξa) probabilities as a function of age to match
age-based transition rates in and out of the labor force.
58Lise and Postel-Vinay (2016) only simulate a cohort of workers to focus on the origins and costs of skill mismatch whereas
I simulate a model labor market, allowing new cohorts to enter.
59The worker draws an education level and a gender and then draws an age, ε, and cognitive and manual skills the education-
gender-group distribution of V̂0(x). Workers initial ages vary based on educational attainment level. No population growth or
shrinkage occurs, so new workers enter when old workers exit.
60I stick to a partial equilibrium, restricting Me,t and Mu,t to remain exogenous and time invariant. These parameters vary in
the general equilibrium as shown in Appendix A.5. In general equilibrium, these rates vary with the endogenous distribution of
worker types. The need for individual agents to forecast and track this endogenous distribution makes the general equilibrium
model intractable. We can also interpret this model as an approximation to the general equilibrium outcome where its accuracy
depends on the strength of general equilibrium feedback onto the meeting probabilities.
61Here, I give the intuition for which variation in the data helps identify the parameters. However, I provide an extensive
identification argument for the estimated parameters given a sufficiently rich panel data set in Appendix A.6. This argument
further illuminates how the moments targeted in indirect inference help identify the parameters.
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Table 3: External Calibration
Parameter Value Target
β˜ 0.992 10% discount rate per annum
δ 0.012 Average Monthly Involuntary Separation Rate
υ2 0.020 Lemieux (2006)
4.3.2 Estimation Moments
I estimate the remaining parameters jointly. The CPS-DOT provides information for most moments, while
the NLSY79 cohort provides information for some of the more micro-level moments. As mentioned, I estimate
ω to match the overall separation rate. The δ shock generates the involuntary flows from employment to
unemployment. The remaining flows come from voluntary separation following a productivity shock. Thus, ω
reproduces the overall average monthly, separation rate conditional on the model’s other parameters. Along
similar lines, Me and Mu reproduce the monthly job-to-job and unemployment to employment transition
rates given the rest of the model parameters. Hence, I target the average monthly job-to-job transition rate,
unemployment to employment flow rate and employment to unemployment flow rate.62
I target the shape of wage-age profile to pin down values for (γ0, γ1, γ2) in the estimation. I also target
the differential between average wages overall and wages out of unemployment to estimate b0, because
b0 determines wage out of unemployment conditional on the model’s other parameters. The wage drop
following an unemployment spell contains information on the worker’s bargaining power out of unemployment
conditional on the model’s other parameters like Γd. I compute average wage drop following an unemployment
spell from the sample NLSY79 panel (Appendix B.5.1) and use it to provide information for the bargaining
power λ.
I include moments on the correlation of initial skills and skill requirements at various dates to estimate
κC , κM , νC , νM , Γh, and Γd. The correlation of x and y in skill dimension measure sorting patterns of worker
type x across jobs with skill requirements y. Parameters κC , κM , νC , and νM govern the sorting patterns
across worker skill and job skill requirements. For instance, a worker close to zero in the cognitive dimension
cannot obtain a job with cognitive task complexity close to one given a high enough κC . Similarly, a worker
with cognitive skill close to one rejects a job with cognitive requirements close to zero for high enough νC .
Γh also governs sorting patterns. For example, suppose Γh is the identity matrix as opposed to the zero
matrix. Skills adjust to skill requirements after one period. Severe under-qualification in any skill dimension
poses a much lower barrier to obtaining the job in question in this case. Thus, the correlation between initial
skills and skill requirements will be low. Intuitively, one does not need a particular skill level if one can
quickly train up to doing the job. Faster human capital accumulation in a dimension tends to lower the
correlation between initial skills and skill requirements in that dimension. Meanwhile, increasing κC , κM ,
νC , or νM tends to raise the correlation in the relevant dimension. It lowers the surplus for over and under-
qualified workers and results in worker skills more closely aligned to the job requirements.63 The NLSY79
cohort provides measures of initial skills and their skill requirements as described in Section 3.3. I target the
observed correlation of initial cognitive and manual skills, x(0), with their respective job requirements, y,
for the cohort in the simulation that corresponds to the NLSY79. I include these correlations at years ’79,
62I set the job-to-job transition rate target to 0.03 based on estimates in the literature (Moscarini and Thomsson, 2006).
63Formally, Lise and Postel-Vinay (2016) show that these parameters alter the set of jobs acceptable to each type of worker.
The correlation serves as a metric to capture this information.
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’81, ’84, ’87, ’90, and ’93, which constitutes twelve moments for these twelve parameters.64
Given V0 and all other parameters, the initial productivity parameters (α0,0, αC,0, αM,0, αCC,0, αMM,0)
along with x shape parameters (ζC , ζM ) govern wage differentials across y and occupational groups by
extension. Fundamentally, information to obtain αC,0 comes from comparing wages of workers with similar
x and yM but different yC (conditional on the model’s other parameters). Information to obtain αCC,0
and αMM,0 comes from wage differentials of workers with different x but matched with the same y.65
Hence, I target initial average wages and wage dispersion for the high, medium, and low occupational groups
described in Section 3.2. I also target decadal changes in average wages for these occupational groups as well
as decadal changes at the 10th, 50th, and 90th wage percentiles. Changes at the 10-50-90 wage percentiles
reflect changes in wage dispersion within occupational groups. These targets aims to capture the decadal
trends in (α0,t, αC,t, αM,t, αCC,t, αMM,t). Additionally, I include the average mean and variance of log wages
across the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s as these levels contain further information on the αt’s and information
on dispersion for the individual heterogeneity parameters (θ0, θ1). The use of decadal time trends for αt’s
give twenty-four parameters for the thirty moments mentioned.
Finally, I target changes in the observed (equilibrium) distribution of skill requirements over time and
decadal changes in employment shares across occupational groups. These targets identify the distribution
of skill requirements, Ft(y), over the set of accepted y’s (conditional on the rest of the model). I target
the means, variances, and correlation of yC and yM in the initial year (1979) and their averages in the
1980s, 1990s, and 2000s to estimate the five parameters of Ft(y). I select the decadal change in employment
shares across occupational groups, because this metric measures job polarization. The estimated Ft(y)
must not only reproduce moments like mean and variance but also the preeminent feature of changes in the
employment structure − job polarization. These targets yield twenty-nine moments for twenty parameters
using decadal time trends for the scale, shape, and correlation parameters of Ft(y).
In summary, the parameters total sixty-four for eighty moments from 1979 to 2010. These moments
consists of
1. decadal averages of mean and variance of log hourly wages
2. decadal averages of mean, standard deviation and correlation of (yC , yM ) and in 1979
3. mean and standard deviation of wages within occupational groups in 1979
4. log change in occupational group employment shares and average wages over 1979-1989, 1989-2000 and
2000-2010 (Figure 5)
5. log change in 10-50-90 wage percentiles over 1979-1989, 1989-2000 and 2000-2010 (Figure 1)
6. average monthly job-to-job, employment-to-unemployment, and unemployment-to-employment transi-
tion rates over 1979-2010
7. average post-unemployment spell wage drop for the simulated NLSY79 cohort
8. differential between average wages and wages out of unemployment for the NLSY79 cohort
64As noted in Appendix B.5.1, I limit the NLSY panel to 1993, because sample attrition accelerates afterwards and makes the
representativeness of the post-1993 sample suspect. In the data, I estimate corr(x̂i(0), yi) ∀i ∈ {C,M} rather than corr(xi(0), yi).
I convert the model’s x to x̂ to compute the comparable model simulation target.
65A precise identification argument can restrict to workers out of unemployment or entering the labor force. These workers
all possess the same bargaining power λ unlike workers with history dependent bargaining power.
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9. correlations of (xC(0), yC) and (xM (0), yM ) in 1979, 1981, 1984, 1987, 1990, and 1993 for the simulated
NLSY79 cohort
10. average wages at ages 25, 35, 45, and 55.
5 Results
To present the results, I first show how well the model fits the data. Then I turn to what the parameter
estimates say about the environment which yields this fit (e.g. how are skills valued relative to one another?
how does this value change over time?). Next, I perform a series of decompositions to understand how and
why the model fits. These decomposition shed light on the importance of the model’s features (e.g. human
capital accumulation, wage-setting employer competition). Finally, I look at what forces (e.g. routine-biased
technological change) can explain the skill demand changes estimated with the model.
5.1 Model Fit
I estimate the model under three different assumptions and show how well each fits the data. The first two
assumptions modify the horizon of foresight to shed light on the importance of anticipation when fitting the
data. The last assumption modifies Vt(x) to inform on its importance for the model’s fit. I take the first
model (I) as the benchmark case. This benchmark considers the model with perfect foresight, human capital
accumulation and decumulation, and the exogenous Vt(x) discussed in Section 3.3. Perfect foresight means
agents know the entire path of zt (i.e. Ft and ft) following an initial shock starting at period 1. In model
(II), I eliminate foresight from the benchmark. Agents do not anticipate changes to zt and changes come
as a surprise each period. A comparison of (I) and (II) grants insight into the importance of anticipation
in reproducing the data. In model (III), I keep the perfect foresight benchmark, however I fix Vt(x) to
V0(x). This modification eliminates the reweighting of V0(x) to obtain Vt(x). This reweighting adjusts for
increasing educational levels and rising female labor force participation, holding fixed the within education-
gender distribution of x. A comparison of (I) and (III) informs on whether changes to V0(x) help account
for the data.
Figure 7 shows the models’ fit to changes in employment shares and occupational average wages in the left
and right panels, respectively. The left panel shows that the model replicates the job polarization observed
in the data. Medium-skilled occupations shrank relative to both low and high-skilled occupations across
decades. The right panel shows that the model mostly replicates changes in occupational average wages over
the same period. Low and medium-skilled occupational wages fell while high-skilled wages rose on average
in the 1980s. All wages rose in the 1990s with low and high-skilled wages rising more than medium-skilled
wages (i.e. occupational wage polarization). The gap between occupational average wages expanded again
the 2000s, however the model fails to match the fall in low-skilled occupational wages observed in the 2000s.66
It also overestimates the increase in high-skilled occupational average wages. Overall, the model fits well
to changes in employment and occupational wages and does not differ much over (I), (II), and (III). This
outcome suggests neither anticipation effects nor changes in the distribution of skills supplied drive the broad
occupational employment and wage patterns in the model.
Similarly, (I), (II), and (III) match the expansion of wage inequality across the wage distribution in the
1980s as shown in left panel of Figure 8 and Appendix Table 19. They also match expansion at the top of
66This fall occurs even when excluding the Great Recession 2007-2010.
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the wage distribution in the 2000s. None generate the rise in wage in the lower tail of the distribution in
the 2000s. However, the model does fit the 2000s after restricting to the period prior to the Great Recession
(2000-2007) as shown in Figure 9. During the 1990s, the fit to changes at wage percentiles differs greatly
over (I), (II), and (III). The perfect foresight benchmark (I) generates the right amount of growth at the 10th
and 90th percentiles, but overestimates growth at the 50th percentile. This change translates to only minor
compression (expansion) at the bottom (top) of the wage distribution compared to the dramatic U-shaped
pattern in the data.
Eliminating foresight (II) worsens the fit as inequality expanded across the distribution in this case.67
Thus, ignoring anticipation in this environment impedes matching the wage patterns we observe. In contrast,
(III) produces the strong U-shaped change in the wage distribution. This outcome strongly suggests the
adjustment to V0(x) to construct Vt(x) affects the model’s ability to produce wage polarization in the 1990s.
This adjustment increases the share of college educated workers as well as female labor force participation to
their observed levels over time, holding the within education-gender group distribution of x fixed. Comparing
(I) to (III) shows holding the within education-gender distribution fixed worsens the model’s fit. Ultimately,
only wage polarization in the 1990s appears sensitive to the differing assumptions of (I), (II), and (III).
Otherwise, the model fits wage distribution changes, occupational wage changes, and employment share
changes well. Furthermore, the model matches occupational wages in 1979 and has a high correlation (above
0.96) with wage percentiles in 1979, 1989, 2000, and 2010 (Appendix Table 21). This correlation becomes
particularly high (0.98) when excluding the extreme low (1-4) and high (96-100) percentiles. The model also
tracks average wages and its increase closely as shown in Figure 10. It also tracks the increase in the wage
dispersion despite overestimating wage dispersion. The job ladder effect causes the model to overestimate
wage dispersion. Some workers take low wages in order to climb onto the job ladder, which creates a long
left tail in the wage distribution (Appendix Figure 45).68
The model produces aggregate moments related to mobility and skill requirements. It also produces
many but not all of the moments related to sorting and transitions to and from unemployment. The model
generates moments from the equilibrium distribution of y shown in Figure 11, including the mean, dispersion,
and correlation of skill requirements. However, it tends to underestimate the dispersion in cognitive skills
and overestimate the correlation between manual and cognitive skills in the last decade. The model captures
the correlation (i.e. degree of sorting) between initial cognitive and manual skills and their respective skill
requirements (Table 4). But it fails to capture the size of the increase in the correlation of initial cognitive
skills and cognitive skill requirements for the NLSY79 cohort (Appendix Figure 38).
The model generates the average monthly flow of employment to unemployment and vice versa as well
as the average monthly job-to-job transition rate (Table 4). It overestimates the wage drop following an
unemployment spell but roughly matches the average wage differential for wages out of unemployment
compared to wage overall. The model also fits the targeted age-wage profile for the CPS (Figure 12) and
the NLSY79 cohort (Appendix Figure 39). Overall, (III) delivers the best fit to all the target moments,
explaining 95.4% of the variation in the target moments compared to 94.6% and 94.3% for (I) and (II),
respectively (Appendix Table 17).69
67Workers at the 10th percentile in (I) became slightly more over-qualified in cognitive skills over 1989-2000. They obtained
a larger increase in wages compared workers at the 10th percentile in (II) who become slightly more under-qualified in cognitive
skills.
68Marginally qualified workers (where the surplus is just above zero) populate the lowest five percentiles in the wage distribu-
tion, increasing the left skewness. I later show the model with pure Nash Bargaining, which reduces the level of wage dispersion
by eliminating the job ladder incentive to take low wage jobs.
69I discuss demographic heterogeneity in Appendix C.1.
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Table 4: Model Fit
Data I II III
Distribution of x(0) and y
corr(xc(0), yc)
1980-1987 0.303 0.403 0.382 0.399
1988-1993 0.387 0.430 0.408 0.419
corr(xm(0), ym)
1980-1987 0.078 0.083 0.064 0.065
1988-1993 0.083 0.053 0.050 0.040
Aggregate Job Flows
Job-to-Job 0.032 0.024 0.035 0.032
Employment-to-Unemployment 0.015 0.016 0.015 0.017
Unemployment-to-Employment 0.261 0.266 0.277 0.262
Differential for U-to-E Wages (%) -0.205 -0.234 -0.273 -0.243
Unemployment Spell Average Wage Drop (%) -0.264 -0.430 -0.447 -0.417
5.1.1 Parameter Estimates
We now turn to understanding what features of the model yield this fit, starting with the model parameters.
I present notable parameter estimates in Table 5 with the full set in Appendix Table 22. The parameter
estimates indicate what environment appears consistent with the data. This environment consists of a
higher valued, harder to accumulate skill and a lesser valued, easier to accumulate skill. The estimates also
mirror the finding of Lise and Postel-Vinay (2016) that the model views different skills quite differently.70
Mismatch between skills and skill requirements costs significantly more in the cognitive dimension in terms
of output loss (governed by κ) and disutility of labor (governed by ν). Surplus lose due to under-qualification
(i.e. yi > xi) remains higher than lose due to over-qualification in both skill dimensions. Cognitive skills
accumulate much slower than manual skills. A worker learns manual skills fast and forgets them relatively
slowly but learns cognitive skills slowly and forgets them relatively fast. These learning parameters (ΓH , ΓD)
cause young workers to sort across jobs like prime age workers. Cognitive skill changes little over the life cycle
70It is worth noting that Lise and Postel-Vinay (2016) employ a different set of moments and data. They match their model
solely to the longitudinal moments of the NLSY79 cohort using O*NET data. They use a plenthora of task content from
O*NET to construct their scores for cognitive, manual and interpersonal skills. Here, I use mainly aggregate cross-sectional
moments from the CPS, supplemented with information from the NLSY79 unavailable in the CPS.
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Figure 11: Equilibrium Distribution of y
in the model’s estimation.71 The estimates also indicate cross-skill complementarities in learning-by-doing
with positive off-diagonal terms in ΓH . For example, a worker possessing high cognitive skills can train up
on-the-job to do more complex manual tasks faster than a worker with low cognitive skills and similar level
of manual skills.
Production technology (ft) shifts away from manual skills towards cognitive skills and from general skills
to specific skills. Table 6 shows that general skills decline in their relative productive value (α0) all else
equal, biasing output towards specialized skills. Naturally, the model estimates cognitive skills to hold a
higher baseline productive value (αC) than manual skills (αM ), because workers in cognitive-intensive, high-
skilled occupations earn more (Appendix Table 21).72 However, production complementarities within tasks
start on a comparable level but diverge over time. Call a worker with high xC (xM ) a cognitive (manual)
specialist. Table 6 shows that cognitive production complementarities (αCC) increased twofold in the 1980s
and continued to increase at a slower rate, benefiting cognitive specialists. Meanwhile, the relative productive
value of manual specialists (i.e. αMM ) increased slightly in the 1980s with no notable increase afterwards.
The change in distance between αC and αM pales in comparison to the change between αCC and αMM .
Increased bias towards specific skills and divergence in the productive value of these skills characterize output
71Lower positive sorting across cognitive skills and requirements when young may come from yet-to-be known information
about the worker’s skill level rather than realized increases in cognitive skill levels over time. This process of learning about
skills when young can result in more turnover and potentially less positive assortative matching across skill dimensions, e.g.
Sanders (2012).
72Intuitively, the more difficult to acquire skill should be more valuable.
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Table 5: Time Invariant Parameters
I II III
ΓH(1, 1) 0.0009 0.0045 0.0029
ΓH(1, 2) 0.0003 0.0020 0.0093
ΓH(2, 1) 0.0185 0.0014 0.0196
ΓH(2, 2) 0.0608 0.0525 0.0897
ΓD(1, 1) -0.0148 -0.0113 -0.0209
ΓD(1, 2) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
ΓD(2, 1) -0.0348 -0.0020 -0.0005
ΓD(2, 2) -0.0331 -0.0535 -0.0330
νC 29.71 27.22 38.35
νM 14.19 0.0004 17.97
κC 130.8 103.0 128.7
κM 48.18 47.00 53.62
in the model.73
The distribution of skill requirements or skill demands exhibit a similar bias towards cognitive-intensive
tasks. Figure 13 shows contour plots of changes in the density of Ft(y). It shows the job-polarizing changes in
skill demands. Lighter areas show increased density while darker areas show decreased density. (I) and (III)
estimate that the distribution of the skill demands concentrated more in the northwest quadrant and fell in
the southeast quadrant. These changes to skill demands polarize employment as the model decompositions
will show. Medium-skilled, manually-intensive jobs populate the southeast quadrant whereas high-skilled,
cognitive-intensive jobs populate the northwest quadrant. (I) estimates a density increase spread across
high-skilled and low-skilled jobs. In contrast, (III) concentrates in jobs in the high-skilled region of (yM , yC)-
space. (II) estimates a proliferation of high and low-skilled jobs like (I). However, this proliferation occurs
at all levels of yC whereas (I) estimates a more concentrated change.
To summarize, the model fits the data well in many dimensions. It fits marginally better under full
anticipation over no anticipation. It also fits better holding the skill endowment distribution fixed rather than
adjusting it fully for between education and gender demographics. The model points to several key features
73Lindenlaub’s (2017) assignment model also finds increasing cognitive complementarites and decreasing manual complemen-
tarities over the 1990s and 2000s. The model only has cognitive and manual skills.
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Table 6: ft(x,y) Parameters at Sample Dates
I II III
α0,t=0 1.314 -8×10−5 1.306
α0,t=121 -1.495 -1.905 -1.479
α0,t=267 -1.950 -1.542 -1.090
α0,t=384 -2.683 -1.208 -1.694
αC,t=0 20.26 19.56 19.23
αC,t=121 20.27 19.77 19.37
αC,t=267 19.80 18.18 19.36
αC,t=384 19.54 18.14 18.51
αM,t=0 -0.775 1.247 -1.283
αM,t=121 -0.853 0.646 -1.383
αM,t=267 -0.516 0.571 -1.383
αM,t=384 0.344 0.282 -0.379
αCC,t=0 9.914 10.62 8.379
αCC,t=121 21.23 16.62 21.01
αCC,t=267 31.83 24.52 32.68
αCC,t=384 34.48 28.04 36.58
αMM,t=0 8.387 8.877 8.615
αMM,t=121 9.055 10.14 10.46
αMM,t=267 6.261 6.174 8.193
αMM,t=384 5.930 2.733 7.347
to fit the data. First, cognitive skills accumulate slower and decline faster (relative to their accumulation
speed) than manual skills. Second, cognitive skills hold higher productive value than manual skills, and this
value increased over time to favor cognitive specialists and slowed more recently. Third, the distribution of
skill demands exhibits polarization. The first feature says some skills must be slower to adjust to understand
the data. I assess the importance of this feature in the model decompositions. The last two features
come as no surprise. Education strongly correlates with cognitive skills (Figure 6), and wage returns to
education have become more convex over the period under consideration.74 The lens of the model says
the “convexification” of the returns to education reflect changes to the productive value of cognitive skills.
Specifically, cognitive production complementarities increased (at a decreasing rate) since the 1980s. Of
course, the distribution of available jobs, Ft(y), affects the allocation of workers. This allocation exhibits
polarization, so the distribution of skill demands polarized as expected.
5.1.2 Skill-Biased Technical Change v. Task-Biased Technical Change
The model provides alternative interpretations to skill-biased technical change and task-biased technical
change. Skill biased technical change conceives of a labor market consisting of high and low skilled workers.
Technological progress increases the productivity of high-skilled workers and wage inequality expands as a
result (Acemoglu and Autor, 2011). Task-biased technical change conceives of a labor market consisting of a
74See Valletta (2016) for a detailed discussion on the “convexification” of the returns to education.
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mix of tasks, and workers use their skills to do said tasks. The returns to performing a specific type of task
increase and wage inequality may expand, contract, or do both but in different parts of the wage distribution
(Acemoglu and Autor, 2011; Lindenlaub, 2017). The outcome depends on which workers reallocate to which
tasks. Routine-biased technical change serves as a notable example of task-biased technical change. Routine-
biased technical change lowers the relative value of medium-level skills used to do routine tasks like assembly
or clerical work. Workers select out of these medium-wage tasks as their relative value falls. This selection
produces an expansion above the median wage and expansion or contraction below it depending on which
workers move into low or high-skill tasks. Some papers consider the 1980s to represent skill-biased technical
change while the 1990s represent more task-biased technical change.75
The model conveys skill-biased technical change in the 1980s as productivity changes favored specific
skills (xC , xM ) over general skills (xG). Estimates of the baseline return to general skills (α0) drop in
the 1980s, while production complementarities (αCC , αMM ) rise. The model conveys task-biased technical
change as a productivity shift towards cognitive skills over manual skills. In the 1990s, the fall in α0 stops
or decelerates while αMM begins to fall or stagnate and αCC continues to rise. Thus, productivity estimates
move towards move towards cognitive skills away from manual skills. Hence, skill-biased technical change
consists of specialization (i.e. a shifts towards specific skills). Meanwhile, task-biased technical change
consists of shifts towards a particular specific skill and away from another. In this sense, the model exhibits
skill-biased technical change in the 1980s and task-biased technical change in the 1990s.76
75See Acemoglu and Autor (2011), (Boehm, 2017), or Mishel, Schmitt, and Shierholz (2013) for further discussion.
76Alternatively, we can interpret the estimates through definition of Lindenlaub (2017). In this case, there is only task-biased
technical change as increased (αC , αCC) convey skill-biased and task-biased technical change, respectively.
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5.2 Decompositions
Examining the model parameters grants broad insight into what assumptions and parameters allow the
model to fit the data. However, they do not readily explain what factors and assumptions drive results like
how (III) best fits polarization in the 1990s while wages in (II) do not polarize at all. To this end, I use a
series of decompositions to unpack the role of the exogenous factors and model features. First, I compar-
atively examine the model versions shown to gain insight into the role of anticipation and the skill supply
distribution, Vt(x). Then I perform decompositions to evaluate the importance of human capital evolution
(IV), heterogeneous specific human capital (V), changes in the distribution of skill demands (VI), changes
in production technology (VII), multidimensional skills (VIII), and employer wage-setting competition (IX).
For each decomposition, I simplify the benchmark model (I) in an aspect and re-estimate the model to
measure the contribution of the relevant factor. Counterfactual analysis alone is unsuitable to measure the
contribution of a factor. The job selection and wage setting mechanisms in the model interact with all of
these factors. They amplify or dampen their effects even in partial equilibrium. For example, suppose we
want to measure the importance of changes in the distribution of skill demands in matching the data. The
relevant counterfactual should measure how much of the data we account for in the absence of changes to
the distribution of skill demand. The gap between this measure and what we account for when changing
Ft(x,y) measures its importance. A naive counterfactual holds Ft(x,y) fixed without adjusting the model
parameters. This counterfactual ignores the increased importance of ft(x,y) in the allocation of workers
to jobs in the absence of changes to Ft(x,y), thereby overstating the importance of Ft(x,y). I begin the
decompositions comparing (I), (II), and (III) as they form the basis as to why I perform the decompositions
that follow. How well they match wage polarization in the 1990s distinguishes these versions of the model.
5.2.1 Wage Polarization
How do wages polarize in the 1990s? During this period, the distribution of cognitive skill requirements
shifts towards cognitive skills, and production complementarities in the cognitive dimension increase. The
opposite occurs in the manual skill dimension. Thus, the parameters suggest a task-specific relative demand
shift towards cognitive skills away from manual skills in the 1990s in contrast to a shift towards both specific
skills away from general skills in the 1980s. This shift results in a proliferation of cognitive jobs and an
increase in their average wages (i.e. occupational upgrading). Meanwhile, a large deceleration in loses due
to specialization (i.e. α0 stabilizes or increases) and an increased level of general skills (e.g. older workers)
drive wage gains for workers in the low-skilled occupation.77 Thus, the model produces polarization in
occupational wages and employment similar to the data in cases (I), (II), and (III).
However, neither job polarization nor occupational wage polarization serve as necessary or sufficient
conditions to generate wage polarization.78 The model allows us to clarify how wage polarization occurs.
We observe similar changes to the distribution of skill demands and productivity parameters across (I), (II),
and (III).79 We observe polarization in the average wage in each occupational group. Moreover, we observe
similar trends in changes in the wage distribution in the 1980s and 2000s. Yet only (I) and (III) lead to
inequality expansion above the median wage and compression below the median.80 Only (III) produces the
77Recall that general skills amplify the output of specific skills. This feature generates the lifecycle profile of wages. Alter-
natively, we can interpret α0 as reflecting the effect of economic growth on wages rather than skill specialization. However this
model is not a growth model, leaving such an interpretation ambivalent.
78Boehm (2017) proves this claim theoretically in a static, competitive Roy model.
79Correlation for all estimates are 0.990 for (I) and (II), 0.997 for (I) and (III), and 0.989 for (II) and (III).
80It is possible to eliminate inequality expansion below the median in (II). However, it increases low-skilled wage growth well
above its target value (Appendix Figure 46) and thus is not the optimal fit to the data.
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dramatic U-shaped polarization which occurs in the data. Comparing these versions of the model grants
insight into how wage polarization in the 1990s arose.
Table 7: Change in Wage Percentile for Median Worker
Occupational Group Data I II III
High +1 +0 −3 +0
Medium −1 −4 −3 −3
Low +1 −1 +2 −1
In the 1990s, marginal expansion occurs below the median in (II), because wage growth rose dispropor-
tionately in the low-skilled occupational group in (II). Some workers in this group overtook workers in the
(shrinking) medium occupational group.81 Consequently, the lowest percentiles in 2000 do not reflect their
wage gains. Table 7 shows the change in the wage percentile for the median worker in each occupation group.
Low-skilled occupation workers gain the most on medium-skilled workers in (II). In contrast, (I) produces
some wage compression in the bottom half without disproportionately increasing wages in the low-skilled
group. In (I), workers and employers anticipate technological and skill demand changes. They agree to
a wage schedule that in part backloads these expected gains to incentivize the worker to stay at the job.
Anticipation in (I) puts downward pressure on wages where workers and employers expect gains, reducing
this overtaking effect while still allowing these wages to rise. In fact, removing foresight under the estimates
of (I) results in inequality expansion across the wage distribution in the 1990s and much more extreme occu-
pational and wage changes (Appendix Figure 47). In contrast, workers and employers do not anticipate such
gains and loses in (II). Adding foresight under the estimates of (II) causes a negligible inequality contraction
across the entire wage distribution (Appendix Figure 48). Overall, the benchmark foresight model (I) fits
marginally better to the data as it spreads out of gains over time. However, the improvement over the model
with no foresight (II) remains small.
Model (III) constitutes a marked improvement over (I) with respect to wage polarization in the 1990s.
Recall that (III) estimates the model without adjusting Vt(x) over time. The adjustment reweights the
within education-gender distribution of V0(x) to match their demographic shares in the labor market. This
improvement suggests the reweight over adjusts of the distribution of skill endowments, because the distri-
bution of skills within these groups changed over time. Notably, women exhibited a lower mean for manual
skills in the NLSY79. The NLSY97 confirms a within gender upward (downward) shift in documented
manual skills for women (men) (Appendix Figure 50). The distribution for men and women look similar
for cognitive skills in the NLSY79 (Figure 6) but appear to align on manual skills over time. Thus, the
adjustment for rising female labor force participation re-enforces a gender bias in documented manual skills
which diminished over time. Thus, we see the shape of the distribution of skill endowments matters greatly
to produce wage polarization in this model. Holding the share of female labor force participation fixed but
adjusting for the rising share of college education workers (X) generates more of the U-shape change to wages
in the 1990s (Figure 20). Holding Vt(x) fixed does not mean the distribution of skills remains fixed. Human
capital accumulates and decumulates over the life cycle and in response to structural change. Both shape
the endogenous skill distribution in the labor market. In both (III) and (X), manual skills accumulate faster
compared to the benchmark (Appendix Table 22).
81In 1989, about 16% of low-skilled occupation worker earned less than the 10th percentile middle-skilled occupation worker.
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Figure 14: Fixed Female Labor Force Participation
Comparing (I) and (III) clarifies why the skill endowment distribution contributes to a more dramatic
U-shape change in wages. The skill endowment distribution in (I) results in too many workers in the
medium occupation concentrated in the lower tail of the wage distribution. Figure 15 shows the (smoothed)
employment share for the medium-skilled occupation at every wage percentile. This curve shows workers in
medium-skilled occupation remain prolific in the middle of the wage distribution and less so in the upper and
lower tails. The curve shifts downward as the medium-skilled employment share shrinks. It also becomes “less
concave” at lower percentiles from 1989 (solid red) to 2000 (dashed green), meaning workers in the medium
occupations concentrate more in lower wage percentiles. In (I), these workers start out more prolific in the
lower wage percentiles in 1989 and move downward. Consequently, more low-skilled occupation workers
overtake them in the wage distribution between the 10th and 50th percentiles. High-skilled occupation
workers move into the 50th percentile as the medium-skilled occupation shrinks and medium occupation
workers move down the wage distribution, driving up wages at the 50th percentile. Thus, the movement of
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Figure 15: Employment Share at Wage Percentiles
medium occupation workers downward causes the model to overestimate the increase in wages at the 50th
percentile. This overestimation worsens in case (I) where these workers start out more concentrated in the
lower percentiles compared to (III) and (X).
By 2000, this percentage fell by 2.36 percentage points (ppts) in (III), 2.66 ppts in (I), and 4.21 ppts in (II).
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The endowment distribution of manual skills accounts for more medium occupation workers in lower
wage percentiles in (I). The adjustment to construct Vt(x) skews the manual skills distribution negatively.
This results in more manual skill under-qualification among medium-skill workers and pushes them to lower
wage percentiles.82 Of course, manual skills accumulate toward the job requirements, but matching the
positive correlation between initial manual skills and manual job requirements constrains how fast manual
skills can accumulate.83 Thus, the skill endowment distribution is crucial to matching wage polarization in
the 1990s in this model. This result contrasts starkly with Lindenlaub (2017) who concludes changes in the
distribution of skill endowments are not crucial to account for wage polarization.
5.2.2 Learning Frictions
Time-consuming human capital evolution and heterogeneous specific human capital cause under and over-
qualification arise in this model. Call them learning frictions or matching frictions. They result in imperfect
matches (i.e. x 6= y). How important are such frictions to accounting for wage and occupational changes
from the 1980s to 2000s? I perform two decompositions to answer this question. The first removes specific
human capital accumulation and decumulation from the benchmark model. This decomposition evaluates
the explanatory power of learning on-the-job. The second removes the matching friction in the model so
that human capital changes instantaneously. This modification equates to making cognitive and manual
specific human capital homogeneous where y serves as a permanent, match-specific productivity shock. This
decomposition evaluates the importance of misalignment between skills and skill requirements in account for
occupational and wage changes.
Eliminating specific human capital accumulation and decumulation makes little difference to the overall
model fit relative to the benchmark.84 More under-qualified medium occupation workers end up in the
lowest wage percentiles due to their inability to acquire more manual skills. Consequently, workers in
the low-skilled occupation overtake them, making wage polarization difficult to generate compared to the
benchmark. However, the model fits just as well on occupational employment and wage changes. This
outcome suggests limited importance for skill loss and acquisition relative to factors like structural change in
Ft and ft. Of course, this indication only says specific human capital evolution remains of limited importance
to reconcile broad wage and occupational changes. Specific human capital accumulation may be crucial to
understand a wide set of phenomena like job promotion paths.85 Also, the acquisition of general human
capital over the life cycle remains important to matching growth at the lower percentiles.
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Figure 16: Fixed Specific Human Capital
82The average difference between xM and yM in 1989 is -0.080,0.001, and -0.006 for (I), (III), and (X), respectively.
83Faster accumulation drives this correlation down as a worker may obtain a job with possessing a level of manual skill well
below what is required.
84Appendix C displays full results for all decompositions.
85See Gibbons and Waldman (2004).
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The next decomposition eliminates the matching friction caused by heterogeneous specific skills. Con-
sequently, it also eliminates the concepts of under-qualification, over-qualification, and sorting. Permanent
i.i.d. match-specific productivity shocks constitute Ft(y) and each worker offers an indivisible, homogeneous
unit of cognitive and manual skill. The αt’s determine aggregate productivity, while Ft(y) determines the
idiosyncratic productivity of the specific skills. This model turns out to fit the data well with respect to wage
levels, wage dispersion, and occupational wage and employment changes (Figure 16, Appendix Table 25, Ap-
pendix Figure 52). It accounts for just under half (45%) of the variation in the target moments that the
benchmark model explains (95%). Therefore, heterogeneous specific human capital and the skill mismatch
and sorting it produces account for the other half of the model. Ft(y) permits the model to generate job
polarization, while αt’s produce occupational wage expansion and polarization. The model also generates
the observed wage expansion in the 1980s and 2000s, but it does not generate wage polarization. It fails to
match occupational wages for the middle-skilled group (last column of Table 8), resulting in large shares of
medium occupation workers at the bottom of the wage distribution. Occupational wage polarization pushes
these workers further down. Wage polarization cannot occur as a result. Clearly, heterogeneous specific
human capital (along with the skill mismatch and imperfect sorting it generates) appears crucial to reconcile
wage and occupational changes from the 1980s to 2000s. Overall, the model suggests matching frictions
matter greatly while skill evolution appears non-essential for this matter.
Table 8: Mean Occupational Wage in 1979 (V)
Data I II III V
High 25.344 25.532 25.311 25.023 27.292
Medium 18.216 17.715 17.967 17.855 14.858
Low 14.410 15.126 14.411 15.106 14.072
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Figure 17: Homogeneous Specific Human Capital
5.2.3 Productivity and Skill Requirements
The controversy surrounding the job-polarization explanation for wages centers on continuous job polariza-
tion but discontinuous wage trends. Mishel, Schmitt, and Shierholz (2013) argue that the long-run secular
trend of job polarization cannot account for the reversal in wage expansion below the median in the 1990s.
The previous decompositions indicate changes in Ft and ft can account for a large portion of the data even
without heterogeneous task specific capital. What individual role do these structural changes play in shaping
consistent job polarization but inconsistent wage polarization? Can they reconcile these seemingly contra-
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dictory phenomena? I decompose the model first holding Ft and then ft fixed to shed light on how each
shape occupational and wage changes. The outcome indicates that the job-polarizing distribution of skill
demands acts as a force of wage compression across occupational groups and the wage distribution broadly.
Whereas, changes in productivity levels act as a force of inequality expansion between occupational groups
and all across the wage distribution. Whichever dominates governs whether we observe inequality growth or
wage polarization.
Figures 18 and 19 show the occupational and wage results re-estimating the model holding either Ft or ft
fixed, allowing the other to evolve. ft alone (Figure 18) generates inequality expansion in the 1980s and 2000s
to a lesser extent. It also delivers wage expansion across occupational wages in the 1980s. However, it fails to
generate enough sorting to match job polarization in any period. It fails to even match the patterns, let alone
the magnitudes. It also predicts wage expansion across occupations in the 1990s but wage contraction across
the entire distribution.86 The model again indicates specialization and its deceleration but fails to estimate
the extent of task-biased technical change. Thus, changes in the distribution of skill demands help identify
task-biased technical change to account growth at the 90th percentile and job polarization. Ft alone (Figure
19) produces general patterns capturing job polarization, however it fails to generate inequality expansion
across any decade. In fact, wages compress in all three decades as medium-skilled workers upgrade to the
high-skilled occupation (i.e. occupational upgrading). Such changes in the distribution of skill demands
offset the inequality expanding force of productivity shifts. This decomposition reveals Ft and ft counteract
to produce a consistent pattern of job polarization with varying changes to the wage distribution over time.
Quantitatively, they appear equally important when comparing their overall fit to the data.87
5.2.4 Multidimensional Skills
Acemoglu and Autor (2011) suggests a task-based framework with at least three skill groups best serves to
analyze job polarization and wage changes. Generating wage polarization requires at least two. Many models
of labor market sorting reduce human capital to a single index to evaluate the impact of technological change,
e.g. Kantenga and Law (2017). Evidence like Kambourov and Manovskii (2002) points towards occupation-
specific rather than task-specific skills. Thus, we might expect tasks to miss out on important differences
between occupations. For instance, a ballerina cannot smoothly transition to being a glass cutter even though
both require high levels of manual dexterity and moderate levels of cognitive ability. This begs the question:
how important is the occupational heterogeneity which tasks fail to capture? More pointedly, what is the
sufficient number of tasks/skill required to reconcile occupational and wage changes? This paper focuses on
major occupation groups, but the model has any number of occupations with three skills and only two tasks.
I address this question in the most direct way possible by “eliminating” one of the tasks from the model and
comparing it to the case with two tasks.
The multidimensional nature of specific tasks define occupational groups. I aim to preserve this definition
to make this two skill, two task model comparable. To do so, I relegate manual tasks and skills to an entirely
descriptive role, setting αM,t, αMM,t, νM , and κM all to zero. In this case, manual skills and tasks play no
role in job selection or wage setting. Manual tasks merely define which occupation we call high, medium, and
low. This change preserves comparability while effectively eliminating manual skills/tasks from the model
mechanisms. The model effectively consists of cognitive specific human capital, general skills, and a cognitive
86Lindenlaub (2017) matches wage polarization with a static assignment model, however that model imposes no consistency
with respect to neither occupational wage changes nor employment shares.
87This result again starkly contrast with the conclusion of Lindenlaub (2017) that changes production complementarities
outweigh the importance of changes in the distribution of skill requirements.
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Figure 18: Fixed F(y)
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Figure 19: Fixed f(x,y)
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task.
This decomposition produces a striking result. It fits wage polarization better than the benchmark and
explains 88% of the variation in moments overall. It also fits wage polarization just as well as (III) (Figure
20). Merely assigning different labels over time produces the patterns of job polarization and occupational
wage expansion/polarization, although not the magnitudes. Hence, we see that cognitive skills/tasks and
general skills provide enough content to reconcile patterns of wage changes and changes in the occupational
wage structure. The model even replicates moments from the marginal distribution of yM in matching
occupational patterns (Appendix Table 29). Though this lens, specialization in cognitive tasks account for all
of these patterns. Unsurprisingly, this model (VIII) cannot replicate the level of correlation between cognitive
and manual task complexity (yM ), because manual complexity (yM ) serves as a mere label. However,
it does decline as it does in the data. This model improves over the benchmark in wage polarization for
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Figure 20: Non-Productive Manual Skills (αM = 0, αMM = 0, νM = 0, κM = 0)
similar reasons to (III). It eliminates under-qualification in manual skills and thus concentrates more medium
occupation workers in middle wage percentiles. This “cognitive-biased” technical change does not push these
medium occupation workers down the wage distribution like task-biased technical change. Increases in
production complementarities increase convexity in the upper half of the wage distribution. Meanwhile, a
deceleration in the fall of α0 and higher xg raise wages disproportionately at the bottom. The lens of this
model says the move from inequality expansion to wage polarization comes from a slowdown in specialization
rather than a different type of technological change. The shift towards higher cognitive task complexity
produces some tasks that require no specialized skills. For example, suppose a technology firm expands to
a new location. This new building raises demand for local low-skilled protective services and food service
workers.
On one hand, this outcome suggests no need to model a large array of tasks and skills to reconcile the
patterns we observe. Idiosyncrasies in task content do not prevent us from understanding broad changes
using task complexity alone. It appears enough that tasks vary in their cognitive complexity to account for
changes in the wage distribution. Identifying occupations by applying the labels constructed in the data
yield patterns for broad occupational groups. The presence of two skills − not three − and one task provide
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enough information to generate these patterns in a frictional setting with heterogeneous human capital.
The inability to reconcile wage polarization with a “canonical” competitive model inspired use of the tasks
framework (Acemoglu and Autor, 2011). Frictions (like search and learning frictions) provide an alternative,
tractable way to enrich the environment instead of expanding the dimensionality of tasks to capture an
intractable, large set of occupations. On the other hand, this simpler model remains unsatisfactory. It seems
unreasonable that non-cognitive skills hold such little value in rewarding productivity or allocating jobs. We
can interpret it as the value of cognitive skills and age encompass the value of all other non-cognitive skills.
Data suggest otherwise as these skills/tasks do not correlate perfectly. It also appears skills like interpersonal
skills hold some importance for wages and job allocation distinct from cognitive skills (Jaimovich, Siu, and
Cortes, 2017).
5.2.5 Stationarity vs. Trends
How much of the same conclusions do we draw when conceptualizing technological change as a one-time,
permanent shock rather than ongoing structural change? The following decomposition determines the sig-
nificance of looking at a transition path to examine occupational structural change. The benchmark model
imposes discipline in the labor market across time. The distribution of skill requirements and productivity
evolve gradually, some parameters remain fixed, and cross-sectional outcomes aggregate from overlapping
cohorts. A non-stationary (partial) equilibrium transition path maps out the labor market from 1979 to 2010.
Many papers take an alternative approach to technological change or demand shifts. Instead, they consider
them as a one time, permanent adjustment and estimate a series of steady state models over sub-periods.88
They then use estimates over each sub-period to perform counterfactual analysis and make inference about
technological change.
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Figure 21: Repeated Stationary Model
I estimate a stationary version of the model over year long sub-periods. This version eliminates human
capital evolution and foresight over structural changes. I estimate the stationary model to match annual
88e.g. Lindenlaub (2017); Kantenga and Law (2017). The question arises as to how long a period makes a steady state.
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levels of the target moments when available.89 This model generates strong U-shaped wage polarization in
the 1990s. In doing so, it fails to match wage and occupational changes otherwise (Figure 21). In fact, it
overestimates wage polarization in the 1990s (Appendix Table 33). Imposing consistency over time greatly
improves the fit to occupational wage and employment changes. In this frictional setting, the accumulation of
decisions in an ongoing transition appear to better describe occupational structural change than two entirely
different states of the world.
5.2.6 Employer Competition
Lastly, I re-estimate the model with pure Nash Bargaining to see if employer competition made any difference
to the model fit. Nash Bargaining does not change the allocation of workers to jobs under the same parameters
as (I) or (III), because it only affects the split of the surplus, not the surplus itself. However, it does affect
wages as shown in Appendix A.4. Nash Bargaining results in a marginally worse fit (Appendix Table 31,
Appendix Figure 53), but ultimately employer competition makes little difference compared to Nash.
5.3 External Validation
I show the model can evaluate hypotheses and produce findings in the literature to support to its validity.
The model yields ambiguous predictions as discussed in Section 2. This lack of prediction makes the model
flexible enough to match wage and occupational patterns over time. However, it also makes the model
difficult to validate. Natural questions for such a quantitative model include: how plausible are the model’s
insights? What can we observe in the data to evaluate (if not test) the model’s validity? For example, the
model indicates workers hold higher general skills in low-skilled occupations in 2000 due to aging. Thus,
we ought to observe older workers in low-skilled occupations in 2000 compared to 1989. If workers in the
low occupations become younger on average, then we might question what the model says about wage
polarization. Average ages increase in this occupational group in the CPS data, which is consistent with the
model.
Table 9: Task Price Polarization (in Log Points)
Boehm (2017) I II III
∆(piA − piR) 27.3 8.4 48.3 34.9
∆piR -5.2 -0.0 -17.4 -19.2
∆(piM − piR) 32.0 4.6 5.6 15.0
A good model replicates at least some relevant findings in reduced form approaches. In contrast to
this model, the competitive framework offers stronger predictions. Notably, task-biased technical change
results in polarized “task prices” if nothing else (Boehm, 2017). I estimate these competitive “task prices”
as a reduced-form validation exercise. Suppose we conceive of wages in the general terms of a competitive
Roy-style assignment model. Wages equal the sum of skill prices times the worker’s skill level. Based on this
framework, Boehm (2017) develops a reduced-form method comparing NLSY cohorts to estimate relative
changes in task prices for manual (piM ), routine (piR), and abstract (piA) tasks. He finds evidence of “task
89Correlations between initial specific skills and current job requirements are unavailable in 2000 and 2010 due to imposed
data restrictions. Instead, I target employment shares by occupational group at the 10, 50, and 90 wage percentiles to provide
information on equilibrium sorting.
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price polarization,” meaning the relative prices of manual to routine skill and abstract to routine skills rise
under task price polarization. I implement his estimator for task prices on model simulated cohorts over the
same time period (1984/92-2007/09), substituting in my skill measures xC(0) and xM (0) and occupational
groups in place of (xA(0), xR(0), xM (0)) and his abstract, routine, and manual occupational groups.90 The
model simulated NLSY-like cohorts exhibit task price polarization despite wages arising from a markedly
different framework and data construction (Table 9).
Autor and Dorn (2013) also consider a competitive Roy-style model and test its predictions about em-
ployment and wage changes in “routine” occupations.91 They hypothesize that demand for routine tasks
fell 1980 to 2005, causing areas with larger shares of routine occupations to experience drops in non-college
worker wages and the share of routine employment. However, they find clerical occupations in commuting
zones with higher routine employment shares experience a wage gain, weakening their results.92 They hy-
pothesize that self selection puts more productive workers in clerical jobs but cannot test this hypothesis
due to a lack of data. The model can fill this gap and evaluate their hypothesis.
The model works in (yC , yM )-space instead of geographical space. Figure 22 shows routine intensity in
(yC , yM )-space where lighter shading represents higher concentration.93 I calculate changes in employment
shares in “clerical” and “non-clerical” middle-skilled occupations in the model using its best fitting version
(III).94 Figure 22 shows moderate to high routine intensity for clerical jobs (red rectangle). From, 1980 to
2005, the employment share of “clerical” occupations fell slightly (-1%) while its average wage rose (+6%)
in the model. This matches the pattern in the data even though the model does not target changes in
this group over this period. Meanwhile, employment shares (-29%) and average wages (-3%) fell in the
model’s “non-clerical” medium-skilled occupational group. Workers selected into these occupation such that
the average level of cognitive skills increases 4.7% in the “clerical” group versus 2.2% in the “non-clerical”
group. Manual skills in each occupational group only changed slightly.
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Figure 22: Routine Intensity in (yC , yM )-space
The hypothesis of Autor and Dorn (2013) says wages rise in clerical occupations due to displacement of
the least skilled workers and most routine tasks within clerical occupations.95 The increase in xC supports
90Abstract, routine, and manual correspond to the high, medium, and low-skilled occuaptions in Acemoglu and Autor (2011).
I selected the occupational groups to best align with these groups in a simple manner in Section 3.2.
91Routine job consists of repetitative, codifiable tasks, e.g. bank teller (Autor, Levy, and Murnane, 2003).
92The gain is not small. It is comparable to the percentage gain for low-skill service occupations and high-skill occupations.
93I calculate the Autor and Dorn (2013) measure of routine task intensity for occupations in 1979, map these occupations
into (yC , yM )-space, and smooth over the contours.
94I define clerical occupations in (yC , yM )-space using the interquartile values of (yC , yM ) estimated for clerical occupations
in the data, i.e. {(yC , yM ) : 0.37 < yC < 0.52, 0.32 < yM < 0.48}.
95The model provides a means to obtain measures of consistent within task changes in occupation that Autor and Dorn
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the first part of their hypothesis. The second part of their hypothesis says the most routine-intensive tasks
within clerical occupations become displaced. The change in the density Ft(y) negatively correlates (-0.25)
with routine intensity within this occupational group. Thus, the skill demand distribution shifts away
from areas holding initially higher routine intensity within the clerical group, supporting the second part of
their hypothesis. This example and “task price polarization” show the model can produce results and test
hypotheses from the literature, adding to the credibility of its own insights.
6 Drivers of Skill Demand
Now, I turn to evaluate the importance of various economic forces behind changes in skill demand. Various
papers put forward strong candidates to explain why skill demand polarized, shifting away from middle-
skilled occupations towards high and low-skilled occupations. Prominent explanations fall into the broad
categories about technological progress, globalization, and consumer preferences. I map related variables
into (yC , yM )-space and perform variance decompositions on Ft(y) to measure the relative importance of
some of these explanations. The model delivers the whole (parameterized) distribution of skill demands
from 1979 to 2010. This distribution provides the power and cross-sectional variation needed to identify the
contributions of each variable considered.96
6.1 Data & Variables
The model casts occupation in terms of their task complexity, but prominent explanations also consider
task content. Autor, Levy, and Murnane’s (2003) routinization hypothesis claims forces like automation
eliminated routine jobs. Goos, Manning, and Salomons (2014) use task content to extrapolate whether au-
tomation and offshoring account for job-polarizing skill demand changes.97 I consider task content measures
for offshoring vulnerability, routine-intensity, and interpersonal intensity estimated using O*NET and DOT
via Autor and Dorn (2013).98 Offshoring vulnerability measures the need for face-to-face contact and hence
the ease of performing a task abroad. Figure 23 shows these jobs range from manually complex but cogni-
tively simple tasks to cognitively complex and manually simple tasks. For example, insurance underwriters,
(yC , yM ) = (0.67, 0.27) and machines operators, (0.09, 0.60), fall into these categories. Routine-intensity
measures the extent to which the job’s tasks follow a set of codifiable rules and thereby susceptible to
automation. Figure 23 shows these jobs consist of moderate to complex manual tasks of low cognitive
complexity. Machine and telephone operators (0.24, 0.4) serve as example of routine-intensive occupations.
Interpersonal intensity measures the extent to which a job requires social skills like negotiation, persuasion,
and emotional perception. Psychologists (0.84, 0.30) serve as a good example of an interpersonal-intensive
task. Visual evidence immediately suggests roles for offshoring and automation in explaining the decline in
demand for medium-skilled occupations. Lighter areas in Figure 23 show high concentration of routine and
offshorable tasks in 1979. These areas in (yC , yM )-space coincide with areas where skill demand declined
(2013) claim to need.
96The low frequency of the variables available makes spurious correlations likely without cross-sectional variation.
97They model technological change as linear time trends as I do in the model. Few datasets measuring realized automation
and offshoring exists, which is why the literature uses task content as a proxy. One recent exception is Acemoglu and Restrepo
(2017). They use a proprietary dataset to examine the role of robots.
98See Autor and Dorn (2013) for details on variable construction of offshoring vulnerability and routine intensity measures.
Interpersonal intensity comes from O*NETmeasures for social perceptiveness, coordination, persuasion, negotiation, instruction,
and service orientation.
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the most (Figure 13).99 These same areas lack intense use of interpersonal tasks while areas of increased
demand use them intensively.
A variety of papers measure the impact of technology and trade via differences in technology adoption
or trade exposure. These difference occur across industries, hence they exploit industry differences and
variation in the industry mix across areas. Michaels, Natraj, and Van Reenen (2014) show large polarizing
effects across industries due to accelerated information and communications technology (ICT) adoption and
R&D using industry data across countries. Following Michaels, Natraj, and Van Reenen (2014), I use
the flow of ICT expenditures as a share of value added to measure technological progress. In addition, I
construct similar capital share variables for machinery, research and development (R&D), and transportation
equipment. This data comes from the EU KLEMS Growth and Productivity Accounts Statistical Module.
I also construct a measure of Chinese import penetration into manufacturing sub-sectors.100 Autor, Dorn,
and Hanson (2013) show large negative, local effects on manufacturing employment driven by rising import
competition from China. Figure 24 shows the manufacturing industry concentrates in the area with the
largest decline in skill demand. Manufacturing industry import and export data comes from Schott (2008).
Data on domestic shipments comes from the NBER-CES Manufacturing Industry Database.101 I aggregate
these annual industry variables into 11 major sectors to create consistency in variables across time and
datasets.102 I then merge all of the above metrics into the CPS DOT dataset (Appendix B.3) based on
these sectors to obtain variables over a (yC , yM ) grid.103 This approach mirrors Autor and Dorn (2013) and
Autor, Dorn, and Hanson (2013). They use variation in local exposure to test predictions stemming changes
in skill demand. I leverage the model and use variation in exposure across (yC , yM ) to identify the impact
of the factors mentioned on Ft(y).
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Figure 23: 1979 Task Content in (yC , yM )-space
To summarize, the factors I evaluate from the literature include ICT adoption, R&D, manufacturing im-
port penetration, susceptibility to automation and vulnerability to offshoring. ICT, R&D, and vulnerability
to automation constitute technological factors. Import penetration and offshoring risk serve as globalization
99I focus all the analysis here on estimated skill demands for the best fitting model (III). Additional results for other model
versions are available upon request.
100Import penetration is the ratio of imports to net imports minus the total value of domestic shipments based on the definition
of Lu and Ng (2013). Manufacturing sub-sectors are 1) food and tobacco, 2) textiles and appliances, 3) wood and furniture, 4)
paper and printing, 5) chemicals and petroleum, 6) clay, stone, rubber and leather, 7) metals, 8) equipment, 9) transport, and
10) other products (e.g. toys).
101http://www.nber.org/nberces/. Accessed 28 July 2017.
102These sectors are 1) agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting, 2) mining, 3) construction, 4) manufacturing, 5) wholesale
and retail trade, 6) transportation and utilities, 7) information and communications, 8) financial, professional and business
services, 9) educational and health services, 10) leisure and hospitality, and 11) other services.
103I weight observations by the industry concentration within the respective CPS DOT occupation in a given year to obtain
concentration variables over a (yC , yM ) grid. I smooth these variables over the support of y which imputes values for jobs with
similar task complexity but are unobserved in the data.
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Figure 24: Manufacturing, Mining, and Construction Concentration in (yC , yM )-space
and trade related factors. None of these factors directly capture the effects of consumer preferences on skill
demand. Autor and Dorn (2013) argue increased demand for low-skilled service occupations comes from the
interaction of consumer preferences and technological change. Technological progress in goods production
lowers their cost, but consumer prefer variety and thereby increase their demand for low-skilled, non-routine
services. Similarly, firms performing highly complex tasks benefit from technological innovation and demand
more of these services as they expand. Figure 25 shows the professional services industry provides jobs
consisting of highly complex cognitive tasks and non-complex tasks. For example, receptionists perform rel-
atively simple tasks, (yC , yM ) = (0.30, 0.22), and work mostly in the professional service industry. I capture
this interaction by weighting industry level variables by their employment share within an occupation.
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Figure 25: Financial, Professional and Business Service Concentration in (yC , yM )-space
6.2 Variance Decompositions
The literature tells us a myriad of factors significantly affected skill demand, contributing to polarization.
However, the disparate nature of these studies makes evaluating their relative importance difficult. Here,
the model proves useful. Its estimates of the distribution of skill demand in (yC , yM )-space provide a
foundation to compare various factors once cast in this space. It implicitly provides variation within and
across occupations over time. We can exploit the variation in changes across the support of (yC , yM ) to
measure which factors appear more important. I perform a simple linear variance decomposition on the
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change in Ft across (yC , yM ) cells to measure each factors relative importance.104 I focus on contributions
rather than the significance of each factor, because the literature has established their significance.105 But,
it has not fully established their relative importance.
First, I examine in which industries changes in the distribution of skill demand took place given the
visual evidence in Figures 24 and 25. Table 10 shows industry concentration in 1979 accounts for up to a
half of the changes from 1979 to 2010.106 In other words, industry (linear) trends alone account for half
of the changes in the skill demand distribution. The manufacturing and construction industries account
for much of industries’ contribution as Figure 24 suggested. The rise in importance in information and
professional services in the 1990s is consistent with rising ICT adoption as these industries experience the
largest additions relative to total value added.
Next, I decompose changes in Ft(y) due to task content. Interpersonal intensity negatively correlates
with both routine intensity (-0.66) and offshoring (-0.44) in 1979. Meanwhile, routine intensity and offshoring
correlate weakly and positively (0.01). Table 11 shows the variance contributions of offshoring vulnerability,
routine intensity, and interpersonal intensity to changes in the skill demand distribution. The fourth column
shows interpersonal task content outweighs routine intensity and offshoring risk in importance. Ignoring
interpersonal content overemphasizes the importance of routine content in accounting for changes in skill
demand as the last column of Table 11 shows. They correlate strongly and negatively, but interpersonal
intensity better accounts for ∆Ft(y) by a factor of 7 to 1.107 All else equal, higher interpersonal intensity at
(yC , yM ) correlates to increased skill demand (i.e. density of F rises). I interpret this correlation as demand
increased for interpersonal skills over the three decades. Holding interpersonal intensity and offshoring risk
fixed, demand decreased for routine skills but to a much lesser degree than it increased for interpersonal
skills. These demand shifts appear to take place in the 1990s and 2000s, respectively. Automation may
account for this fall in demand for routine skills as routine skills remain more susceptible to automation
by their definition. Jobs with higher offshoring risk actually increase in demand, all else equal, especially
in the 1990s.108 These jobs include tasks which require high cognitive skills but little face-to-face contact
like economists (0.65, 0.25), accountants (0.65, 0.23), and operations/systems analysts (0.67, 0.34). Again,
this increase outweighs the fall in routine skills in importance to account for ∆Ft(y). Overall, the model’s
skill demand estimates do not reject Autor, Levy, and Murnane’s routinization hypothesis. However, they
emphasize asymmetry in the importance of the rise in demand for interpersonal skills versus the fall in demand
for routine skills. The model’s skill demands suggests industry trends in manufacturing and construction
encompass most of the explanatory power of automation risk. Offshoring risk does not correlate to lower
skill demand overall. In fact, demand rose for cognitively complex tasks at higher risk of offshoring, all
else equal. Some of these jobs may have been offshored to the US, because the net flow of foreign direct
investment (FDI) began to increase starting in 1990.
Finally, I turn to the industry level variables to provide insight how technology and trade account for
∆Ft(y).109 Table 12 presents the individual variance contribution of each factor and their joint contribution
104In Appendix C.2, I show that selection effect necessitate the use of the model primitive, Ft, and not the equilibrium
distribution of y.
105The projection coefficients hold no meaningful interpretation with respect to changes in the density of Ft.
106The total variance contribution displayed includes contributions due to correlations in industry concentration at (yC , yM )
cells. I use a 100×100 grid for 10,000 cells.
107The partial R2 of routine intensity is 1.6% compared to 11.8% for interpersonal intensity.
108The projection coefficient on offshoring vulnerability is positive for 1979 to 2010.
109I control for the initial industry shares in this decomposition, which is equivalent to including industry trends in the level
regressions. I do this for the same reason as Autor, Dorn, and Hanson (2013). I want to use variation in industry level exposure
(rather than industry trends) to identify the effects of changes in each factor.
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to changes in the distribution of skill demand. The results suggest changes in machinery and transport
adoption drove changes in demand in the 1980s. The increase in variance contribution for ICT confirms the
finding of Michaels, Natraj, and Van Reenen (2014) for the 1990s. ICT drove changes in demand in the
1990s to a relatively large extent. The 2000s appear more mixed in what affects ∆Ft(y). Overall, R&D
and transport adoption appear to serve as the most important determinants of changes in skill demand over
the three decades. The importance of manufacturing import competition from China diminishes over time
as the manufacturing industry share falls.110 ICT’s impact occurred mainly in the 1990s. Industry trends,
technological progress, and trade as measured by the variables shown explain up to 57% of the job-polarizing
change in the distribution of skill demands from 1979 to 2010.111
I now provide a comprehensive interpretation of these results.112 Continued productivity-enhancing (or
labor-augmenting) industrialization in part drove the 1980s. Adoption of machinery made specific skills which
use complex tasks more valuable and thereby increased their demand. At the same time, the manufacturing
industry lowered demand for the manually complex tasks it performs (likely due to automation), forcing the
least productive workers into low-skilled occupations.113 Hence, we see job polarization but wage expansion
across occupations and the distribution overall.114 The accumulation of machinery also began to decelerate
in the 1980s (Appendix Figure 54). The development of ICT in the 1990s created opportunities requiring
high cognitive skill to leverage social skills like negotiation and persuasion. This key development led to
occupational upgrading as demand shifted away from complex manual tasks towards complex cognitive
tasks involving interpersonal skills. After the 1990s, it seems the impact of ICT development tapered.
Automation susceptibility appears to have taken on some importance in the 2000s, but a lot of the changes
in skill demand during this time remain unexplained.
7 Conclusion
This paper presents a quantitative model which reconciles changes in the occupational and wage structures.
Reconciling these changes requires a framework which takes selection effects seriously. To this end, I employ
a dynamic, multidimensional-skill search model. I use variation in micro data on wages, occupations, and
task complexity to estimate model parameters and back out what skill demand shifts occurred. The model
produces the observed patterns of expansion and contraction across occupations and the wage distribution
over 1979 to 2010. It also reproduces some patterns observed in the reduce form literature on job and wage
polarization. The model indicates selection based on heterogenous specific human capital plays an important
role in accounting for the observed allocation of workers to jobs.
I then take the estimated shifts in the distribution of skill demands and use them to evaluate explanations
for these changes. I find industry trends, technological progress, and trade as measured by the variables shown
explain up to 57% of the polarization in the distribution of skill demand over 1979 to 2010. Looking closer,
the adoption of machinery, transport equipment and R&D appear to hold some importance throughout
the three decades. However, ICT adoption took on a strong role in the 1990s and spurred demand for
interpersonal and social skills. The results suggest this “ICT Revolution” changed the occupational and
110Autor, Dorn, and Hanson (2013) instrument this variable, but obtain similar results with OLS and 2SLS.
111The remaining 43% and lack of explanatory power in the 1980s and 2000s prompt questions beyond the scope of this paper.
112Of course, this interpretation does not rule out others.
113The decline in manufacturing employment share in the 1980s onward look to be part of a long-run trend. See
<https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/USAPEFANA>.
114Workers with few skills (often younger) tend to make more gains through experience. During the 1980s, life cycle wage
profiles flattened and began to become stepper again more recently Manovskii and Kambourov (2005). This occurance likely
relates to occupational wage polarization.
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Table 10: Initial Industry Concentration Variance Decomposition on ∆F(y)
1979-1989 1989-2000 2000-2010 1979-2010
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing, & Hunting 0.033 0.006 0.045 0.001
Mining 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.000
Construction 0.063 0.026 0.010 0.074
Manufacturing 0.020 0.098 0.056 0.125
Wholesale & Retail Trade 0.000 0.024 0.001 0.011
Transportation & Utilities 0.000 0.045 0.029 0.010
Information Services 0.010 0.048 0.001 0.034
Financial, Professional, & Business Services 0.003 0.041 0.007 0.068
Education and Health Services 0.004 0.018 0.003 0.012
Leisure & Hospitality 0.020 0.001 0.011 0.000
Other Services 0.002 0.008 0.000 0.008
Total Variance Contribution (R2) 13.8% 37.4% 16.0% 47.1%
Table 11: Initial Task Content Variance Decomposition on ∆F(y)
1980s 1990s 2000s 1979-2010 1979-2010
Offshoring Vulnerability 0.040 0.164 0.009 0.128 0.021
Routine Intensity 0.004 0.001 0.090 0.023 0.226
Interpersonal Intensity 0.025 0.400 0.002 0.239 −
Total Variance Contribution (R2) 2.8% 30.2% 7.4% 33.5% 24.6%
Table 12: Capital Input and Imports Variance Decomposition on ∆F(y)
1980s 1990s 2000s 1979-2010
Individual Contributions
∆ Chinese Manufacturing Import Penetration 0.082 0.009 0.005 0.003
∆ Capital Formation
ICT 0.006 0.176 0.031 0.006
Machinery 0.087 0.006 0.062 0.039
R&D 0.007 0.009 0.021 0.094
Transportation Equipment 0.162 0.064 0.058 0.104
Joint Contribution (Partial R2) 7.5% 18.6% 4.9% 16.3%
Total Variance Contribution (with industry mix) 20.3% 43.2% 20.1% 56.9%
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wage structure far more than the decline in demand for routine skills. Shifts in routine skills do not appear
quantitatively important outside of the long-run decline in manufacturing and construction employment.
Still, the variables used fail to account for about 40% of the changes in the distribution of skill demand,
leaving several questions. Is what is left truly unexplained noise at the occupational level or estimation error
in ∆Ft(y) or noise due to aggregating to the sector level? Are there technological changes yet to be widely
considered (e.g. robots, better measures of automation) which account for much of what is left? All of these
questions remain important for future work of this nature.
The model points to several avenues of potential research. First, the model takes a first step at quantita-
tively introducing frictions and dynamic selection issues neglected in the job/wage polarization literature. In
doing so, it takes meeting rates as given to deal with the inherently non-stationary nature of the transition
path. As a result, the model remains silent on the role of search related general equilibrium feedback. In this
dimension, further developments in directed search may prove fruitful. For example, Menzio and Shi (2010)
present a block recursive directed search model which makes meeting rates independent of the endogenous
distribution of worker types. However, the model has no firm heterogeneity. Thus, it also has no meaningful
notion of skill mismatch or imperfect sorting, which arguably remains an important feature of the data.
Second, the model views labor market structural change as the result of a gradual process. Hershbein and
Kahn (2016) provide evidence which says short downturns amplify the negative impact of these changes
on (cognitive) routine skill demand. The exogenous nature of skill demands and free entry here means the
model cannot speak to the timing of structural adjustment on the firm side. Understanding this requires
progress in understanding how firms determine their multidimensional skill demands.
References
Acemoglu, D., and D. Autor (2011): Skills, Tasks and Technologies: Implications for Employment and
Earningsvol. 4 of Handbook of Labor Economics, chap. 12, pp. 1043–1171. Elsevier.
Acemoglu, D., D. Autor, D. Dorn, G. H. Hanson, and B. Price (2016): “Import Competition and
the Great US Employment Sag of the 2000s,” Journal of Labor Economics, 34(S1), 141–198.
Acemoglu, D., and P. Restrepo (2017): “Robots and Jobs: Evidence from US Labor Markets,” Boston
University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series dp-297, Boston University - Department
of Economics.
Altonji, J. G., P. Bharadwaj, and F. Lange (2012): “Changes in the Characteristics of American
Youth: Implications for Adult Outcomes,” Journal of Labor Economics, 30(4), 783–828.
Autor, D. H. (2015): “Why Are There Still So Many Jobs? The History and Future of Workplace
Automation,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 29(3), 3–30.
Autor, D. H., and D. Dorn (2013): “The Growth of Low-Skill Service Jobs and the Polarization of the
US Labor Market,” American Economic Review, 103(5), 1553–1597.
Autor, D. H., D. Dorn, and G. H. Hanson (2013): “The China Syndrome: Local Labor Market Effects
of Import Competition in the United States,” American Economic Review, 103(6), 2121–2168.
Autor, D. H., and M. J. Handel (2013): “Putting Tasks to the Test: Human Capital, Job Tasks, and
Wages,” Journal of Labor Economics, 31(S1), 59–96.
54
Autor, D. H., L. F. Katz, and A. B. Krueger (1998): “Computing Inequality: Have Computers
Changed the Labor Market?,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 113(4), 1169–1213.
Autor, D. H., F. Levy, and R. J. Murnane (2003): “The Skill Content Of Recent Technological Change:
An Empirical Exploration,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118(4), 1279–1333.
Bartel, A., C. Ichniowski, and K. Shaw (2007): “How Does Information Technology Affect Produc-
tivity? Plant-Level Comparisons of Product Innovation, Process Improvement, and Worker Skills,” The
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 122(4), 1721–1758.
Boehm, M. (2017): “The Price of Polarization: Estimating Task Prices under Routine-Biased Technical
Change,” mimeo, University of Bonn.
Bresnahan, T. F., E. Brynjolfsson, and L. M. Hitt (2002): “Information Technology, Workplace
Organization, and the Demand for Skilled Labor: Firm-Level Evidence,” The Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics, 117(1), 339–376.
Bureau of Labor Statistics (2016): “Characteristics of minimum wage workers, 2015,” Discussion Paper
1061, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Washington, DC, An optional note.
(2017): “Occupation Requirements Survey,” https://www.bls.gov/ors/.
Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor (2014a): National Longitudinal Survey of
Youth 1979 cohort, 1979-2012 (rounds 1-25), Produced and distributed by the Center for Human Resource
Research, The Ohio State University. Columbus, OH.
(2014b): National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997 cohort, 1997-2013 (rounds 1-16),
Produced by the National Opinion Research Center, the University of Chicago and distributed by the
Center for Human Resource Research, The Ohio State University. Columbus, OH.
Cahuc, P., F. Postel-Vinay, and J.-M. Robin (2006): “Wage Bargaining with On-the-Job Search:
Theory and Evidence,” Econometrica, 74(2), 323–364.
Center for Economic and Policy Research (2017): CPS ORG Uniform Extracts, Version 2.2.1,
Washington, DC.
Chari, V. V., and H. Hopenhayn (1991): “Vintage Human Capital, Growth, and the Diffusion of New
Technology,” Journal of Political Economy, 99(6), 1142–1165.
Cortes, G. M., N. Jaimovich, and H. E. Siu (2016): “Disappearing Routine Jobs: Who, How, and
Why?,” NBER Working Papers 22918, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
Dorn, D. (2009): “Essays on Inequality, Spatial Interaction, and the Demand for Skills,” Dissertation,
University of St. Gallen.
England, P., and B. Kilbourne (1980): Occupational Measures from the Dictionary of Occupational
Titles for 1980 Census Detailed Occupations, Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political
and Social Research [distributor], 2013-06-20.
Eriksson, T., and N. Kristensen (2014): “Wages or Fringes? Some Evidence on Trade-Offs and Sorting,”
Journal of Labor Economics, 32(4), 899–928.
55
Firpo, S., N. M. Fortin, and T. Lemieux (2011): “Occupational Tasks and Changes in the Wage
Structure,” IZA Discussion Papers 5542, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
Gibbons, R., and M. Waldman (2004): “Task-Specific Human Capital,” American Economic Review,
94(2), 203–207.
Goos, M., A. Manning, and A. Salomons (2014): “Explaining Job Polarization: Routine-Biased Tech-
nological Change and Offshoring,” American Economic Review, 104(8), 2509–2526.
Hagedorn, M., T. H. Law, and I. Manovskii (2017): “Identifying Equilibrium Models of Labor Market
Sorting,” Econometrica, 85(1), 29–65.
Hawkins, W. B., and D. Acemoglu (2014): “Search with multi-worker firms,” Theoretical Economics,
9(3).
Heathcote, J., F. Perri, and G. L. Violante (2010): “Unequal We Stand: An Empirical Analysis of
Economic Inequality in the United States: 1967-2006,” Review of Economic Dynamics, 13(1), 15–51.
Heckman, J., L. Lochner, and C. Taber (1998): “Explaining Rising Wage Inequality: Explanations
With A Dynamic General Equilibrium Model of Labor Earnings With Heterogeneous Agents,” Review of
Economic Dynamics, 1(1), 1–58.
Hershbein, B., and L. B. Kahn (2016): “Do Recessions Accelerate Routine-Biased Technological Change?
Evidence from Vacancy Postings,” NBER Working Papers 22762, National Bureau of Economic Research,
Inc.
IPUMS-CPS, University of Minnesota (2016): Current Population Survey Data, http://www.ipums.
org. Accessed: 2016-08-23.
Jaimovich, N., H. Siu, and G. M. Cortes (2017): “The End of Men and Rise of Women in the High-
Skilled Labor Market,” Discussion paper.
Jones, M. (2009): “Kumaraswamy’s distribution: A beta-type distribution with some tractability advan-
tages,” Statistical Methodology, 6(1), 70–81.
Kambourov, G., and I. Manovskii (2002): “Occupational Specificity of Human Capital,” mimeo, Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania.
Kantenga, K., and T.-H. Law (2017): “Sorting and Wage Inequality,” mimeo, The University of Penn-
sylvania.
Katz, L. F., and D. H. Autor (1999): “Changes in Wage Structure and Earnings Inequality,” in Handbook
of Labor Economics, ed. by O. Ashtenfelter, and D. Card, vol. 3A, pp. 1463–1555. Amsterdam: North
Holland.
Keane, M. P., and K. I. Wolpin (1997): “The Career Decisions of Young Men,” Journal of Political
Economy, 105(3), 473–522.
Kredler, M. (2014): “Experience vs. obsolescence: A vintage-human-capital model,” Journal of Economic
Theory, 150(C), 709–739.
56
Lefter, A., and B. M. Sand (2011): “Job Polarization in the U.S.: A Reassessment of the Evidence from
the 1980s and 1990s,” Economics Working Paper Series 1103, University of St. Gallen, School of Economics
and Political Science.
Lemieux, T. (2006): “Increasing Residual Wage Inequality: Composition Effects, Noisy Data, or Rising
Demand for Skill?,” American Economic Review, 96(3), 461–498.
Lindenlaub, I. (2017): “Sorting Multidimensional Types: Theory and Application,” Review of Economic
Studies, 84(2), 718–789.
Lise, J., and F. Postel-Vinay (2016): “Multidimensional Skills, Sorting, and Human Capital Accumula-
tion,” Revise and resubmit.
Lu, Y., and T. Ng (2013): “Import Competition and Skill Content in U.S. Manufacturing Industries,” The
Review of Economics and Statistics, 95(4), 1404–1417.
Manovskii, I., and G. Kambourov (2005): “Accounting for the Changing Life-Cycle Profile of Earnings,”
Discussion paper.
Menzio, G., and S. Shi (2010): “Directed Search on the Job, Heterogeneity, and Aggregate Fluctuations,”
American Economic Review, 100(2), 327–332.
(2011): “Efficient Search on the Job and the Business Cycle,” Journal of Political Economy, 119(3),
468–510.
Menzio, G., I. Telyukova, and L. Visschers (2016): “Directed Search over the Life Cycle,” Review of
Economic Dynamics, 19, 38–62.
Michaels, G., A. Natraj, and J. Van Reenen (2014): “Has ICT polarized skill demand? Evidence from
eleven countries over 25 years,” LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 46830, London School of
Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
Miller, A., D. Treiman, P. Cain, and P. Roos (1980): Work, Jobs, and Occupations: A Critical Review
of the Dictionary of Occupational Titles. National Academy Press, Washington, DC.
Mishel, L., J. Bivens, E. Gould, and H. Shierholz (2012): The State of Working America. Cornell
University Press, Ithaca, New York, 12 edn.
Mishel, L., J. Schmitt, and H. Shierholz (2013): “Assessing the Job Polarization Explanation of
Growing Wage Inequality,” Epi-cepr working paper, Economic Policy Institute.
Mortensen, D. T., and C. A. Pissarides (1999): “New developments in models of search in the labor
market,” in Handbook of Labor Economics, ed. by O. Ashenfelter, and D. Card, vol. 3 of Handbook of Labor
Economics, chap. 39, pp. 2567–2627. Elsevier.
Moscarini, G., and K. Thomsson (2006): “Occupational and Job Mobility in the US,” Working Papers 19,
Yale University, Department of Economics.
National Bureau of Economic Research (2016): “CPS Merged Outgoing Rotation Groups,” http:
//www.nber.org/data/morg.html Accessed: 2016-08-23.
57
National Crosswalk Service Center (2016): “O*NET Resource Center,” http://www.xwalkcenter.
org Accessed: 2016-08-23.
O*NET (2016): “O*NET Resource Center,” https://www.onetcenter.org Accessed: 2016-08-23.
Postel-Vinay, F., and G. Moscarini (2009): “Non-Stationary Search Equilibrium,” Discussion paper.
Postel-Vinay, F., and J.-M. Robin (2002): “Equilibrium Wage Dispersion with Worker and Employer
Heterogeneity,” Econometrica, 70(6), 2295–2350.
Robin, J.-M. (2009): “Labour Market Dynamics with Sequential Auctions and Heterogeneous Workers,”
mimeo, University College London.
Roy, A. D. (1951): “Some Thoughts On The Distribution Of Earnings,” Oxford Economic Papers, 3(2),
135–146.
Sanders, C. (2012): “Skill Uncertainty, Skill Accumulation, and Occupational Choice,” Discussion paper.
(2016): “Skill Uncertainty, Skill Accumulation, and Occupational Choice,” Discussion paper.
Sanders, C., and C. Taber (2012): “Life-Cycle Wage Growth and Heterogeneous Human Capital,” Annual
Review of Economics, 4(1), 399–425.
Schmitt, J. (2003): “Creating a consistent hourly wage series from the Current Population Survey’s Out-
going Rotation Group, 1979-2002,” mimeo, Center for Economic and Policy Research.
Schott, P. K. (2008): “The relative sophistication of Chinese exports,” Economic Policy, 23, 5–49.
Segall, D. O. (1997): “Equating the CAT-ASVAB,” in Computerized Adaptive Testing: From Inquiry
to Operation, ed. by W. A. Sands, B. K. Waters, and J. R. McBride, chap. 19, pp. 181–198. American
Psychological Association, Washington, DC, 1 edn.
Sherk, J. (2013): “Productivity and Compensation: Growing Together,” Discussion Paper 2825, The Her-
itage Foundation, Washington, DC, An optional note.
Shimer, R. (2012): “Reassessing the Ins and Outs of Unemployment,” Review of Economic Dynamics, 15(2),
127–148.
Slonimczyk, F. (2013): “Earnings inequality and skill mismatch in the U.S.: 1973âĂŞ2002,” The Journal
of Economic Inequality, 11(2), 163âĂŞ194.
U.S. Department of Labor (1991): The Revised Handbook for Analyzing Jobs. JIST Works, Indianapolis,
IN.
U.S. Department of Labor, U.S. Employment Service, and the North Carolina Occupational
Analysis Field Center (1991): DICTIONARY OF OCCUPATIONAL TITLES (DOT): REVISED
FOURTH EDITION,
Washington, DC: United States Department of Labor, United States Employment Service, and Raleigh,
NC: North Carolina Occupational Analysis Field Center [producer], 1991. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university
Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 1994.
58
Valletta, R. G. (2016): “Recent Flattening in the Higher Education Wage Premium: Polarization, Skill
Downgrading, or Both?,” IZA Discussion Papers 10194, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
Willis, R. J., and S. Rosen (1979): “Education and Self-Selection,” Journal of Political Economy, 87(5),
7–36.
Yamaguchi, S. (2012): “Tasks and Heterogeneous Human Capital,” Journal of Labor Economics, 30(1), 1
– 53.
59
Appendix (For Online Publication)
A Model Appendix
A.1 Occupational Wages, Employment Shares, and Wages
Typically, workers in the low, medium and high wage occupational groups populate the 10th, 50th, and
90th wage percentiles, respectively (Appendix Figure 49). Wages overall reflect wage changes between these
occupation groups. Thereby, wage polarization between occupational groups may induce wage polarization
overall. However, neither job polarization nor occupational wage polarization serve as necessary nor sufficient
conditions to generate wage polarization. Workers switching ranks in the wage distribution may undo wage
polarization. To illustrate, suppose there exists 3 workers in low, medium and high-paying jobs. The high-
earning worker earns 10 units, the medium worker earns 5 units, and the low worker earns 4 units. Now
suppose the low worker gains 3 units, the high worker gains 10, and the medium worker gains none. The
low worker earns 75% more and the high worker earns 50% more. Clearly, occupation wage polarization
occurs. However, the change in wages for the 1st ranked worker is only 20% (4→5), the change for the 2nd
ranked worker is 40% (5→7), and the change for the highest ranked worker remains 50%. Wages overall do
not polarize even though occupational wages polarize, because the low worker overtakes the medium worker.
If the low worker gains any amount within the interval (0, 2), then wages polarize. Such complications
necessitate using the model to isolate what generates wage polarization in the 1990s.
Clearly, occupational wage polarization is not sufficient to ensure wage polarization. Furthermore, it is
not even necessary. Wages may polarize mainly due to changes in the occupational distribution. Suppose
the medium occupation expands to populate the 10th percentile and its wage increases slightly. Meanwhile,
the low occupation shrinks and its wages stagnate. Call this phenomenon “occupational upgrading.” The
increased presence of medium earners compresses wages in the bottom half of the wage distribution. The
higher wage now at the 10th percentile disproportionately increases the wage growth at lower percentiles
while only increasing wage growth slightly at the 50th percentile. If wages in the high occupational group
grow enough at the 90th percentile, then wage polarization occurs but neither occupational wage polarization
nor job polarization occur. Again, these complications necessitate using the model to isolate what generates
the patterns of wage expansion and polarization we observe.
A.2 Bargaining Protocol
The bargaining protocol described in Section 2.1.2 serves several purposes. First, it is empirically relevant.
Cahuc, Postel-Vinay, and Robin (2006) present evidence that this intra-employer competition or “job ladder"
effect matters for wage determination. Second, this effect may also be important to explain changes across
the wage and occupational wage distribution. For example, the average wage in a low-skilled occupation
may rise due to a disproportionate number of workers in that occupation climbing the job ladder. We may
attribute a wage increase due to wage dynamics to demand shifts if we ignore this effect. Third, this protocol
delivers a value to the worker beyond their outside option, which enables the model to generate more realistic
wage dynamics and wage levels. In Lise and Postel-Vinay (2016), even highly skilled workers can receive low
and perhaps negative wages when the surplus is sufficiently large. In such a case, the high-skilled worker
stands to gain significantly upon a job-to-job move due to the intra-employer competition. Consequently,
the employer has a strong incentive to backload wage payments as much value to the high-skilled worker
1
will be delivered upon a job-to-job transition. In fact, Lise and Postel-Vinay (2016) drop wages out of
unemployment in their estimation due to the strength of this mechanism.115 I give the worker some explicit
bargaining power (λ > 0) to dampen this effect.
This bargaining protocol also which distinguishes this model from Lise and Postel-Vinay (2016) who
use the bargaining protocol of Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002). Future gains beyond S(x,y) accrue to the
new employer Lise and Postel-Vinay (2016), because λ is zero. This assumption results in the worker and
the employer not taking the gains from a future job-to-job move into account when determining whether
to form the match. Here, expected gains from future moves not only affect wages today as in Lise and
Postel-Vinay (2016), but they also affect the job selection decision of the worker.116 This occurs because the
worker’s expectation over future gains from a move affects the continuation value of a match when λ is not
zero. In this way, workers care about their potential career path when accepting and declining job offers.
Furthermore, employers care about the risk of a worker being poached when forming a match. Whereas in
Lise and Postel-Vinay (2016), the match value does not take future moves into account, because the gains
from a job-to-job move accrue entirely to the new employer.117
A.3 Surplus and Wages with No Offer Writing Cost
In this appendix, I derive the surplus and wage function in the case where a meeting that fails to deliver a
job-to-job transition may still bid up the wage at the current employer. In this case, the renegotiated share
of the surplus (σ′) is
σ′ = σ(x,y,y′) = λ+ (1− λ)S(x,y
′)
S(x,y)
∈ (0, 1]. (19)
and the value to the employed worker is
Wt(x,y, σ) = wt(x,y, σ)− c(x,y) + βaEtUt+1(x′) + βa(1− δ)(1−Me,t)σEtS˜t+1(x′,y) +
βa(1− δ)Me,t ×
Et
∫
Y
max{λSt+1(x′,y) + (1− λ)Ŝt+1(x′,y′), λSt+1(x′,y′) + (1− λ)Ŝt+1(x′,y)]}dFt(y′)
(20)
where
Ŝt+1(x,y) = max{St+1(x,y), 0}
S˜t+1(x
′,y) =(1− ω)Ŝt+1(x′,y) + ω
∫
Y
max{St+1(x′,y′), 0}dFt(y′)
115See Footnote 25 in Lise and Postel-Vinay (2016).
116Risk neutrality (i.e. linear preferences) makes the total surplus independent of the time profile of wage payments in Lise
and Postel-Vinay (2016). Workers accept and reject offers based on the total surplus which does not depend on expectations
over future gains from offers on-the-job.
117In Lise and Postel-Vinay (2016), workers and employers do care about how workers’ skills evolve as a result of forming the
match as they do here. In this way, workers care about their potential skill evolution when selecting a job. However, the path
of future skill requirements does not affect the value of match and thus does not affect job selection.
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subject to (1). We can now derive the following surplus and wages as in the main section. The value of
producing now solves
Pt(x,y, σ) = ft(x,y)− wt(x,y, σ) + βa(1− δ)(1−Me,t)(1− σ)EtS˜t+1(x′,y) +
β(1− δ)Me,t(1− λ)Et
∫
Y
max{0, St+1(x′,y)− Ŝt+1(x′,y′)}dFt(y′). (21)
We can show that the surplus which follows is
St(x,y) = ft(x,y)− c(x,y)− b(x) + βa(1− δ)Et
[
− λMu,t
∫
Y
max{0, St+1(x′, y˜)} dFt(y˜) +(
1−Me,t
) ·max{0, S˜t+1(x′,y)}+
Me,t ·max{0, St+1(x′,y)}+
Me,t · (1− ρ(x,y)) ·
[
λ
(
S¯t+1(x
′,y)− Ŝt+1(x′,y)
)]]
, (22)
S¯t+1(x
′,y) =
∫
Y
1{Ŝt+1(x′,y) < St+1(x′, y˜)} · St+1(x′, y˜) dFt(y˜)∫
Y
1{Ŝt+1(x′,y) < St+1(x′, y˜)}dFt(y˜)
.
(22) is identical to (12). Intuitively, the surplus should not change, because this modification changes the
split of the surplus but not the surplus itself. If employers (who draw y′ such that they cannot poach the
employer) engage in Bertrand competition anyway, then they merely bid up the share of the surplus the
worker’s receives in the current match. These employers do not change the total value of the current match.
However, wages depend on how the worker and employer split the surplus. Hence, the wage function changes
to the following.
wt(x,y, σ) = σft(x,y) + (1− σ)c(x,y) + (1− σ)b(x) + (1− σ)βa(1− δ)×
Et
[
λMu,t
∫
Y
max{0, St+1(x′,y)} dFt(y)−Me,t ·max{0, St+1(x′,y)} −
Me,t · (1− ρ(x,y)) · λ ·
(
S¯t+1(x
′,y′)− Ŝt+1(x′,y)
)]
+
βa(1− δ)Me,t(1− λ)Et
[
ρ(x,y) ·
(
St+1(x
′,y′)− St+1(x′,y′)
)]
. (23)
where
St+1(x
′,y) =
∫
Y
1{St+1(x′,y) ≥ Ŝt+1(x′, y˜)} · St+1(x′, y˜) dFt(y˜)∫
Y
1{St+1(x′,y) ≥ Ŝt+1(x′, y˜)}dFt(y˜)
.
We can also rewrite (13) as
wt(x,y, σ) = σft(x,y) + (1− σ)c(x,y) + (1− σ)b(x) + (1− σ)βa(1− δ)×
Et
[
λMu,t
∫
Y
max{0, St+1(x′,y)} dFt(y)−Me,t ·max{St+1(x′,y), 0} −
Me,t · (1− ρ(x,y)) · λ ·
(
S¯t+1(x
′,y′)− Ŝt+1(x′,y)
)]
+
βa(1− δ)Me,t(1− σ)Et
[
ρ(x,y) ·max{St+1(x′,y), 0}
]
. (24)
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(24) is almost identical to (13) but (1−λ)Me,tρ(S−S) replaces (1−σ)Me,tρS in the continuation value. The
difference in these terms comes from the difference in the bargaining protocols with and without offer writing
costs. Without offer writings costs, the potential outside offers which will not steal the worker still affect the
value of the surplus delivered to the worker in the current match. These potential offers affect the worker’s
expected share of the surplus tomorrow and hence affect the value of the current match. Consequently, the
wage adjusts downward when the expected value for a bidding up offer (S) increases to deliver the surplus
split σ today. In essence, the worker takes lower wages today with a greater expectation that the wage will
be bid up on the job. With offer writing costs, no employer who draws skill requirements with lower surplus
than the current match bids for the worker and hence the worker’s value in the current match remains the
same. As mentioned in section 2.2, this restriction prevents bidding up of wages on-the-job in order to
restrict attention to human capital evolution over job shopping in the model. Both mechanisms can produce
wage growth over a job’s tenure. However quantitatively, the job shopping mechanism tends to generate
large, counterfactual wage jumps on-the-job compared to more gradual wage changes due to human capital
evolution. It also generates counterfactually low and negative wages due to promises of the wages being bid
up over the job tenure. Hence, I assume the offering writing cost to preclude these counterfactuals.
A.4 Nash Bargaining Protocol
In this section, all workers with power λ ∈ [0, 1] bargain with employers à la Nash. Again, I assume the share
of the surplus stays constant until an on-the-job meeting triggers renegotiation. I also assume unemployed
workers accept job offers when indifferent. Hence, workers take a share of the surplus equal to λ. Again,
a job-to-job transition only occurs when the surplus for the poaching employer exceeds that of the current
employer. The unemployed worker’s value function Ut(x) imposing the bargaining protocol does not change
as all unemployed workers Nash bargain in the benchmark model. The employed worker’s value function
Wt(x,y, λ), imposing the bargaining protocol, solves
Wt(x,y) = wt(x,y)− c(x,y) + βaEtUt+1(x′) + βa(1− δ)(1−Me,t)λEtS˜t+1(x′,y) +
βa(1− δ)Me,t ×
λEt
∫
Y
max{Ŝt+1(x′,y), St+1(x′,y′)}dFt(y′), (25)
where
Ŝt+1(x,y) = max{St+1(x,y), 0}
S˜t+1(x
′,y) =(1− ω)Ŝt+1(x′,y) + ω
∫
Y
max{St+1(x′,y′), 0}dFt(y′).
The value of a vacancy Vt solves
Vt = −τt + (1− δ)Mv,tCu,tλEt
∫
Y
∫
X|u
βa max{0, St+1(x,y)}dFt(y)dWt(x|u) +
(1− δ)Mv,tCe,t(1− λ)×
Et
∫
Y
∫
X|e
βa max{0, St+1(x,y)}dFt(y)dWt(x|e) (26)
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whereWt(x|u) andWt(x|e) are the distributions of unemployed and employed workers at time t, respectively.
(26) differs from (7) in that employer do not need to compute expectations over all matches, because the
bargaining power stays the same for all workers. I assume free entry of employers which drives the value of
vacancy to zero so that
τt = (1− δ)Mv,tCu,tλEt
∫
Y
∫
X|u
βa max{0, St+1(x,y)}dFt(y)dWt(x|u) +
(1− δ)Mv,tCe,t(1− λ)×
Et
∫
Y
∫
X|e
βa max{0, St+1(x,y)}dFt(y)dWt(x|e). (27)
The value of producing solves
Pt(x,y) = ft(x,y)− wt(x,y) + βa(1− δ)(1−Me,t)(1− λ)EtS˜t+1(x′,y) +
βa(1− δ)Me,t(1− λ)Et
[
max{0, St+1(x′,y)} · ρ(x,y)
]
(28)
where
ρ(x,y) =
∫
Y
1{St+1(x′, y˜) < St+1(x′,y)}dFt(y˜).
ρ(x,y) is the probability the worker at y does not draw an employer with higher surplus. 1{·} denotes
the indicator function. We can now derive the surplus function using (5), (25), (28), and the free entry
assumption which implies that Vt equals zero. For non-retiring workers, the surplus is
St(x,y) = ft(x,y)− c(x,y)− b(x) + βa(1− δ)Et
[
− λMu,t
∫
Y
max{0, St+1(x′, y˜)} dFt(y˜) +(
1−Me,t
)
S˜t+1(x
′,y) +Me,t · ρ(x,y) ·max{0, St+1(x′,y)}+
λ ·Me,t · (1− ρ(x,y)) · S¯t+1(x′,y)
]
, (29)
S¯t+1(x
′,y) =
∫
Y
1{Ŝt+1(x′,y) < St+1(x′, y˜)} · St+1(x′, y˜) dFt(y˜)∫
Y
1{Ŝt+1(x′,y) < St+1(x′, y˜)}dFt(y˜)
.
This surplus takes on the same form as (12), but the final continuation value consists solely of a fraction
of expected future surplus of the leaving worker. Combining (29), Wt(x,y) = λSt(x,y) + Ut(x), and (25)
produces the following wage equation
wt(x,y) = λft(x,y) + (1− λ)c(x,y) + (1− λ)b(x) + λ(1− λ)βa(1− δ)×
Et
[
Mu,t
∫
Y
max{0, St+1(x′,y)} dFt(y)−
Me,t · (1− ρ(x,y))S¯t+1(x′,y′)
]
. (30)
This wage equation mirrors (13), however the final continuation value differs. The sequential auction results
in a value that is the convex combination of the competing employers’ surpluses.
5
A.5 Equilibrium Concept
Here, I define the general rational expectations equilibrium and explain the difficulties in solving for it outside
of a steady state. I then make the case for a more restrictive but more easily solved partial equilibrium,
which I use to take the model to the data. An equilibrium must consist of the solutions to (5), (6), and
(9) which characterize equilibrium wages (13) given that free entry assumption drives equilibrium Vt (7) to
zero. In general equilibrium, meeting probabilities arise from the measures of employed, unemployed, and
vacancies and the matching function. Hence, we add the t subscript to Mu,t, Mv,t, and Me,t in all the value
functions and include these probabilities in the aggregate state zt. Now we can define the general rational
expectation equilibrium path as follows:
Definition A.1 (Rational Expectations Equilibrium Path). Let ut be measure of unemployed workers at
time t, et be measure of employed workers at time t, vt be the measure of vacancies at time t, φ be the on-the-
job search effort, andm : [0, 1]2 → [0,min(ut+φet, vt)] be a matching function. LetWt(x|e) =
∫
Y
Wt(x,y)dy.
Given {Ft(y)}Tt=0, {ft(x,y)}Tt=0, and initial {e0, u0,W0(x|u),W0(x|u)}, the tuple
{Ut(x),Wt(x,y, σ), Pt(x,y, σ), Vt, wt(x,y, σ),Wt(x|u),Wt(x,y|e)}
form a rational expectations equilibrium path from time 0 to time T if the following hold.118
1. (5), (6), and (9) solve Ut(x), Wt(x,y, σ), and Pt(x,y, σ), respectively
2. wt(x,y, σ) satisfies (13) for all employed workers
3. Vt = 0 at every period t and vt satisfies (8) [Free Entry]
4. Agents form expectations using {Ft(y)}Tt=0 and {ft(x,y)}Tt=0 [Rational Expectations]
5. Mu,t = m(vt,ut+φet)ut+φet , Me,t = φMu,t, Mv,t =
m(vt,ut+φet)
vt
6. et and ut evolve according to (31) and (33), respectively
7. Wt evolves by (1) and according to the transitions in (31) and (33)
The main difficulty with for this equilibrium arises from the last condition. The difficulty lies in the
fact that this worker distribution (Wt) is endogenous and a part of the state space due to the meeting
probabilities (Me,t,Mu,t,Mv,t). Wt evolves in a complicated way even without human capital evolution.
We must track Wt in order to pin down et and ut and thus vt from (8) and consequently everything else
dependent on the meeting probabilities, {Ut,Wt, Pt, Vt, wt}. All these objects must be solved simultaneously,
making this equilibrium intractable to solve for over a multidimensional state space. Here I only note the
difficulty in finding such an equilibrium if one exists. Establishing a proof of existence or uniqueness of this
equilibrium stands as even more challenging. As noted by Menzio and Shi (2011), random search models
like the one here remain difficult to solve outside a steady state, because number of employed workers (et)
and unemployed workers (ut) depend on the entire distribution of workers across employment states and
types.119 This distribution is not fixed outside of a steady state.
118For completeness, Cu,t = utut+φet , Ce,t =
φet
ut+φet
.
119it in Equation 34 exists for accounting purposes, since et + ut + it = N where N is the number of agents in the model.
There is no population growth, so a new agent fills the place of a dead agent − often referred to as cloning in the search and
matching literature.
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et+1 =
∫
Y
∫
X|u
(1− ξa)Mu,t1{St+1(x,y) > 0}dFt(y)dWt(x|u)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
U2E
+ (31)
∫
X|e
(1− ξa)(1− δ)Me,tetdWt(x|e) +∫
X|e
(1− ξa)(1− δ)(1−Me,t)(1− ω)etdWt(x|e) +∫
X|e
(1− ξa)(1− δ)(1−Me,t)ωet1{St+1(x,y) > 0}dFt(y)dWt(x|e)−[ ∫
X|e
(1− ξa)δet dWt(x|e)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Exogenous E2U
+
∫
Y
∫
X|e
(1− ξa)(1− δ)(1−Me,t)ωet1{St+1(x,y) ≤ 0}dFt(y)dWt(x|e)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Endogenous E2U
+
∫
X|e
ξaetdWt(x|e)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
E2I
]
(32)
ut+1 = µait︸︷︷︸
Entrants
+
∫
X|e
(1− ξa)δet dWt(x|e)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Exogenous E2U
+
∫
Y
∫
X|e
(1− ξa)(1− δ)(1−Me,t)ωet1{St+1(x,y) ≤ 0}dFt(y)dWt(x|e)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Endogenous E2U
+
∫
X|u
(1− ξa)(1−Mu,t)utdWt(x|u) +
∫
Y
∫
X|u
(1− ξa)Mu,t1{St+1(x,y) ≤ 0}dFt(y)dWt(x|u)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
U2U
−
[∫
Y
∫
X|u
(1− ξa)Mu,t1{St+1(x,y) > 0}dFt(y)dWt(x|u)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
U2E
+
∫
X|u
ξautdWt(x|u)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
U2I
]
(33)
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it+1 = (1− µa)it +
∫
X|e
ξaetdWt(x|e)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
E2I
+
∫
X|u
ξautdWt(x|u)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
U2I
(34)
The directed search literature circumvents this problem, because directed search makes the meeting prob-
abilities independent of the distribution of worker types across employment states and types (Menzio and
Shi, 2011; Menzio, Telyukova, and Visschers, 2016). Employers post wages to induce a self-selection of job
applicants. Job applicants self-sort and apply in different submarkets, making the meeting probabilities
depend only on the number of applicants as all applicants are the same type.
However, this achievement comes at some costs. First, employers attract specific worker types rules
out any notion of skill mismatch, which some evidence suggests plays a significant role in wage dispersion
(Slonimczyk, 2013). Second, the most recent innovations in directed search models with worker heterogeneity
like Menzio, Telyukova, and Visschers (2016) only introduce discrete skills (i.e. age and experience) to my
knowledge, which appear ill-equip to handle continuous multidimensional skill like cognitive and manual
skills. While seemingly not discussed in the literature, this discreteness appears to contribute significantly to
the existence of the block recursive equilibrium. An infinite number of submarkets would need to exist given
a continuum of worker types in cognitive and manual skills in order to separate out each multidimensional
skill type across submarkets. However, an infinite number of submarkets and no mass points for any one
worker type suggests that in the limit there will be only one worker in each submarket queue who is hired
with certainty. In this limiting case, it seems directed search implements the outcome from an assignment
model with job destruction and productivity shocks, because search frictions do not emerge in submarkets
with a continuum of types. Overcoming this drawback likely requires discretizing the skill types, which
reenforces the first drawback. Wage differentials due to skill mismatch will be attributed to noise in such a
model after collapsing the support of worker types.
Workers and employers face the same distribution of skill requirements in this model, because employer
draw skill requirements after meeting the worker. This assumption along with free entry and exogenous
meeting probabilities remove the endogenous distribution of worker types or employer types from the state
space along a rational expectations equilibrium path. These assumptions eliminate the problem of tracking
the endogenous distribution of worker types, however they make the model a partial equilibrium model.
While restrictive, these assumptions keep the model tractable while permitting enrichment of the model with
multidimensional skills (a necessity to generate secular, non-monotonic changes in the wage distribution).
Postel-Vinay and Moscarini (2009) and Robin (2009) also assume exogenous meeting rates to examine labor
market dynamics in response to aggregate productivity shocks.
Hawkins and Acemoglu (2014) state that exogenous meeting rates make such a model unsuitable for
general equilibrium analysis. In this model, the partial equilibrium misses out on general equilibrium feedback
to the meeting rates.120 Estimating meeting rates (Me,t, Mu,t) which change over time may approximate to
the general equilibrium solution. However, it is difficult to say how well such a solution approximates the
general equilibrium solution without computing the general equilibrium solution. But the general equilibrium
solution will also have to generate the same moments (i.e. transition rates) as the partial equilibrium solution
to estimate its structural parameters, thus estimating (Me,t, Mu,t) to match a target over time may improve
120Hawkins and Acemoglu (2014) do not provide any evidence as to how important this feedback is, let alone whether it
is important enough to make the partial equilibrium analysis unsuitable for long-run macro level analysis of wages and job
selection. This question along with how directed search may resolve this issue are future avenues for research.
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the approximation.
A.6 Identification
Provided a sufficiently rich panel data set, we can jointly identify the parameters of the parametric model in
Section 4. The following argument only serves to show an identification strategy of the estimated parameters
and provide guidance on what moments to target in lieu of the necessary, rich data to implement such a
strategy. I target moments carrying much of the same information as the argument ascribes. This identifi-
cation argument assumes known values for the externally calibrated parameters discussed in Section 4.3 (β˜,
θ0, ξa) and a given λ. It builds on the argument in Lise and Postel-Vinay (2016) but exploits workers in
the terminal period of work life rather than a closed form solution. The data necessary parallels the NLSY
panel described in Appendix B.5 but includes workers in the terminal period of work life and their terminal
x as well as gives the reason for a job separation.121
Assume we observe initial and terminal x’s (with age) in the data as well as wages without measurement
error, yt, and employment status. Let ti be the first period a worker i’s work life and Ti be the last
possible period of a worker’s work life. The maximum wage possible for workers age Ti − ti + 1 at time
t is wt(x,y, σ) = ft(y,y;αt) = xG
[
α0,t + yC(αC,t + αCC,txC) + yM (αM,t + αMM,txM )
]
. Given xG, wage
differentials of maximum wages across y for worker’s age Ti − ti + 1 at time Ti identify αC,t, αCC,t, αM,t,
αMM,t at Ti. The level (average) of these maximum wages for worker’s age Ti − ti + 1 pins down α0,t
conditional on xG. This argument gives αt’s conditional on xG. Implicitly, we align the model to the data
assuming maximum wages across y in the model correspond to maximum wages in the data. This imposition
and the level of maximum wages also pin down the alignment parameters (ζC , ζM ) conditional on xG, because
xˆζii = yi at the maximum wage for i = C,M .
122
Wage differentials of identical workers (xC , xM , age,y) pin down the θ1 parameter for the i.i.d. random
variable ε. Wage differences for such terminal period workers only arise due to ε. Knowing the distribution
of ε, wage differentials of workers (xC(0), xM (0),y) age t and t+ 1 hired upon entry pin down (γ1, γ2). With
(θ1, γ1, γ2), the distribution of xG is identified at time t up to some constant γ0 given the observed Vt(x).
Thus, the maximum wages for workers age Ti − ti + 1 at time t along with wage differentials for entering
workers where the unemployment duration approaches zero (i.e. hired upon entry) separately identify αt
and the parameters of xG upon to some constant γ0.
Thus, sufficient wage and (x,y) observations for workers in their initial period provide information to
identify (γ1, γ2, θ1). While, sufficient wage and (x,y) observations for workers in their terminal period
provide information to identify αt, ν’s, and κ’s. Ultimately, wage differentials across y help determine
αt and conditional wage moments help determine (γ1, γ2). I capture these features with changes in wage
percentiles, mean wages, wage variance, changes in occupational wages, and the coefficients of age and age2 in
a regression of initial skills and skill requirements. These moments provide information on wage differentials
across y. θ1 affects the dispersion of wages of similarly skilled workers in high skill requirement occupations,
thus the right tail of wages serve to capture this information on θ1.
Given (αt, λ,x,y), comparisons of wage differentials and employment matches for workers age Ti− ti + 1
hired from unemployment separately identify (νC , νM , κC , κM ).123 For example, consider age Ti − ti + 1
121The CPS identifies “leavers" and “losers" as the reason for unemployment, referring to voluntary and involuntary unem-
ployment on the part of the worker (IPUMS-CPS, University of Minnesota, 2016).
122This argument requires maximum wages across y correspond to some workers in the terminal period so that we observe x̂
in the data.
123Obviously, we are unlikely to observe workers hired out of unemployment in the period before retirement in the data,
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workers hired from unemployment identical in (y, ε, xM ) but not xC where xC < yC for some and xC = yC
for the others. The wage differential (conditional on xC and αt) between these two groups at time Ti identifies
κC .124 Alternatively, we can identify (νC , νM , κC , κM ) using the set of all observed matches for workers age
Ti − t1 + 1. St for a worker in the terminal period can be written as
St(x,y) = xG
[
α0,t + αC,tyC + αM,tyM + αCC,tyCxC + αMM,tyMxM − b0 +
−νC(xC − yC)2 − ν(xM − yM )2 +
−(κC − νC) min{xC − yC , 0}2 − (κM − νM ) min{xM − yM , 0}2
]
.
We observe the set of acceptable offers given x {y : St(x,y) ≥ 0} and thereby observe its boundary set
{y : St(x,y) = 0}. We observe x from workers initial and terminal skills. Consider a case where xC > yC ,
xM = yM , and y ∈ {y : St(x,y) = 0}, then we have
0 = α0,t + αC,tyC + αM,tyM + αCC,tyCxC + αMM,ty
2
M − b− νC(xC − yC)2
which identifies νC up to the scalar b0 given αt. Similar comparisons yield (νM , κC , κM ) up to scale, hence
comparisons of acceptable jobs to workers with similar x provides information to identify (νC , νM , κC , κM ).
I incorporate this information through the observed cross correlations of (xC(0), xM (0), yC , yM ).
Conditional on the rest of the model parameters, Γd is identified by comparing the set of accepted
jobs for entering workers with the same starting x(0) but different initial unemployment spell lengths.
Skills depreciate during unemployment spells, thus the job a worker obtains out of unemployment carries
information about how fast skill depreciate. Intuitively, skills could not have depreciated to the point where
the worker’s x does not generate positive surplus with the employer y. Conditional on the rest of the model’s
parameters, differences in the set of jobs for initially identical workers come from x, which consists of known
x(0), known unemployment spell duration, and unknown Γd. Observing {y : St(x,y) = 0}, Γd is identified
conditional on all the other parameters. In practice, I target the average level and dispersion of wage drops
following an unemployment spell to estimate the two parameters of Γd. Conditional on the other model
parameters, Γd governs wage drops following an unemployment spells in the same spirit as comparisons of
acceptance sets for identical workers.
Identification of Γh comes from again comparing workers with similar starting skills but experience dif-
ferent employment-unemployment spell lengths. Given the other model parameters (∆) and the observed set
{y : St(x,y) = 0}, we can write the surplus function for an entering worker who experiences as unemployment
spell one period followed by employment as
0 = ft(x,y)− c(x,y)− b(x) + Ω(x′,y; ∆),
x = x(0) + ΓD ·max{x(0),0},
x′ = x+ ΓH ·max{y − x,0}+ ΓD ·max{x− y,0}
where Ω is the continuation value solving backwards to obtain St+1 given model parameters ∆. Given Γd,
making the direct application of this strategy impractical. This argument only serves to argue identification of the estimated
parameters exists.
124Coming out of unemployment wipes the history of workers. Thus knowing λ, it is possible to identify (νC , νM , κC , κM )
with all wages of workers coming out of unemployment given x. However, such an argument also requires knowledge of other
parameters like Γd, Γh and those of Ft(y). Using workers in the terminal period eliminates the need to know parameters that
enter the continuation value to identify (νC , νM , κC , κM ).
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the only unknown is Γh which is identified up to scale with the observed set {y : St(x,y) = 0}. Given Γh
and Γd, the sequence {x(t)}Tit=ti can be identified for each worker based on (17).125
Conditional on the other parameters, Ft(y) is identified over the union of all sets where y is acceptable to
an x, i.e.
⋃
Y {y : St(x,y) ≥ 0}. All potential employers draw skill requirements from the same distribution
independently, however changes in skill requirements do not map one-to-one to changes in employment shares
over
⋃
Y {y : St(x,y) ≥ 0}. Nonetheless, employment shares across y map out Ft(y) given the other model
parameters that define St. Thus, I target changes in employment shares for occupational group in practice.
All endogenous separations are mutual through the lens of the model and result from changes in Ft(y)
and a permanent productivity shock (ω). Thus, δ shocks create involuntary unemployment whereas ω shocks
may result in voluntary unemployment. Thus, the average ratio of voluntary to involuntary unemployment
and the average employment-to-unemployment (E2U) transition rate identify δ and ω given Ft(y). The
unemployment-to-employment (U2E) transition rate at time t identifies Mu,t given all other parameters.
The employment-to-employment (E2E) transition rate at time t identifies Me,t given all other parameters.
Finally, we can solve backwards and write the wage continuation value as a function Ω of b0 given all
other parameters ∆. Wages out of unemployment then identify b0 given ∆ and x as shown in (35).
(1− λ)b(x) + Ω(b0; ∆) = wt(x,y, λ; ∆)− λft(x,y; ∆) + (1− λ)c(x,y; ∆). (35)
Thus, b0 is identified up to scale conditional on all other parameters. This completes the argument for joint
identification of the parameters. As mentioned, I target moments related to the information contained in
such an identification strategy even though the data does not permit its full implementation.
B Data Appendix
B.1 Current Population Survey (1979-2010)
I use the Current Population Survey’s Outgoing Rotation Group (CPS ORG), because of its timespan,
informational content, frequency, and comparability over time. These features make it more appropriate for
my use than other nationally representative surveys like the SIPP, PSID, or SCF. The CPS ORG provides
monthly data from as far back as 1979 and covers every year up to 2016 (National Bureau of Economic
Research, 2016). I make use of the CEPR Uniform Data Extracts for the CPS ORG (Center for Economic
and Policy Research, 2017). The CEPR constructs monthly extracts from the NBER Merged ORG extracts
from 1979 to 1993 and the CPS Basic data from 1994 onwards. I use these extracts from CEPR and their
publicly available programs to construct a consistent, monthly dataset from 1979 to 2010 of the CPS Outgoing
Rotation Group year by year. These extracts contain monthly cross-sectional data on earnings, employment
status, occupation and industry codes, age, educational attainment, gender, and self-employment status
among other variables. These CPS ORG extracts contain about 25,000 records each month before merging
with the occupational skill scores and imposing sample restrictions, which I describe later.
125
Ω(x′,y; ∆) = βa(1− δ)
[
− λMu,t
∫
Y
max{0, St+1(x′, y˜)} dFt(y˜) +
(
1−Me,t
)
S˜t+1(x
′,y) +Me,t · ρ(x,y) ·max{0, St+1(x′,y)} +
Me,t · (1− ρ(x,y)) ·
[
Ŝt+1(x
′,y) + λ
(
S¯t+1(x
′,y)− Ŝt+1(x′,y)
)]]
.
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B.1.1 Wage Measurement, Top-Coding, and Imputation
Schmitt (2003) provides a detailed discussion of issues related to measuring hourly wages with the CPS
ORG. I summarize the main issues here with respect to wage measurement, top-coding (commonly known
as censoring), and imputation.
The CPS ORG wage records arguably provide a more accurate wage measure than the CPS March
Supplement as they measure most wages (approximately 60%) at a point in time (Mishel, Bivens, Gould,
and Shierholz, 2012; Lemieux, 2006).126 For consistency purposes, I exclude overtime, tips, and commission
(otc) from hourly wage records. The complicated nature of when and how the CPS reports this compensation
makes it intractable to create a sensible series including otc for these records over more than a few years as
noted in Mishel, Bivens, Gould, and Shierholz (2012) and Schmitt (2003).127 The remaining 40% of ORG
records report a constructed measure of hourly wages using weekly earnings and usual hours worked per
week, which includes otc by the construction of weekly earnings. This measurement contains substantially
more measurement error compared to the point in time measure (Lemieux, 2006). The March CPS permits
only a constructed measure of hourly or weekly earnings from total earnings, weeks worked, and usual hours
worked each week. Consequently, the measurement error in the March CPS wages seems significantly higher
than the ORG as documented by Lemieux (2006). Hence, ORG wage records arguably provide a more
accurate wage measure even though they do not measure all wages at a point in time.
Each year, 1-3% of these 40% of ORG records exceed the top-code threshold except in the 1980s where the
share grows due to nominal earnings growth with no increase in the top-code threshold. Following Schmitt
(2003) with the CEPR programs, I impute these top-coded weekly earnings using a log-normal imputation.
The imputation estimates the mean of the wage distribution by gender above the top-code threshold and
replaces the top-coded wage with this value. The log-normal imputation procedure provides for a smoother
wage series over time in terms of mean and variance than the commonly used Pareto imputation (Schmitt,
2003). As seen in Schmitt (2003), these top-coded records have little impact on wage percentiles − a key
measurement of interest here − compared to the wage mean and variance.
B.1.2 Occupational Code Harmonization
The CPS employs the Census occupational coding structure which is derived from the Standard Occupational
Classification (SOC) and the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS). Major occupational
coding changes in 1983 and 2003 and a minor change in 1992 complicate the construction of a consistent
set of occupational code from 1979 to 2010. These changes introduces discontinuities in employment shares
and average wages by occupation over time. The coding change in 1983 introduces 64 new occupational
titles while the 2003 coding change reduces the number of titles by collapsing and expanding occupational
categories.128 Dorn (2009) provides a crosswalk to create a balanced panel of occupations from 1983 onward.
This balanced panel consists of aggregated occupational categories shown in his Appendix Table 2. I use
this occ1990dd crosswalk to harmonize the occupational titles from 1979 to 2010, which results in 246
occupations on which to construct DOT/ONET scores. From 1979 to 1983, occupational employment shares
and average wages cannot be constructed for 64 occupations, because they only begin to appear in 1983.
These occupational titles range from human resource managers to occupational therapists to locksmiths to
126These hourly wage records also rarely cross the top-coding threshold of 99.99, so I follow Schmitt (2003) and make no
top-coding adjustment on them.
127In many cases, reconstructing hourly wages from weekly earnings in order to include otc for these records produces hourly
wages that imply otc is counterfactually negative.
128See Dorn (2009) Appendix Table 1.
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machine feeders. Discontinuities persist in occupational series (e.g. cognitive skills, employment shares)
with this harmonized set of occupational titles. I apply the method of Mishel, Schmitt, and Shierholz (2013)
and smooth any occupation related series at the major coding break years 1983 and 2003. This adjustment
produces series similar to the original series overall but with slight differences. For example, Figure 26 shows
the slight magnitude differences in employment share and occupational wage changes. The only patterns
change comes from average low-skilled wages falling in the 2000s while still maintaining their relative distance
from medium and high-skilled average wages.
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Figure 26: Occupational Coding Break Adjustment
B.2 Dictionary of Occupational Titles (1977, 1991)
The Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT) provides measures related to the job requirements for 12,099
occupational titles (U.S. Department of Labor, 1991). Job analysis reports serve as the source of the mea-
sures, and these reports come from combinations of on-site observation, interviews, and external information
(e.g. information from trade associations) (Yamaguchi, 2012). Job analysis measures the “worker attributes
that contribute to successful job performance" (U.S. Department of Labor, 1991). However, the DOT mea-
sures these attributes based on tasks the worker performs rather than the worker skills. This distinction along
with the use of external information arguably justifies treating DOT measures as constructed independently
of the workers’ skills at the time of measurement. Thus, these measures allow me to construct cognitive and
manual measure analogous to y in the model. In contrast, DOT’s modern replacement O*NET (Occupa-
tional Information Network) collects data directly from incumbent workers, making it more difficult to argue
independence of worker skills at the point of measurement (O*NET, 2016). The DOT is also updated over
the time period of interest as a Revised Fourth Edition emerged in 1991 in addition to the Fourth Edition
in 1977 whereas O*NET provides no time variation in task measurements over the period considered.129
129O*NET provides waves for only 2008 and 2013 as of now. I explore the possibility of mapping the DOT to O*NET over
time using job attributes that appear in both datasets. I conclude that the differences between the DOT and O*NET are too
vast to permit a full, consistent mapping of task measures across these two datasets.
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Of course, the DOT is not without its own shortcomings − many of which O*NET aims to improve upon.
Miller, Treiman, Cain, and Roos (1980) provide a critical review of the DOT. These criticisms include the
limited time dimension of DOT updates and its outmoded nature with respect to new occupations. The
occupation coding change in 2003 presents a challenge for using the DOT beyond 2000 as it introduces new
occupational titles. Yamaguchi (2012) drops observations beyond the year 2000 for this reason. However,
this work aims to understand wage and occupational structure changes up to 2010. Hence, I construct DOT
measures for these new occupations using weighted combinations of older but similar occupational titles and
validate these imputed measures with O*NET measures. These new occupational titles consists mainly of
informational and technology occupations like computer support specialists and computer software engineers.
The ICPSR distributes DOT measures for the 1980 and 1990 Census occupational codes for DOT (1977)
and DOT (1991), respectively. England and Kilbourne (1980) and the U.S. Department of Labor, U.S.
Employment Service, and the North Carolina Occupational Analysis Field Center (1991) produce these DOT
measures by aggregating the 12,099 occupational titles of the DOT to the Census occupation level. To do so,
they make use of the April 1971 CPS Monthly File and the so-called Treiman file, which ultimately record
a sample of the Census in DOT and Census 1970 and 1980 occupational titles.130 Using this matching
file, they take weighted averages of the DOT measures to aggregate to the Census occupational level. I
match these Census occupational codes to the occ1990dd harmonized occupational code and aggregate again,
taking weighted averages of the DOT measure to reach the occ1990dd level. I use the respective Census
weights for this procedure. This procedure compresses the variance in these measures, thus it likely leads
to underestimating the true level of dispersion among the DOT task measures. However, the literature
commonly uses such averaging to aggregate the DOT or O*NET to a level to merge with the NLSY or CPS
(Dorn, 2009; Acemoglu and Autor, 2011; Yamaguchi, 2012; Lise and Postel-Vinay, 2016).131 I retain the
measures from the DOT shown in Table 13 and a measure of the physical strength a job requires.
Table 13: DOT Task Complexity Measures
Name Ability
G General Learning Ability Learn, reason, and make judgments
V Verbal Ability Understand use words effectively
N Numerical Ability Understand and perform mathematical functions
S Spatial Ability Visualize three dimensional objects from two dimensions
P Form Perception Perceive and distinguish graph detail
Q Clerical Perception See and distinguish verbal details
K Motor Coordination Coordinate eyes, hands, fingers
F Finger Dexterity Finger and manipulate small objects
M Manual Dexterity Handle placing and turning motions
E Eye-Hand-Foot Coordination Motor responsiveness to visual stimuli
C Color Discrimination Match and discriminate colors
Source: U.S. Department of Labor (1991).
These measures range from 1 to 5 where 1 indicates the most complex usage of the ability and 5 indicates
the least complex.
130Autor, Levy, and Murnane (2003) describe this procedure thoroughly in their Section A.2.
131Sanders (2016) puts all weight on the disaggregated occupation with the highest employment share when aggregating up
to the Census level to merge the NLSY and O*NET.
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B.3 CPS-DOT Construction and Sample Restrictions
I construct an annual CPS-DOT dataset to analyze wage and employment share trends. I impose some
restrictions on the data, which can be followed in Table 14. First, I restrict the sample to the population
aged 18 to 65. Second, I restrict the sample to include only observations with a valid wage and occupational
code. This restriction eliminates all unemployed workers and workers out of the labor force. Third, I
merge the DOT to the CPS based on the harmonized occ1990dd occupational code. I impute occupations
with missing scores using weighted average DOT scores from similar occupations based on occupational
descriptions. For example, I impute the DOT measures for occupation “secretary (not specific)" using all
other types of secretaries.132 I drop some observations after merging in the DOT or O*NET due to dropping
armed forces members and unpaid family farm workers. Finally, I keep all non-self-employed workers aged
18 to 64, and I follow the literature in eliminating implausibly low or high values by dropping wage records
below $1 or above $100 in 1989 terms (Lemieux, 2006). I show the remaining number of valid cases per
annum in the last column of Table 14. Table 16 present demographic and distributional statistics for the
sample at the start and end years.
B.4 O*NET Comparability
I use the same procedure described for DOT to construct a CPS-O*NET dataset. O*NET lists occupations
using the Standard Occupation Classification (SOC) system. I use a crosswalk from National Crosswalk
Service Center (2016) to map SOC codes from 2000 and 2010 into Census occupation codes and hence the
occ1990dd harmonized code.133 I select measures from O*NET that align with the DOT measurements
based on their descriptions. In some cases, multiple O*NET measures correspond to the DOT measure. For
instance, O*NET element IDs 1A1a1-1A1a4 correspond to verbal ability. In other cases, a single O*NET
measure corresponds to the DOT measure like manual (M) and finger (F) dexterity and color discrimination
(C). As described in 3.2, I use the first principle component of general learning ability, verbal ability, and
numerical ability measures to construct the cognitive skill score weighted using the CPS ORG weight. I
use the first principle component of the other measures (S, P, Q K, M, F, E, C, Strength) to construct the
manual skill score. I then linearly rescale the scores into the interval [0, 1]. The U.S. Department of Labor
updated the DOT in 1991, and O*NET replaced it in the 2000s. I show the DOT and O*NET cognitive and
manual skill scores at all occupations with both scores during the 1990s decade of transition in Figure 27.
13290% of all missing scores come from this one occupational title.
133I modify the crosswalk manually like Sanders (2016) and impute some O*NET measures as some SOC codes correspond to
multiple Census codes and vice versa. Approximately, 70% of the codes map one-to-one.
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Table 14: Sample Size Post-Restrictions
Year Ages 18-65 Valid Wage/Occupation DOT/O*NET Additional Restrictions
1979 266,575 161,561 161,561 160,648
1980 313,645 188,230 188,230 187,097
1981 295,931 176,963 176,963 176,031
1982 285,736 167,249 167,249 166,322
1983 283,371 165,764 165,653 164,598
1984 279,684 168,976 168,878 167,839
1985 279,892 172,193 172,086 171,046
1986 273,846 170,856 170,757 169,673
1987 272,186 171,887 171,780 170,693
1988 258,132 164,745 164,647 163,629
1989 262,498 168,233 168,122 167,308
1990 276,736 176,903 176,769 175,820
1991 273,160 171,936 171,797 170,900
1992 268,355 169,499 169,484 168,702
1993 264,119 167,325 167,304 166,438
1994 256,178 162,647 162,623 161,749
1995 252,855 162,280 162,265 161,409
1996 223,258 144,821 144,820 144,070
1997 225,572 147,579 147,579 146,857
1998 225,754 149,332 149,332 148,563
1999 227,599 151,478 151,478 150,783
2000 229,056 153,224 153,224 152,441
2001 244,931 163,121 163,121 162,174
2002 266,531 175,260 175,260 174,243
2003 265,775 172,124 172,124 171,090
2004 261,571 169,246 169,246 168,189
2005 261,116 170,297 170,297 169,159
2006 258,747 169,606 169,606 168,540
2007 256,367 167,882 167,882 166,600
2008 255,574 165,984 165,984 164,588
2009 258,110 161,110 161,110 159,837
2010 257,936 159,431 159,431 158,209
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Figure 27: DOT to O*NET from 1992 to 2002
The DOT and O*NET cognitive scores line up well. It is not unreasonable to allow the O*NET score
to be an affine transformation of the DOT score as shown by the red line in the left panel of Figure 27.
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Table 15: CPS-DOT Summary Statistics
1979 2010
Age Shares (%)
Age 18-24 22.29 12.95
Age 25-34 28.84 23.98
Age 35-44 20.03 23.18
Age 45-54 17.11 24.47
Age 55-64 11.73 15.42
Education Attainment (%)
Less than High School 19.94 7.48
High School Diploma 38.62 29.37
Some college 22.82 30.08
College 12.94 21.98
Advanced 5.67 11.08
Female Share (%) 43.44 48.71
Occupation (%)
Management & Professional 27.83 40.27
Administrative & Retail Sales 25.06 22.14
Low-Skill Services 12.02 16.32
Production & Craft 4.46 2.64
Operators, Assemblers & Inspectors 11.99 3.81
Transportation, Construction, & Mining 18.65 14.82
Distribution of y
Mean of yC 0.388 0.436
Mean of yM 0.445 0.413
Standard Deviation of yC 0.206 0.208
Standard Deviation of yM 0.143 0.150
Correlation (yC , yM ) -0.017 -0.111
Mean of Log Wage 2.810 2.906
Variance of Log Wage 0.261 0.376
Sample Size 160,648 158,209
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However, the manual scores do not line up well. The noise introduced by numerous O*NET measures
corresponding to the (S, P, Q K, M, F, E, C, Strength) measures accounts for some of this difference.
In additional, improvements made to measurement on these task aptitudes and possible changes in task
content within occupational titles over time account for some of this difference. However, the data does not
permit us to distinguish these three items even with identical occupational titles and their DOT and O*NET
measures. From this exercise, I conclude that mapping DOT to O*NET appears only reasonable in the case
of a limited set of task measurements − in particular the cognitive measurement and measurements that
correspond exactly (e.g. manual and finger dexterity). Thus, they do not permit a full mapping across time.
A trade off exists between losing information and losing consistency over time. For the reasons described in
B.2, I use the DOT for estimation of the model.
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Figure 28: DOT v. O*NET (1979 to 2010)
Constructing cognitive and manual skill requirement scores from DOT versus O*NET results in a different
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distribution of equilibrium y. However, the main differences occur in the levels and not the evolution of the
series as Figure 28 shows.134 The left panel of Figure 28 indicates moments of y according to the DOT task
measures and the right panel indicates those same moments according to analogous O*NET measures. The
mean of cognitive (manual) skills increases (decreases), and cognitive skills become more dispersed over time
for both. They also agree as to the decelerating decline in the correlation between cognitive and manual
skills. However, they contradict in terms of whether manual skills become more dispersed over time. This
difference comes at no surprise given the right panel of Figure 27.
B.5 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (1979, 1997)
The National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) provides ability measures analogous to the DOT task
complexity measures. These measures provide a means to construct Vt(x) and examine the joint distribution
of (x(0),y). The panel and national representative features of the NLSY also provide a means to estimate
other data features like the average fall in wages following an unemployment spell. The 1979 cohort consists
of 12,686 males and females (Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor, 2014a), while the 1997
cohort consists of 8,984 (Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor, 2014b). Around half of
the observations in each cohort come from an oversample of blacks, Hispanics, and non-black/non-Hispanic
economically disadvantaged youth. I drop these respondents, leaving 8,998 and 7,127 respondents for the
NLSY79 and NLSY97, respectively.
B.5.1 Construction of Vt(x)
As described in 3.3, I use the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) test scores to construct
x(0). The ASVAB test consists of scores for mathematics knowledge, arithmetic reasoning, word knowledge,
paragraph comprehension, numerical operations, general science, coding speed, auto and shop information,
mechanical comprehension, and electronics information (Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of
Labor, 2014a,b). Raw scores between NLSY79 and NLSY97 are not readily comparable for two reasons.
First, NLSY79 respondents did a pencil and paper test whereas their 97 counterparts did a computerized
test. Segall (1997) accounts for this difference and provides comparative ASVAB scores and weights which
I use. Second, the two cohorts took the exam at different ages. NLSY79 took the exam from aged 15 to
22 while NLSY97 took the exam aged 12 to 17. I follow Altonji, Bharadwaj, and Lange (2012) and do a
percentile based age mapping of the Segall scores to make the two cohort scores comparable.
Taking these transformed scores, I extract the first two principle components of all the ASVAB scores,
and rotate them using the two restrictions on the loading matrix. I restrict mathematical knowledge to
load only on cognitive skills, and I restrict auto and shop information to load only on manual skills. Then
I linearly rescale these rotated scores into the interval [0, 1] to form (x˜C(0), x˜M (0)). I employ principle
component analysis here instead of separating the measures into categories, because some of the ASVAB
measures do not categorize as easily as the DOT or O*NET measures like electronics information. This x˜(0)
does not necessarily align with the estimate y. I perform the following steps to align x˜(0) with y. First, I
merge y from the first recorded occupation for the 1979 respondents. Next, I run a log-log regression aimed
at minimizing the discrepancy between initial skills and initial job requirements. This step normalizes the
level of potential skill mismatch (i.e. the gap between worker skill and job skill requirements). Then, I take
the fitted values of x˜(0) − call them x̂(0) − and use them to construct V(x) for the two cohorts.135 I show
134I smooth the time series of the moments to reduce sampling noise using Lowess with the optimal bandwidth.
135I also allow a transformation of x̂(0) into x(0) in the estimation to better align it with y.
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the marginal distributions for this V̂1979(x) and V̂1997(x) in Figure 29.136
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Figure 29: NLSY79 v. NLSY97 Marginal Distributions
The comparable distributions of initial skill show some small changes between the two cohorts. However,
the striking similarity of x(0) across cohorts also suggests that it remains reasonable to treat the distribution
of x(0) as fixed given educational attainment and gender shares. This result is not surprising given that
Boehm (2017) uses a similar approach to measure his x(0) and finds little change in the correlation structure
of skill scores between the two cohorts. Thus, V̂1979(x) forms the basis for V0(x). I reweigh V̂1979(x) to
reflect changing educational attainment and rising female labor force participation to obtain Vt(x) over
time. This approach remains sensible only if the distribution of cognitive and manual skill remains similar
within education-gender cells of cohorts. Figure 30 shows that this appear to be the case in terms of gender.
The marginal distributions for females look similar between the two cohorts although manual skills appear to
skew more positively for the 1997 cohort. The two cohorts also appear similar with respect to the marginal
distribution given an education level. For example, the comparable marginal distributions for cognitive skills
at different education attainment levels look similar after adjusting for the time of the ASVAB test shown
in Figure 31.
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Figure 30: NLSY79 v. NLSY97 Marginal Distributions for Females
136I use an Epanechnikov kernel with the optimal bandwidth selected for Figure 29.
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Figure 31: NLSY79 v. NLSY97 Distribution of Cognitive Skills by Highest Grade Completed
My estimate of Vt(x) only reflects changes in the initial skill distribution due to changes between shares
of education and gender groups rather than changes in the distribution of skill within gender and education
groups. Thus, Vt(x) amplifies the initial manual skill bias between males and females shown in Figure 32
as the share of females rises as shown in Figure 34. It also yields an increase in worker cognitive skills
shown in Figure 33 as education attainment rises as shown in Figure 34. Comparing NLSY cohorts shows
that changes in initial skill within these groups (Figures 30, 31) appear less dramatic than changes in the
shares of these groups (Figure 34). This evidence suggests my construction of Vt(x), holding the within
group distribution fixed, reasonable. However, we need more cohorts to definitively argue for this restriction,
which are unavailable at this time.
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Figure 32: NLSY1979 Initial Skills by Gender
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B.5.2 Construction of Monthly Panel and Sample Restrictions
I construct a monthly panel of workers from the NLSY79 job array. The job array reports the weekly
start and end dates of job spells and identifying job numbers. I merge in the corresponding wages, Census
occupational codes, and usual hours worked associated with the job numbers. I also merge in demographic
data, including gender, race, age, years of schooling, and highest grade completed. I drop oversampled black,
Hispanic, and economically disadvantaged workers. I convert monthly-level wages to real 2014 dollar wages
using the CPI-U-RS series to make NLSY wages comparable to the CPS-DOT wages. I impute top-coded
wages using the same method described in B.3, and trim wages below $1 or above $100 in 1989 terms. For
workers with multiple jobs within a month, I select the job with the highest earnings that month. I merge in
workers’ initial cognitive and manual skills along with DOT and O*NET job skill requirements constructed
in the previous section. Due to accelerating attrition, I limit the panel to cover only up to 1993 as discussed
in Lise and Postel-Vinay (2016). Finally, I reconstruct the sampling weight as in Boehm (2017) and Altonji,
Bharadwaj, and Lange (2012) to produce a final weight accounting for attrition, missing ASVAB scores, and
hours worked at the job. This process results in a monthly panel of 5,747 male and female workers from
1979 to 1993. Table 16 presents summary statistics of the sample.
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Table 16: NLSY79-DOT Summary Statistics
1979-1993
Female Share (%) 52.20
Educational Attainment (%)
Less than High School 8.49
High School Diploma 34.37
Some college 25.06
College+ 32.08
Occupation (%)
Management & Professional 29.89
Administrative & Retail Sales 22.71
Low-Skill Services 16.43
Production & Craft 3.15
Operators, Assemblers & Inspectors 8.16
Transportation, Construction, & Mining 19.65
Distribution of x̂(0)
Mean of x̂C(0) 0.439
Mean of x̂M (0) 0.611
Standard Deviation of x̂C(0) 0.191
Standard Deviation of x̂M (0) 0.129
Correlation of (x̂C(0), x̂M (0)) 0.427
Joint Distribution of (y, x̂(0))
Correlation of (yC , x̂C(0)) 0.354
Correlation of (yM , x̂M (0)) 0.080
Correlation of (yC , x̂M (0)) 0.122
Correlation of (yM , x̂C(0)) -0.041
1979 1993
Mean of Log Wage 2.462 2.889
Variance of Log Wage 0.148 0.338
Sample Size (Individuals) 5,747
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B.6 Occupational Wage and Employment Changes
The literature commonly presents job polarization as changes in employment shares across the occupational
skill distribution. Authors typically rank disaggregated occupations by their mean wage, median wage or
education attainment rather than grouping occupations into major categories. They then plot smoothed
changes in employment shares across these ranks. A U-shape plot rising at the bottom and the top reveals
job polarization either in absolute or relative terms. Absolute means that the bottom and top employment
shares rise. Relative means either the top or the bottom employment shares rise, while the middle-skill
employment shares shrink the most.
Mishel, Schmitt, and Shierholz (2013) and Lefter and Sand (2011) analyze evidence regarding job and
polarization. Both conclude that the evidence fails to some extent to support the narrative of routine-biased
technical change as put forward by Autor, Levy, and Murnane (2003) and developed in Acemoglu and
Autor (2011) and Boehm (2017) among others. Their critique centers on two pieces of evidence. First, job
polarization appears to show similar patterns in the 1980s and 1990s. Thus, factor driving job polarization
seem unlikely candidates to account for the abrupt switch from expansion to contraction in the lower half of
the wage distribution from the 1980s to the 1990s. Second, the weak correlation between occupational wages
and employment shares does not intuitively support a demand-driven story of technological change. Lefter
and Sand (2011) use the CPS March supplement and the decadal Census. Mishel, Schmitt, and Shierholz
(2013) use the CPS ORG as I do.
I replicate and extend their figures to 2010, ranking occupation using 1979 average wages. Like Mishel,
Schmitt, and Shierholz (2013), I smooth over occupational breaks in 1983 and 2003, replacing the wage
and employment share changes for each occupation those years with the average change two years before
and after the coding break. I exclude farmers and other small sized occupations like wall paper hangers. I
extrapolate employment shares and average wages in 1979 for the new 64 occupations that appear in 1983
in order to rank them.137 I extrapolate using a fractional polynomial time trend. I validate this procedure
by extrapolating employment shares and average wages for occupations observed in 1979 and comparing the
predictions to their actual values in 1979. This procedure generates predictions with a correlation of 0.91 for
the true average occupational wage and 0.95 for the true occupational employment share in 1979. I interpret
these correlation as strong support for the procedure. I then rank these occupations using their predicted
1979 wages.
The top left panel of Figure 35 confirms the findings of Mishel, Schmitt, and Shierholz (2013) and Lefter
and Sand (2011). Job polarization in the 1980s evolved similarly to the 1990s. The main difference comes
from job polarization becoming absolute in the 1990s whereas it is only relative in the 1980s. In other words,
the middle-ranked or middle-skilled occupations still shrank relative to the lowest ranked occupations even
though these lowest ranked occupations contracted relative to all occupations in the 1980s. In the second
row of left panel, I show the figure for the period covered by Mishel, Schmitt, and Shierholz (2013). In the
third row of left panel, I add the extended years to this figure. In the last row of the left panel, I show
changes in employment shares from the dates of occupational coding breaks. Thus, the smoothing the breaks
plays no role in shaping this figure. All of these figures suggest a long-run trend towards job polarization.
However, the lack of job polarization from 1983 to 1991 suggests this change accelerates in shorter episodes
as Hershbein and Kahn (2016) suggests. Figure 36 shows that primarily men drive these patterns across the
occupational skill distribution as the patterns become more pronounced if looking at only men.
137These occupations compose roughly 10-20% of all occupations from 1983 onwards. Excluding them due to their absence in
1979 is misleading. Figures without them show no relative job polarization in the 1980s.
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The right panel of Figure 35 shows corresponding changes in occupational wages. Changes in occupational
wages appear to be similar across occupations in the 2000s, polarizing in the 1990s, and expanding in the
(early) 1980s. This change parallels wages overall. However, changes in the overall wage distribution will
be affected by wage changes within occupational ranks and the concentration of workers across occupations
(shown in Figure 37). The latter of which does not appear to change much. In contrast to employment
shares, Figure 36 shows that women primarily drive patterns in occupation wages across the occupational
skill distribution in the 1980s.
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Figure 35: Occupational Employment and Wage Evolution
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Figure 36: Occupational Employment and Wage Evolution (Men Only)
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C Additional Results
Table 17: Model Variants
I Perfect Foresight Benchmark
II No Foresight (Et[zt+1] = zt ∀t)
III Fixed skill supply distribution (Vt(x) = V0(x) ∀t)
IV Fixed human capital (ΓH = 0, ΓD = 0)
V No matching frictions/Homogeneous specific human capital
VI F(y) fixed
VII f(x,y) fixed
VIII αM = 0, αMM = 0, νM = 0, κM = 0
IX Nash Bargaining
X Vt(x) not adjusted for female labor force participation
XI Repeated Stationary Model, ΓD = 0, ΓH = 0
Table 18: Model Accuracy on Targets
RMSE Goodness of Fit
I 0.02740 0.946
II 0.02817 0.943
III 0.02532 0.954
IV 0.02370 0.960
V 0.08812 0.445
VI 0.03872 0.893
VII 0.03679 0.903
IX 0.02760 0.946
X 0.02741 0.946
Note: RMSE refers to the root-mean squared error of the model and target moments. Goodness of fit refers to the share of
variation in the targets explained by the model.
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Table 19: Model Fit (1/2)
Data I II III
Log Change in Employment Shares
1979-1989
High 0.159 0.156 0.162 0.164
Medium -0.102 -0.098 -0.107 -0.111
Low 0.034 0.014 0.020 0.034
1989-2000
High 0.171 0.167 0.186 0.170
Medium -0.125 -0.132 -0.146 -0.135
Low 0.003 0.009 -0.011 0.009
2000-2010
High 0.026 0.017 0.034 0.021
Medium -0.039 -0.042 -0.049 -0.041
Low 0.031 0.031 0.025 0.031
Log Change in Occupational Wage
1979-1989
High 0.011 0.025 0.016 0.033
Medium -0.056 -0.023 -0.049 -0.034
Low -0.078 -0.079 -0.096 -0.080
1989-2000
High 0.100 0.142 0.090 0.120
Medium 0.050 0.058 0.064 0.052
Low 0.079 0.093 0.115 0.077
2000-2010
High 0.031 0.057 0.048 0.058
Medium 0.029 0.043 0.030 0.033
Low -0.029 -0.001 0.010 0.004
Log Change in Wage Percentiles
1979-1989
90 0.053 0.034 0.035 0.046
50 -0.018 -0.021 -0.034 -0.032
10 -0.137 -0.127 -0.121 -0.136
1989-2000
90 0.133 0.130 0.120 0.132
50 0.065 0.112 0.105 0.087
10 0.115 0.114 0.092 0.108
2000-2010
90 0.091 0.060 0.048 0.065
50 0.026 0.039 0.039 0.029
10 0.011 -0.005 0.002 -0.018
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Table 20: Model Fit (2/2)
Data I II III
Distribution of y
Mean of yc
1980s 0.401 0.405 0.420 0.423
1990s 0.419 0.417 0.449 0.430
2000s 0.432 0.430 0.473 0.442
Standard Deviation of yc
1980s 0.204 0.180 0.199 0.193
1990s 0.205 0.182 0.201 0.193
2000s 0.207 0.183 0.203 0.196
Mean of ym
1980s 0.436 0.417 0.445 0.432
1990s 0.422 0.403 0.426 0.412
2000s 0.416 0.387 0.409 0.397
Standard Deviation of ym
1980s 0.143 0.158 0.144 0.140
1990s 0.146 0.158 0.145 0.141
2000s 0.149 0.159 0.144 0.139
Correlation of (yc, ym)
1980s -0.031 -0.029 -0.030 -0.022
1990s -0.079 -0.074 -0.078 -0.080
2000s -0.114 -0.107 -0.094 -0.112
Log Wage
Mean
1980s 2.783 2.782 2.790 2.800
1990s 2.799 2.810 2.822 2.816
2000s 2.896 2.910 2.908 2.891
Standard Deviation
1980s 0.549 0.578 0.589 0.581
1990s 0.575 0.615 0.620 0.613
2000s 0.598 0.624 0.637 0.629
Distribution of x(0) and y
corr(xc(0), yc)
1980-1987 0.303 0.403 0.382 0.399
1988-1993 0.457 0.430 0.408 0.419
corr(xm(0), ym)
1980-1987 0.078 0.083 0.064 0.065
1988-1993 0.083 0.053 0.050 0.040
Aggregate Job Flows
Job-to-Job 0.032 0.024 0.035 0.032
Employment-to-Unemployment 0.015 0.016 0.015 0.017
Unemployment-to-Employment 0.261 0.266 0.277 0.262
UE Wage Differential (%) -0.205 -0.234 -0.273 -0.243
Post-Unemployment Average Wage Drop (%) -0.264 -0.430 -0.447 -0.417
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Figure 38: Correlation of x(0) and y: NLSY79 vs. Model Cohort
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Figure 39: Mean (left) and Standard Deviation (right) Wage-Age Profile
C.1 Demographic Heterogeneity
The model has two demographic dimensions − gender and age. Generally, the model matches aggregate
features and changes well but performs less well in capturing the patterns of young workers and different
outcomes by gender. For example, the model replicates the pattern of rising and flattening wage dispersion
over age (Figure 12). However, it does not match the magnitude of the increase in wage dispersion for
young workers compared to the increase seen in the NLSY79 cohort (Appendix Figure 39). The model also
replicates average mobility rates and their decline over age but fails to match the initial sharp decline in
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Figure 40: Transition Rates by Age
the job-to-job and employment-to-unemployment rates among young workers (Appendix Figure 40).138 In
addition, the model matches the correlation between initial cognitive and manual skills and skill requirements
for prime age (30-54) workers. But it fails to capture the increase in this correlation for younger workers
as they age (Appendix Figure 38). In essence, young workers appear indistinguishable from prime age
workers in terms of endogenous labor market transitions and sorting. Importantly, the employment and
wage trends observed remain when restricting to prime age workers in the data, which makes accounting for
youth outcomes non-pivotal.
The model distinguishes genders only in the sense that their endowment distributions of cognitive and
manual skills differ (Appendix Figure 32). This distinction along these skill dimensions remains insufficient
to account for differing occupational employment and wage outcomes between genders as Appendix Figures
41, 42, 43, and 44 show.139 Only slight differences in emerge for the genders in the model for their pay
and allocation of jobs. Whereas the data shows large differences in changes in their occupational wage
and employment. For instance, middle-skilled wages rose for women each decade but declined for men in
the 1980s. Naturally, only slight differences emerge in the model, because their within-gender marginal
distributions of cognitive skills look almost identical. Endowed manual skills differ, but the model judges
cognitive skills as far more valuable than manual skills. Furthermore, manual skills adjust rather quickly as
138The decline in job-to-job and employment to unemployment switching occurs naturally with ageing, because workers
settle into better matches (via human capital accumulation or transitions) as seen in Lise and Postel-Vinay (2016) and Menzio,
Telyukova, and Visschers (2016). The decline in unemployment to employment occurs over age, because workers’ life expectancy
declines. This decline lowers the value of the surplus at any job and increases the chances of exit before finding a job, reesulting
in less unemployment to employment transitions with age.
139Cortes, Jaimovich, and Siu (2016) document gender differences in terms of exiting the labor market across education levels,
which accounts for some of these differences across genders. Workers do not exit based on gender here.
34
we shall see next. Thus, the gender-education based endowment of skills input into the model fails to result
in dramatically different outcomes for men and women.140
140Another factor like job preferences (Yamaguchi, 2012) or another skill like interpersonal skills (Jaimovich, Siu, and Cortes,
2017) may reconcile differences in occupational wage and employment outcomes for men and women.
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Figure 41: Employment Share Changes: Men (left) vs. Women (right)
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Figure 42: Occupational Wage Changes: Men (left) vs. Women (right)
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Figure 43: Wage Changes: Men
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Table 23: ft(x,y) Parameters at Sample Dates
I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X
α0,t=0 1.314 -8×10−5 1.306 0.794 0.176 1.918 -1.970 3.067 1.314 1.306
α0,t=121 -1.495 -1.905 -1.479 -1.846 -1.713 -1.082 − 0.744 -1.583 -1.566
α0,t=267 -1.950 -1.542 -1.090 -1.985 -3.352 -0.932 − 0.555 -2.040 -1.614
α0,t=335 -2.376 -1.348 -1.441 -2.358 -3.505 -1.273 − 0.0373 -2.572 -2.327
α0,t=384 -2.683 -1.208 -1.694 -2.627 -3.615 -1.518 − -0.336 -2.956 -2.841
αC,t=0 20.26 19.56 19.23 17.08 1.111 16.11 24.17 17.79 20.26 18.73
αC,t=121 20.27 19.77 19.37 17.67 -0.792 14.84 − 18.54 20.27 17.95
αC,t=267 19.80 18.18 19.36 17.42 -3.211 14.06 − 18.54 20.51 18.51
αC,t=335 19.65 18.16 18.87 17.11 -4.360 13.69 − 18.34 20.73 18.29
αC,t=384 19.54 18.14 18.51 16.88 -5.187 13.43 − 18.19 20.90 18.13
αM,t=0 -0.775 1.247 -1.283 -0.110 -2.492 0.0360 -0.0169 0 -0.702 -1.283
αM,t=121 -0.853 0.646 -1.423 -0.575 0.392 0.0507 − 0 -0.661 -1.491
αM,t=267 -0.516 0.571 -1.423 -0.250 7.762 -0.00679 − 0 -1.644 -1.564
αM,t=335 -0.0161 0.403 -0.817 0.140 9.815 -0.252 − 0 -1.143 -0.943
αM,t=384 0.344 0.282 -0.379 0.421 11.29 -0.429 − 0 -0.783 -0.496
αCC,t=0 9.914 10.62 8.379 6.067 25.57 8.373 -2.501 7.444 10.41 9.063
αCC,t=121 21.23 16.62 21.01 17.74 35.39 22.77 − 15.76 20.84 22.48
αCC,t=267 31.83 24.52 32.68 29.33 41.19 36.96 − 28.82 32.26 33.44
αCC,t=335 33.37 26.56 34.95 30.75 43.01 38.21 − 30.58 33.90 35.85
αCC,t=384 34.48 28.04 36.58 31.77 44.32 39.12 − 31.85 35.07 37.59
αMM,t=0 8.427 8.877 8.615 11.88 -3.117 11.25 7.914 0 8.552 8.631
αMM,t=121 9.055 10.14 10.46 12.61 -8.731 12.70 − 0 9.023 11.40
αMM,t=267 6.261 6.174 8.193 6.352 -17.44 12.77 − 0 6.228 10.00
αMM,t=335 6.069 4.174 7.701 6.305 -19.99 13.81 − 0 6.036 10.24
αMM,t=384 5.930 2.733 7.347 6.271 -21.83 14.57 − 0 5.897 10.41
41
Table 24: Ft(y) Parameters at Sample Dates
I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X
rt=0 -0.160 -0.0464 -0.0700 -0.110 -0.264 -0.238 -0.103 -0.0100 -0.169 -0.0700
rt=121 -0.240 -0.0974 -0.150 -0.199 -0.405 − -0.182 0.884 -0.249 -0.135
rt=267 -0.313 -0.313 -0.277 -0.303 -0.482 − -0.199 -0.405 -0.323 -0.342
rt=335 -0.236 -0.175 -0.192 -0.142 -0.505 − -0.199 -0.123 -0.303 -0.193
rt=384 -0.181 -0.0753 -0.130 -0.0254 -0.521 − -0.199 0.0808 -0.290 -0.0850
aC,t=0 1.200 1.100 1.200 1.198 1.568 1.200 1.200 1.169 1.231 1.200
aC,t=121 1.188 1.100 1.173 1.150 1.556 − 1.285 1.187 1.219 1.113
aC,t=267 1.421 1.228 1.405 1.437 1.784 − 1.487 1.331 1.453 1.330
aC,t=335 1.387 1.140 1.390 1.385 1.758 − 1.466 1.327 1.418 1.315
aC,t=384 1.361 1.076 1.379 1.347 1.738 − 1.451 1.324 1.393 1.304
bC,t=0 2.625 2.062 2.156 2.505 4.964 2.500 2.250 1.942 2.656 2.156
bC,t=121 2.667 2.062 2.108 2.505 4.960 − 2.194 1.942 2.698 2.123
bC,t=267 2.659 2.032 2.062 2.495 5.008 − 2.255 1.940 2.690 2.079
bC,t=335 2.614 1.955 1.969 2.388 5.010 − 2.255 1.820 2.646 2.079
bC,t=384 2.582 1.900 1.902 2.311 5.012 − 2.255 1.733 2.614 2.079
aM,t=0 2.765 3.450 3.242 3.200 3.942 2.820 3.712 3.080 2.765 3.250
aM,t=121 2.755 3.306 3.141 3.260 3.924 − 3.579 2.930 2.755 3.164
aM,t=267 2.484 3.269 2.873 2.828 3.730 − 3.363 2.758 2.484 2.929
aM,t=335 2.454 3.246 2.843 2.773 3.740 − 3.354 2.770 2.454 2.899
aM,t=384 2.432 3.229 2.821 2.734 3.746 − 3.347 2.778 2.432 2.877
bM 6.073 8.987 9.813 8.004 10.87 8.773 14.83 7.913 6.018 9.828
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Figure 46: Creating Lower Tail Compression in II
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Figure 47: I Estimates with No Foresight
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Figure 49: Employment Shares at Wage Percentiles (CPS)
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Table 25: Learning Frictions Decomposition (1/2)
Data I IV V
Log Change in Employment Shares
1979-1989
High 0.159 0.156 0.159 0.150
Medium -0.102 -0.098 -0.094 -0.113
Low 0.034 0.014 0.049 0.028
1989-2000
High 0.171 0.167 0.181 0.142
Medium -0.125 -0.132 -0.111 -0.129
Low 0.003 0.009 0.006 0.001
2000-2010
High 0.026 0.017 0.029 0.029
Medium -0.039 -0.042 -0.041 -0.044
Low 0.031 0.031 0.037 0.030
Log Change in Occupational Wage
1979-1989
High 0.011 0.025 0.042 0.040
Medium -0.056 -0.023 -0.052 -0.050
Low -0.078 -0.079 -0.051 -0.102
1989-2000
High 0.100 0.142 0.136 0.119
Medium 0.050 0.058 0.071 0.033
Low 0.079 0.093 0.083 0.058
2000-2010
High 0.031 0.057 0.070 0.038
Medium 0.029 0.043 0.036 0.028
Low -0.029 -0.001 -0.005 -0.031
Log Change in Wage Percentiles
1979-1989
90 0.053 0.034 0.037 0.093
50 -0.018 -0.021 -0.028 -0.030
10 -0.137 -0.127 -0.140 -0.162
1989-2000
90 0.133 0.130 0.129 0.122
50 0.065 0.112 0.108 0.127
10 0.115 0.114 0.102 0.098
2000-2010
90 0.091 0.060 0.061 0.081
50 0.026 0.039 0.044 0.025
10 0.011 -0.005 -0.007 0.008
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Table 26: Learning Frictions Decomposition (2/2)
Data I IV V
Distribution of y
Mean of yC
1980s 0.401 0.405 0.410 0.496
1990s 0.419 0.417 0.422 0.499
2000s 0.432 0.430 0.437 0.508
Standard Deviation of yC
1980s 0.204 0.180 0.183 0.110
1990s 0.205 0.182 0.187 0.112
2000s 0.207 0.183 0.190 0.115
Mean of yM
1980s 0.436 0.417 0.449 0.439
1990s 0.422 0.403 0.436 0.420
2000s 0.416 0.387 0.420 0.401
Standard Deviation of yM
1980s 0.143 0.158 0.147 0.143
1990s 0.146 0.158 0.148 0.144
2000s 0.149 0.159 0.149 0.142
Correlation of (yC , yM )
1980s -0.031 -0.029 -0.044 -0.007
1990s -0.079 -0.074 -0.100 -0.080
2000s -0.114 -0.107 -0.105 -0.108
Log Wage
Mean
1980s 2.783 2.782 2.792 2.787
1990s 2.799 2.810 2.831 2.810
2000s 2.896 2.910 2.914 2.892
Standard Deviation
1980s 0.549 0.578 0.577 0.504
1990s 0.575 0.615 0.615 0.565
2000s 0.598 0.624 0.632 0.589
Distribution of x(0) and y
corr(xC(0), yC)
1980-1987 0.303 0.403 0.394 .
1988-1993 0.457 0.430 0.446 .
corr(xM (0), yM )
1980-1987 0.078 0.083 0.094 .
1988-1993 0.083 0.053 0.095 .
Aggregate Job Flows
Job-to-Job 0.030 0.019 0.030 0.009
Employment-to-Unemployment 0.015 0.016 0.016 0.021
Unemployment-to-Employment 0.261 0.266 0.270 0.104
U-to-E Wage Differential (%) -0.205 -0.234 -0.243 -0.152
Unemployment Spell Average Wage Drop (%) -0.264 -0.430 -0.381 -0.504
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Table 27: Ft(y) and ft(x,y) Decomposition (1/2)
Data I VI VII
Log Change in Employment Shares
1979-1989
High 0.159 0.156 0.157 0.167
Medium -0.102 -0.098 -0.037 -0.094
Low 0.034 0.014 -0.060 -0.005
1989-2000
High 0.171 0.167 0.075 0.158
Medium -0.125 -0.132 -0.046 -0.111
Low 0.003 0.009 -0.006 -0.013
2000-2010
High 0.026 0.017 -0.053 0.044
Medium -0.039 -0.042 0.021 -0.038
Low 0.031 0.031 0.016 -0.002
Log Change in Occupational Wage
1979-1989
High 0.011 0.025 0.045 0.028
Medium -0.056 -0.023 -0.016 0.018
Low -0.078 -0.079 -0.080 0.006
1989-2000
High 0.100 0.142 0.119 0.037
Medium 0.050 0.058 0.099 0.086
Low 0.079 0.093 0.082 0.088
2000-2010
High 0.031 0.057 0.059 0.032
Medium 0.029 0.043 0.010 0.028
Low -0.029 -0.001 0.038 0.030
Log Change in Wage Percentiles
1979-1989
90 0.053 0.034 0.054 0.049
50 -0.018 -0.021 -0.027 0.044
10 -0.137 -0.127 -0.137 0.015
1989-2000
90 0.133 0.130 0.088 0.067
50 0.065 0.112 0.107 0.097
10 0.115 0.114 0.154 0.121
2000-2010
90 0.091 0.060 0.043 0.031
50 0.026 0.039 0.025 0.036
10 0.011 -0.005 0.002 0.063
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Table 28: Ft(y) and ft(x,y) Decomposition (2/2)
Data I VI VII
Distribution of y
Mean of yC
1980s 0.401 0.405 0.383 0.404
1990s 0.419 0.417 0.392 0.426
2000s 0.432 0.430 0.391 0.444
Standard Deviation of yC
1980s 0.204 0.180 0.176 0.192
1990s 0.205 0.182 0.176 0.194
2000s 0.207 0.183 0.176 0.194
Mean of yM
1980s 0.436 0.417 0.390 0.421
1990s 0.422 0.403 0.388 0.409
2000s 0.416 0.387 0.388 0.398
Standard Deviation of yM
1980s 0.143 0.158 0.141 0.121
1990s 0.146 0.158 0.142 0.122
2000s 0.149 0.159 0.141 0.122
Correlation of (yC , yM )
1980s -0.031 -0.029 -0.066 -0.049
1990s -0.079 -0.074 -0.057 -0.085
2000s -0.114 -0.107 -0.071 -0.118
Log Wage
Mean
1980s 2.783 2.782 2.783 2.796
1990s 2.799 2.810 2.823 2.859
2000s 2.896 2.910 2.897 2.933
Standard Deviation
1980s 0.549 0.578 0.567 0.596
1990s 0.575 0.615 0.583 0.589
2000s 0.598 0.624 0.582 0.578
Distribution of x(0) and y
corr(xC(0), yC)
1980-1987 0.303 0.403 0.447 0.400
1988-1993 0.457 0.430 0.475 0.424
corr(xM (0), yM )
1980-1987 0.078 0.083 0.107 0.164
1988-1993 0.083 0.053 0.097 0.123
Aggregate Job Flows
Job-to-Job 0.030 0.019 0.026 0.001
Employment-to-Unemployment 0.015 0.016 0.016 0.017
Unemployment-to-Employment 0.261 0.266 0.253 0.251
U-to-E Wage Differential (%) -0.205 -0.234 -0.267 -0.185
Unemployment Spell Average Wage Drop (%) -0.264 -0.430 -0.401 -0.393
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Table 29: Skil Content Decomposition (1/2)
Data I III X VIII
Log Change in Employment Shares
1979-1989
High 0.159 0.156 0.164 0.151 0.189
Medium -0.102 -0.098 -0.112 -0.102 -0.107
Low 0.034 0.014 0.035 0.038 0.021
1989-2000
High 0.171 0.167 0.171 0.165 0.148
Medium -0.125 -0.132 -0.135 -0.128 -0.120
Low 0.003 0.009 0.009 0.016 0.033
2000-2010
High 0.026 0.017 0.022 0.021 0.036
Medium -0.039 -0.042 -0.040 -0.036 -0.044
Low 0.031 0.031 0.030 0.027 0.023
Log Change in Occupational Wage
1979-1989
High 0.011 0.025 0.032 0.032 0.051
Medium -0.056 -0.023 -0.035 -0.015 -0.014
Low -0.078 -0.079 -0.081 -0.079 -0.111
1989-2000
High 0.100 0.142 0.121 0.135 0.144
Medium 0.050 0.058 0.052 0.066 0.038
Low 0.079 0.093 0.077 0.090 0.137
2000-2010
High 0.031 0.057 0.059 0.053 0.091
Medium 0.029 0.043 0.036 0.044 0.055
Low -0.029 -0.001 0.006 0.016 -0.023
Log Change in Wage Percentiles
1979-1989
90 0.053 0.034 0.045 0.041 0.053
50 -0.018 -0.021 -0.033 -0.017 -0.008
10 -0.137 -0.127 -0.137 -0.099 -0.154
1989-2000
90 0.133 0.130 0.132 0.133 0.152
50 0.065 0.112 0.087 0.099 0.087
10 0.115 0.114 0.107 0.116 0.105
2000-2010
90 0.091 0.060 0.066 0.062 0.095
50 0.026 0.039 0.030 0.039 0.045
10 0.011 -0.005 -0.015 0.005 -0.001
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Table 30: Skill Content Decomposition (2/2)
Data I III X VIII
Distribution of y
Mean of yC
1980s 0.401 0.405 0.423 0.419 0.419
1990s 0.419 0.417 0.430 0.426 0.426
2000s 0.432 0.430 0.442 0.439 0.429
Standard Deviation of yC
1980s 0.204 0.180 0.193 0.191 0.196
1990s 0.205 0.182 0.193 0.193 0.198
2000s 0.207 0.183 0.196 0.194 0.199
Mean of yM
1980s 0.436 0.417 0.432 0.437 0.449
1990s 0.422 0.403 0.413 0.416 0.431
2000s 0.416 0.387 0.397 0.401 0.405
Standard Deviation of yM
1980s 0.143 0.158 0.140 0.140 0.144
1990s 0.146 0.158 0.141 0.140 0.146
2000s 0.149 0.159 0.139 0.140 0.149
Correlation of (yC , yM )
1980s -0.031 -0.029 -0.022 -0.018 0.141
1990s -0.079 -0.074 -0.080 -0.080 0.133
2000s -0.114 -0.107 -0.112 -0.117 -0.138
Log Wage
Mean
1980s 2.783 2.782 2.799 2.797 2.781
1990s 2.799 2.810 2.815 2.829 2.827
2000s 2.896 2.910 2.890 2.912 2.905
Standard Deviation
1980s 0.549 0.578 0.581 0.579 0.573
1990s 0.575 0.615 0.613 0.605 0.610
2000s 0.598 0.624 0.630 0.620 0.633
Distribution of x(0) and y
corr(xC(0), yC)
1980-1987 0.303 0.403 0.398 0.407 0.371
1988-1993 0.457 0.430 0.419 0.415 0.406
corr(xM (0), yM )
1980-1987 0.078 0.083 0.063 0.074 0.026
1988-1993 0.083 0.053 0.040 0.037 0.030
Aggregate Job Flows
Job-to-Job 0.030 0.019 0.021 0.020 0.027
Employment-to-Unemployment 0.015 0.016 0.017 0.017 0.014
Unemployment-to-Employment 0.261 0.266 0.262 0.256 0.267
U-to-E Wage Differential (%) -0.205 -0.273 -0.243 -0.247 -0.291
Unemployment Spell Average Wage Drop (%) -0.264 -0.447 -0.417 -0.430 -0.417
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Table 31: Nash Bargaining (1/2)
Data I IX
Log Change in Employment Shares
1979-1989
High 0.159 0.156 0.154
Medium -0.102 -0.098 -0.108
Low 0.034 0.014 0.026
1989-2000
High 0.171 0.167 0.161
Medium -0.125 -0.132 -0.117
Low 0.003 0.009 -0.011
2000-2010
High 0.026 0.017 0.020
Medium -0.039 -0.042 -0.046
Low 0.031 0.031 0.033
Log Change in Occupational Wage
1979-1989
High 0.011 0.025 0.019
Medium -0.056 -0.023 -0.018
Low -0.078 -0.079 -0.059
1989-2000
High 0.100 0.142 0.120
Medium 0.050 0.058 0.046
Low 0.079 0.093 0.093
2000-2010
High 0.031 0.057 0.057
Medium 0.029 0.043 0.030
Low -0.029 -0.001 0.013
Log Change in Wage Percentiles
1979-1989
90 0.053 0.034 0.040
50 -0.018 -0.021 -0.007
10 -0.137 -0.127 -0.127
1989-2000
90 0.133 0.130 0.112
50 0.065 0.112 0.107
10 0.115 0.114 0.105
2000-2010
90 0.091 0.060 0.057
50 0.026 0.039 0.039
10 0.011 -0.005 0.001
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Table 32: Nash Bargaining (2/2)
Data I IX
Distribution of y
Mean of yC
1980s 0.401 0.405 0.411
1990s 0.419 0.417 0.422
2000s 0.432 0.430 0.435
Standard Deviation of yC
1980s 0.204 0.180 0.176
1990s 0.205 0.182 0.178
2000s 0.207 0.183 0.180
Mean of yM
1980s 0.436 0.417 0.415
1990s 0.422 0.403 0.402
2000s 0.416 0.387 0.387
Standard Deviation of yM
1980s 0.143 0.158 0.158
1990s 0.146 0.158 0.157
2000s 0.149 0.159 0.158
Correlation of (yC , yM )
1980s -0.031 -0.029 -0.014
1990s -0.079 -0.074 -0.066
2000s -0.114 -0.107 -0.129
Log Wage
Mean
1980s 2.783 2.782 2.760
1990s 2.799 2.810 2.782
2000s 2.896 2.910 2.882
Standard Deviation
1980s 0.549 0.578 0.567
1990s 0.575 0.615 0.603
2000s 0.598 0.624 0.605
Distribution of x(0) and y
corr(xC(0), yC)
1980-1987 0.303 0.403 0.426
1988-1993 0.457 0.430 0.442
corr(xM (0), yM )
1980-1987 0.078 0.083 0.089
1988-1993 0.083 0.053 0.054
Aggregate Job Flows
Job-to-Job 0.030 0.019 0.018
Employment-to-Unemployment 0.015 0.016 0.016
Unemployment-to-Employment 0.261 0.266 0.254
U-to-E Wage Differential (%) -0.205 -0.273 -0.234
Unemployment Spell Average Wage Drop (%) -0.264 -0.447 -0.431
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Figure 53: Nash Bargaining
54
Table 33: Repeated Stationary Model (1/3)
Data XI
Log Change in Employment Shares
1979-1989
High 0.159 0.167
Medium -0.102 -0.082
Low 0.034 -0.021
1989-2000
High 0.171 0.202
Medium -0.125 -0.159
Low 0.003 0.011
2000-2010
High 0.026 -0.082
Medium -0.039 0.081
Low 0.031 -0.021
Log Change in Occupational Wage
1979-1989
High 0.011 0.031
Medium -0.056 -0.105
Low -0.078 -0.041
1989-2000
High 0.100 0.053
Medium 0.050 0.093
Low 0.079 0.078
2000-2010
High 0.031 0.045
Medium 0.029 0.022
Low -0.029 0.031
Log Change in Wage Percentiles
1979-1989
90 0.053 0.005
50 -0.018 -0.026
10 -0.137 -0.214
1989-2000
90 0.133 0.153
50 0.065 0.062
10 0.115 0.128
2000-2010
90 0.091 0.016
50 0.026 0.022
10 0.011 -0.027
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Table 34: Repeated Stationary Model (2/3)
Data XI
Distribution of y
Mean of yC
1979 0.388 0.402
1989 0.411 0.419
2000 0.426 0.439
2010 0.436 0.436
Standard Deviation of yC
1979 0.206 0.189
1989 0.203 0.197
2000 0.206 0.208
2010 0.208 0.208
Mean of yM
1979 0.445 0.447
1989 0.428 0.441
2000 0.418 0.417
2010 0.413 0.437
Standard Deviation of yM
1979 0.143 0.139
1989 0.144 0.151
2000 0.148 0.138
2010 0.150 0.164
Correlation of (yC , yM )
1979 -0.017 0.017
1989 -0.068 -0.068
2000 -0.118 -0.118
2010 -0.111 -0.017
Log Wage
Mean
1979 2.810 2.827
1989 2.783 2.763
2000 2.872 2.859
2010 2.906 2.876
Standard Deviation
1979 0.511 0.515
1989 0.572 0.609
2000 0.583 0.609
2010 0.613 0.620
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Table 35: Repeated Stationary Model (3/3)
Data XI
Aggregate Job Flows
Job-to-Job
1979 0.030 0.022
1989 0.030 0.027
2000 0.030 0.020
2010 0.030 0.019
Employment-to-Unemployment
1979 0.015 0.015
1989 0.014 0.012
2000 0.011 0.012
2010 0.016 0.019
Unemployment-to-Employment
1979 0.291 0.258
1989 0.299 0.290
2000 0.323 0.365
2010 0.162 0.166
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Table 36: Repeated Stationary Model Parameters
1979 1989 2000 2010
ζC 0.787 0.892 0.900 0.892
ζM 1.100 1.100 1.100 1.100
b0 2.544 0.002 2.419 2.456
λ 0.425 0.312 0.412 0.482
γ0 -1.165 -1.339 -1.153 -1.224
γ1 14.671 15.014 14.917 15.014
γ2 -15.527 -16.331 -15.983 -16.194
α0 0.530 1.059 2.303 0.383
αC 14.266 15.781 3.500 11.220
αM 0.049 -0.332 1.222 0.287
αCC 12.055 22.512 28.714 32.897
αMM 12.758 7.435 6.980 5.155
νC 25.529 39.409 28.561 27.645
νM 20.000 0.000 5.888 19.751
κC 92.232 109.517 124.606 149.196
κM 59.777 38.885 92.336 71.590
Mu 0.600 0.417 0.867 0.482
Me 0.120 0.120 0.120 0.120
r -0.285 -0.317 -0.500 -0.450
aC 0.800 1.102 0.700 0.500
bC 2.400 2.337 1.700 1.550
aM 3.500 3.071 3.400 2.951
bM 7.700 6.000 6.984 4.000
θ0 0.044 0.001 0.087 0.062
θ1 2.035 1.008 4.516 14.610
ω 0.010 0.000 0.000 0.019
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Figure 54: Explantory Factors for ∆F(y)
Table 37: Average Task Content by Occupational Group (1979)
High Medium Low
Offshoring Vulnerability 0.425 -0.310 0.148
Routine Intensity -1.246 0.900 -0.025
Interpersonal Intensity 0.863 -0.613 -0.678
Table 38: Correlation in Task Content (1979)
Offshoring Vulnerability Routine Intensity
Routine Intensity -0.200
Interpersonal Intensity -0.060 -0.608
C.2 ∆Ft(y) vs. ∆ in Equilibrium Distribution of y
The distribution of skill demand, Ft(y), serves as the object of interest to infer why skill demand changed
here, because the distribution of y may not reflect skill demand changes. Most reduced-form studies infer
demand changes from the equilibrium wage and employment share changes. If Ft(y) governs the equilibrium
distribution of y, then why estimate at Ft(y)? After all, the object remains difficult to estimate and
the equilibrium distribution of y is available with some caveats. However, selection effects (or sorting)
in equilibrium lead to changes in the equilibrium distribution of y. Also, skill mismatch, changes in the
distribution of x, and search frictions all affect the equilibrium distribution of y. Hence, the observed
equilibrium distribution does not necessarily reflect concurrent skill demand everywhere. Figure 55 shows
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Table 39: Average Industry Concentration by Occupational Group (1979)
High Medium Low
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing, & Hunting 0.001 0.004 0.003
Mining 0.009 0.013 0.003
Construction 0.016 0.096 0.006
Manufacturing 0.151 0.351 0.161
Wholesale & Retail Trade 0.047 0.113 0.379
Transportation & Utilities 0.027 0.071 0.070
Information Services 0.014 0.021 0.006
Financial, Professional, & Business Services 0.230 0.086 0.068
Education and Health Services 0.427 0.156 0.144
Leisure & Hospitality 0.005 0.006 0.006
Other Services 0.005 0.030 0.130
Table 40: 1979 Task Content Variance Decomposition on ∆F(y)
I II III
Offshoring Vulnerability 0.051 0.058 0.128
Routine Intensity 0.025 0.007 0.023
Interpersonal Intensity 0.139 0.070 0.239
Total Variance Contribution 21.9% 10.9% 33.5%
contour plots of the change in the distribution of equilibrium skill requirements and Ft(y) for the model
(III). The model equilibrium distribution of y appears rather misleading compared to Ft(y). Skill demands
in the model polarize much more than the equilibrium distribution of y suggests. This difference illustrates
why we must look at Ft(y) directly to judge how skill demands evolved.
The data’s equilibrium distribution of y exhibits polarization although not as strong as the model’s
skill demands suggests (Figure 56).141 One interpretation of this difference is the model overestimates the
importance of frictions and selection effects, making the equilibrium distribution of y an imperfect but
suitable proxy for Ft(y). Another interpretation of this difference comes from the construction of y in the
data versus the model. y changes little within occupations in the data over time, because the DOT waves
only took place in 1977 and 1991. We also do not observe dispersion in y within occupations due to its
construction at the occupational level. This aggregation means any change in the area will occur roughly in
the same place in the data, whereas changes in an area can be more spread out in the model. This spreading
out within occupations makes skill demand polarization more difficult to see.142 On one hand, aggregation
causes the data to better reflects polarizing in skill demands. On the other, it reduces our power to distill
between various theories as well as demand shifts and selection effects, lessening the credibility of inference
directly from y in the data.
141The model only matches the first and second moments of this distribution.
142Collapsing the model’s equilibrium distribution of y into (yC , yM ) cells shows more polarization. Hence, Figure 56 cannot
rule out the possiblity of a strong role for frictions and selection given the strong possibility that data construction drives it.
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Table 41: Capital Input and Imports Variance Decomposition on ∆F(y)
I II III
∆ Chinese Manufacturing Import Penetration 0.000 0.014 0.003
∆ Capital Investment
Information & Communications Technology 0.001 0.002 0.006
Machinery 0.026 0.023 0.039
Research & Development 0.076 0.047 0.094
Transportation Equipment 0.050 0.001 0.104
Total Variance Contribution 58.8% 28.4% 56.9%
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Figure 55: ∆Ft(y) vs. ∆ in Equilibrium y from 1979 to 2010 (III)
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Figure 56: ∆ in Equilibrium y from 1979 to 2010 (Data)
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